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INTRODUCTION
Few philosophers have achieved as much in so many
areas of human endeavor as has Michael Polanyi.

My study of

Polanyi's philosophical works introduced me to an outstanding and penetrating thinker in the areas of epistemology and.
the philosophy of science, which emphasizes a wide-sweeping
view of the ontology of evolutionary change.

But these works

were themselves grounded in the insights he achieved as a
thinker in the fields of chemistry, economics, and sociology.
And I found that an understanding of these works was helpful
in understanding his philosophical insights.
My study of Polanyi was not a mere perusal of a point
of view.

I encountered his thought in an attempt to discover

insights which mediate between the epistemological methodologies of existential phenomenology and analytic philosophy.
A teacher had recommended reading Polanyi's Tacit Dimension
and Personal Knowledge; and, upon reading them, I became convinced that the notion of tacit knowledge held much promise
for satisfying my search.
But my motive for investigating Polanyi's notion of
tacit knowledge was not strictly a desire to find a mediating
epistemological methodology.

I, like most students of philos-

ophy, wanted more deeply to find some philosophical position
which did more than suggest some point of view or fact of
1
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knowledge, as valuable as such a discovery might be.

Perhaps

I am only dimly reflecting a more wide-sweeping interestiin
the practical import of philosophical thought; but I understood my oKn search to be an attempt to find some rational
guide for ethical life.
I have always believed that some actions and even
beliefs and intents were somehow fundamentally right whereas
others were wrong.

And I am convinced that most rational

and sane persons believe this.

But I have found it difficult

to compartmentalize ethical issues apart from what I actually
think and do, as so many reflective people are capable of
doing.

My acts seem always to be fraught with the reflective

self-criticism:

is.this act right?

there a better way?

Should it be done?

What is wrong with what I'm doing?

Is
And

in so far as my thoughts themselves were considered to be
forms of action, I asked whether in some sense it was ethically correct--and not merely factually correct--to adopt
certain points of view.

In short, I have considered the

ethical search for "riahtness"
and for "good" to have preo
.
eminence over the search for facts or for wide-sweeping points
of vieK which form a context for the facts.
I cannot justify this preference.
~

be justified.

I'm not sure it

But I have not chosen to attempt such a

justification; I have chosen only to be led by this preference into the search for those answers that are most
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meaningful to me.

It forms what Karl Jaspers the Fragestellen,

the context in which all answers appear--the ethical question
is my fundamental question.
This question (What is right and Good?) was the true
inspiration of my investigation of Polanyi's thought.
tial thought seemed to be a dead-end:

Existen-

I found Gabriel Marcel

and Jean-Paul Sartre at an impasse which could not be resolved
merely be accepting blindly the presuppositions of The Mystery
of Being or of Being and Nothingness.

Nor did I find resolu-

tion in the works of Heidegger or other existential

~hinkers.

I was searching for a rational ground of human interaction and
decision; and I found the existential refrain of groundlessness
to be inimical to this search.

Only Marcel was helpful, since

he asserts the reality of human relations; .but still I could
find no rational grounds not to "refuse the invitation" which
he extends to "being-with" others in fidelity and love.

I

thought Marcel was right; but I needed more rational grounds
on which to justify his (and my own) convictions.
Again, the analysts offered me nothing more than clarifications of the use of words such as "right" and "good".

I

wanted to know what I ought to do in particular, concrete
situations; but from Wittgenstein and Ryle I seemed to learn
only what I ought

to~

about such situations.

I cannot deny

that such reflections are helpful and even necessary for ethical decision-making; but clarifying how one ought to speak of

4

"right" and "good" is simply not sufficient for establishing
firm principles of right action in concrete. situations.

~1ore

is needed; and I felt impelled to search for what was lacking
1n an analytic approach.
I cannot justify this prejudice I have developed
against existentialism and analytic philosophy.

I feel my

critique is generally just in so far as it goes.

But I do

not wish to devote much space to a critique of these broad
philosophical methodologies.

I only wish to state the pre-

judicial grounds that formed my motive for pushing beyond
existentialism and analytic philosophy to new insights, such
as those of Polanyi.
Thus, when I encountered Polanyi's detailed description of the nature and role of tacit knowing as the key to
the epistemological dynamic of scientific knowledge I
immediately raised to myself the question whether there might
be a tacit knowledge of values and of the principles of right
action.

That is, I questioned whether tacit knowing were

reducible to being the dynamic only of scientific knowing.
I saw the potential of expanding such a notion into other
areas of knowledge as well; for to say that an explicit,
focal knowledge of facts always relies upon assumptions of
knowledge to which we are committed and of which we are not
necessarily a\\·are seems to outline a dynamic that could pertain not only to science in its strictest sense but also to
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the kind of knowing we might claim for non-scientific fields
such as art and history.
A close reading of Personal Knowledge and the Tacit
Dimension suggested such an interpretation.
far ahead of me.

But Polanyi was

He too saw the ramifications of his notion

of tacit knowledge and worked on an expansion of it into
other domains of knowledge.

He acknowledged in these works

that knowledge in general develops according to the dynamic
of tacit knowing.

And in later articles and books such as

Meaning he argued for the reality of domains of knowledge
other than science which also are supported by the dynamic of
tacit knowing.

Thus, art, history, religion, and political

science were all given full status as true domains of knowledge.
But what about ethics?

Polanyi's .epistemological

insights as well as the ontology which he develops on the
basis of it lead naturally to knowledge-claims in other
domains.

Thus,

s~ould

not one expect or hope that ethics

would be a domain of knowledge in its own right?

If there

are domains of knowledge other than science--domains which
are limited and justified in terms of the standards and
norms pertaining to their own subject matter--then why not
expect an appropriate domain for knowledge of the right and
of the good?
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I began to search the works of Polanyi for an answer
to my question:

is there a domain of knowledge appropriately

called "ethics" which is constituted by some grasp of "right"
and "good"?

Polanyi himself does not specifically address

the problem of the existence of such a domain.
does not mean that such a domain cannot be

But that

piece~

together

out of what Polanyi does say about values, ethics, morality,
social dynamics, and the dynamic of tacit knowing.
is far from inimical to such a task.

Polanyi

Indeed, he is very con-

cerned in his works in social and political theory to respond
to the question of moral right and good.

But he develops

explicitly only the areas of epistemology (philosophy of
science), art (in the various forms of literature, painting,
sculpting, etc;), history, religion, and political science.
I am convinced, however, from the large number--of statements
responding to moral concerns that he did not omit an explicit
development of ethical theory as the result of holding some
theory which would preclude the possibility of ethical knowledge.
In the first place, I not only found no evidence of
such a theory in his major works but rather found many intimations of the possibility of developing such theory.

Second,

his works are full of references to what appears to be a
tacit moral thoery which Polanyi had integrated loosely into
his texts but never made explicit mainly because his focus,
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though often shifting, was trained on other important issues.
And this theory is most evident in his social and political
works, though its basic structure surfaces even in a close
• study of his specifically ethical statements.
Thinking myself to be only one of a large number of
people who had raised the question of ethical knowledge in
Polanyi's works, I thoroughly reviewed the secondary literature on Polanyi in order to benefit from those who had cleared
this ground before me.

But to my surprise my study turned up

only two such articles:

one by Frank_Knight written in 1949

(Virtue and Knowledge) and a recent one by Harry Prosch dealing directly with Polanyi ·~ethics.
suggestive than helpful.

Knight's article was more

He did not actually try to develop

a Polanyian ethical theory but pointed out that one might be
able to construct such a thing.

I was already that far along

in my research, so I turned to Prosch's article in hopes of
finding
some concrete guidance.
--~-

~

Prosch's

article was indeed stimulating; but it stimu-

lated me by arousing my disagreement.

His article centered

around the most recent work which Prosch edited and published
for Polanyi:

Meaning.

And that book presents a theory of

symbolism (in just a few chapters) which Prosch lifts out and
makes the key and essential notion of a "polanyian" ethic.
This bothered me because I was already convinced of the possibility of a Polanyian ethic on the basis of all of Polanyi's
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other works prior to the publishing of Meaning.

So I could

not believe that a Polanyian ethic would be impossible without his notion of symbols--or, at least I did not want to
believe this.

For then I would have to.: be wrong in my in-

sight.
I read Meaning and realized its value for a Polanyian
ethical theory.

But I was convinced that there was a great

deal more to developing a Polanyian ethical theory than concocting one out of a few of Polanyi's last lectures.

The

entire notion of tacit knowing and Polanyi's theory of
ontological change were presupposeq in Meaning and were essential for an understanding of Polanyian symbols.

Hence, the

ethical domain, in so far as it involved tacit as well as
symbolic knowledge, also involved the kinds of norms and
standards developed by Polanyi for other domains of
ledge.

know-

And this meant that a close study of all of Polanyi's

important works in the philosophy of science and his social
and political writings might indeed uncover--by way of making
explicit--the tacit Polanyian ethic.

Indeed, I take this

insight to be my prime contribution to Polanyi studies.
I decided-to examine Polanyi's philosophy of science
first, since this constitutes the emphasis of his philosophical work and is also the prime source of his notion of
tacit

knowl~dge.

I believed that an analysis of a well-

structured presentation could give me the basic structure of

9

a dynamic of tacit ethical knowledge.
work is dedicated to this task.

The first half of this

My strategy was to develop

from Polanyi's philosophy of science (his epistemology and
ontology) the basic dynamic and structure of moral knowledge;
and then this structure could be confirmed in a study of his
social and political writings.

The structure of moral

knowledge as made explicit in Part I can then act to organize Polanyi's scattered references to moral realities and
their relation to social change (Part II).

Using the basic

structure of moral knowledge as an organizing factor, I can
develop a coherent picture of a concrete Polanyian ethic
from his social and political writings.

And these together

should tell me what, in Polanyian terms, constitutes a right
action or a proper pursuit of the good, at least in a general
sense which can be applied to specific situations.

Further,

such a picture allows us to see the ideal societal structure
produced by such an ethic; it allows us to see

~he

sorts of

decisions called for in a moral society.
More specifically, the strategy of my argument is
aimed at finding and confirming a tacit structure of personal
knowledge in the ethical domain through a detailed analysis
of the important ideas of Polanyi's philosophical development.

I have already explained the nature, function, and

relation of the two major parts; but it is helpful to examine
the movement of the argument in a more detailed overview.
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In Chapter One I present what I take to be Polanyi's
fundamental idea:

the notion of tacit knowledge.

Relying

on Polanyi's own technique of making explicit what lies
tacit in an idea, I do not employ what many may consider to
be "logical" arguments or point to "facts" in order to draw
out a concept of value-knowledge which I believe would correspond more or less closely to Polanyi's own concept had he
developed it 'more explicitly.

Instead, I simply apply the

principles of tacit knowing to a presupposition which I
believe Polanyi shares with me (a view for which there is
ample documentation):

that we ordinarily have a fairly well

formed sense of right and wrong and of good and some kind
of hierarchical value structure.

Given this presupposition,

I do not believe it is difficult to establish a case for at
least the possibility of a tacit knowledge of values.

And

that is what I attempt to do in the first chapter.
In this chapter I also integrate Polanyi's concept
of the role of the body in the knowing act into knowledge of
values.

One cannot leave Polanyi' s notion of "embodiment''

in knowledge untouched in a theory of values.

I attempt to

show how fundamental life-values are rooted in biological
existence and how less "body-connected" values can be seen
to be integrated with them in a profound way.

In the con-

text of embodiment in knowledge I argue that, if knowledge
is intuitive (rather than "rational" or "empirical") in
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character, then value knowledge must also be intuitive.

Thus,

value-knowledge, like all tacit knowledge, is intuitive in
the sense that it is an embodiment of the person within value
experience.

And this experience is the ground for reflection

and insight into value and the nature of the Good.

At this

point, I tie Polanyi's unique notion of truth and reality
into his notion of intuition and insight in order to pre.cise
in what sense value-knowledge can be true.

In short, I argue

that there can be a personal knowledge of values.
In Chapter Two I apply Polanyi's notion of how knowledge passes from the tacit dimension to explicit concepts to
tacit value knowledge.

That is, I extend the notion of per-

sonal, tacit knowing to the explicitation of tacit knowledge
in the form of personal commitments to concepts.

And I

argue that value-knowledge may be brought to explicitness so
that we have access to concepts of value and of the Good
which may be said to be true or false.
Chapter Three extends Polanyi's notion of conceptual
knowledge to the social, interpersonal ground of all knowledge.
Demonstrating that Polanyi's concept of embodiment (now called
"indwelling") involves a notion of interpersonal relations
(which he calls "conviviality") I attempt in this chapter to
show how value concepts are not just individual insights but
refer essentially to the communal bond that makes individual
life possible.

Thus, I attempt to show that a Polanyian ethic
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1

s grounded in values which reflect our communal bond with

others.

We are right, in Polanyi's view, to believe that

others are persons just as we are; and this belief is the
basis for a "convival" ethic, an ethic which is essentially
social in that it bequeaths to each generation in the form
of "tradition" insights into value that must be learned from
"connoisseurs".
-I do not wish, however, to give the impression that

ethical knowledge is simply the learning of a social code
to which we are bound.

I do not believe Polanyi would wish

to see a "Polanyian" ethic identified with casuistry.

Apply-

ing his concept of the dynamic of discovery to ethical knowledge, I argue that new insights into value and into the
nature of the Good are possible.

We can "break out" of

older traditional modes, not by ignorantly rejecting them,
but by utilizing them as connoisseurs of the tradition to go
beyond them to new ethical realities.

These realities, like

all new insights, participate in (and reveal more profoundly)
a "whole" which makes sense of more fragmented insights.

I

argue simply that, if all forms of tacit knowledge give
access to discoveries, then value-knowledge must admit of
them.
The third chapter ends the discussion of Polanyi's
epistemology and the way it can be extended to knowledge of
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values.

The argument thus far has consisted of a gradual

extension of tacit knowing to personal and interpersonal
dimensions of conceptuality, an extension which was applied
immediately to our conviction that we know right from wrong.
Chapters Four and Five deal with an extension of Polanyi's
ontology into the ethical realm of knowledge.
involve two important shifts of focus.

These chapters

First, I shift from

talking about the knowledge of values to talking about
knowledge of the ontological structure of man.

That is, I

shift from speaking about how we gain knowledge of values to
speaking about how we exist as human beings.

Second, I shift

from speaking primarilY- about values to speaking about right
action (mainly because the first shift commits me to speaking about man as actor rather than as knower).

Thus, these

chapters involve an application of Polanyi's theory of man
(and being in general) to an ethical notion of right action.
An importantly relevant argument in forming this
bridge from an action-oriented ontology to a concept of
right action in the ethical realm is my argument that knowing itself is an action and can be described in ontological
terms.

Furthermore, the reverse is true:

Polanyi's ontology

can be viewed as having the same structure as.the dynamic of
tacit knowing.

In Chapter Four I argue for the parallel of

Polanyi's epistemology and ontology in order to show that
knowledge of a value is also at the same time a commitment
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to act in certain ways.

Indeed, knowing itself is an act

to which ethical norms are applicable; thus, knowledge of
the Good is a move toward the good, a move that must obey
standards of right action just as knowledge must obey standards of truth.
Having established this parallel of knowing and

.

being, and having applied this parallel to ethical modes of
knowing and being, I proceed in Chapter Four to consider
Polanyi's concept of emergent evolution and freedom.
Polanyi's commitment to a kind of universal freedom (in the
sense that no event is entirely explicable in terms of the
events that "cause" it) is obviously relevant for an extension of his thought to the moral domain.

Man'is free in the

sense that he is morally responsible for his decisions, even
if this freedom cannot be conceived in terms of a rational
philosophy.

Again the parallel of knowing and being is

relevant here in that the irreducibility of "higher" reactions
to the "lower" elements that make it possible is due both to
the epistemological principle that we always know more than
we can tell and to Polanyi's notion of a "boundary condition".
This latter notion is relevant to his concept of emergence;
and emergence is a more complex and wide-sweeping concept
of "breaking out", which I discussed in previous chapters.
Boundary conditions are taken up more specifically in Chapter
Five.

In Chapter Four, emergence and freedom are extended
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into a concept of moral freedom exerting itself in more and
more complex and highly developed ways in pursuit of the Good.
Chapter Five considers the moral development of man
more profoundly as a movement toward higher levels of being.
That is, the ontological structure Polanyi defines as a
hierarchy of being in which higher levels rely on lower levels
(which in turn support and participate in higher levels) is
extended to the moral domain.

Man freely pursues the Good

through a process of maturing toward the achievement 'Of wholly
novel modes of human being, modes which represent new insights
into value, right, and the Good.

I apply Polanyi's notion

of "rules of rightness" (which he applies to the structures
of reliance and marginal controls in the functioning of
organisms and machines) to the moral domain, contending that,
just as there is a tendency toward the stabilization of
reactions or repeated functions so that "rules" of normal or
"right" behavior are established and cannot be broken without
damage to the structure created by them, so moral action procedes by "rules of rightness".

These rules describe systems

of behavior which make communal life possible, though they
are rules to which we freely submit and change as we break
through to new levels.

I conclude the chapter with a-dis-

cussion of Polanyi's concept of "ultra-biology", which is
immediately relevant to ethics since is describes the ultimate end toward which man is moving as he develops

higher
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levels of being.
of

Polanyi points toward Chardin's concept

the neogenesis as the apex of human development.

And I

take this to be a moral as well as ontological category,
as I am sure Teilhard de Chardin did.
Chapter Five ends the major discussion of the
relevance of Polanyi's epistemology and ontology to the
ethical domain of personal knowledge.

I consider that I have

thus far made three contributions to Polanyi scholarship:
first, I have drawn from a wide number of resources to present an integrated description of Polanyi's epistemology
and ontology; second, I have located the parallel between his
epistemology and his ontology and have lffted out from them a
basic philosophical structure which can be applied to other
fields of thought; third, I have extended this basic structure
to ethical experience and have shown that ethical theory is
possible in terms of personal knowledge.
A fourth and important contribution is made in
Chapter Six.

In this chapter I take Harry Prosch to task for

too narrowly identifying the possibility of a Polanyian ethic
with his very late concept of symbols.

I agree with Prosch

that symbols are important for understanding certain aspects
of moral life, such as the role of moral heroes.

But my

previous arguments have already established that a personal
andnotmerely a symbolic knowledge of values and of right
action and the Good are possible; and, on the basis of this
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contribution, I argue that a Polanyian ethic is primarily
personal knowledge though it admits the role of symbolic
knowledge.

Thus, my fourth contribution consists in ensuring

that the whole structure of personal knowledge is applied tc
the ethical domain.

For this also guarantees that even

those who do not have the imagination to appreciate the value
of moral heroes can still legitimately speak of the sense of
value, right, and wrong which all persons experience.

I

take this position to be unique among those which other
scholars, few though they be, have suggested in regard to a
Polanyian ethic.
Chapters Seven and Eight are transitional chapters.
Chapter Seven is a closing summary of Part I, and Chapter
Eight outlines what we might expect to find concerning scattered references to moral ideas which we find in Polanyi's
social and political writings if I am right about the way in
which I am extending his epistemology and ontology into the
ethical domain.

I consider the second part of the disserta-

tion to be a confirmation of the contributions I have
advanced, though it is a confirmation which "fleshes out"
the essential structure of ethical theory I have proposed
and thus extends an understanding of it into more concrete
images.
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Chapter Nine returns to Polanyi's notion of the
nature of the scientific enterprise in order to lift out
the social dynamic of the search for truth (rather than the
epistemological dynamic, which was dealt with earlier).

My

purpose in doing this is to demonstrate that science, considered as a human activity, involves essentially a moral
strategy for achieving its purposes.

Thus, science,

replete with its commitment to truth, is a moral activity
and binds scientists together as a moral community.

Com-

mitment to truth, freedom of exploration, mutual control
and polycentric interests, free competition for publication,
etc., are all social anti moral activities which make the
achievement of truth possible.

And, if truth is possible

only under such conditions, then the development of moral
truth itself can occur only under similar social structures.
Hence, the republic of science is a model for the moral
community.

Its essential structure is the fundamental

structure of all truth-finding, which is the root of all
moral development (since without moral truth there can be
no moral life).
But Polanyi, I argue, gives us more than science as
a depository of truth.

I have argued that there are other

domains of knowledge besides science,

and in this chapter

I amass evidence of Polanyi's intended extension of personal
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knowledge to other domains such as art and history.

So what

is true of the moral organization of science must be true
about other domains of knowledge including ethics.

This

means that the ethical life is necessary in order to gain
ethical knowledge.

Thus, we can pursue the Good only by

reference to moral truth and the ethical organization (both
individually and communally that that implies.

Hence, we

find confirmation that ethics is not only possible as a form
of personal knowledge, but that it is essential as part of
the search for truth that personal knowledge participates
in.

From this point, the "confirmation" slides into a

description of how moral organization functions in society.
And the description matches what we might have expected to
be the case judging from the ethical theory I developed from
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology.

The chapter ends with

a description of the communal movement toward the Good as
a moral achievement.
Chapter Ten deals with the various moral inversions
of this movement toward the communal Good in an effort to
throw further light on the nature of this movement by virtue
of some well-developed contrasts.

To this end, I discuss

Polanyi's dissatisfactions with rampant scientific scepticism (which leads to nihilism), Marxism, and the liberalism
of democratic institutions.

These dissatisfactions are

related to the failure of these social structures to
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properly pursue truth and to the way in which they differ
from the dynamic of the republic of science.
Finally, in Chapter Eleven, I analyze Polanyi's
notion of the free society to find the elements of moral
culture which were implied in the contributions of Part I,
as well as the more concrete working out of our expectations
in earlier portions of Part II.

This description of the

free society concludes the dissertation.
In addition to the research and argument portions of
the dissertation, I have also added sections entitled "critical comments".

These comments are intended to explore·

various important critical insights into certain notions
which Polanyi advances.

Their purpose is to clarify what

Polanyi means rather than to be isolated critical statements
with no relation to the body of the whole.

Some of the

criticisms were suggested by journal articles and some of
them were developments of my own thought (a minor contribution to Polanyi studies).

Since I have intended this work

as a whole to be a development of only certain of Polanyi's
works, I have not amassed references for the critical notes,
though I do not wish to claim that some of their basic ideas
are not to be found in critical journal articles.

My intent

to clarify rather than merely defend or refute Polanyi in
these comments should enable me to escape from a charge of
building "straw horses".

My work is aimed at explicitating
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what is tacit in Polanyi (right or wrong) and not at defending his ideas.

CHAPTER I
THE STRUCTURE OF TACIT KNOWING AS EMBODIED TRUTH
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Introduction
In what follows I take the "epistemological argument"
to mean a Polanyian account of how we come to know that the
values we hold are right (or, conversely, how they are
known to be wrong).

That is, I shall display the fundamental

criteria by which we know whether what we value is what we
ought to value.
I call this a "Polanyian account" because I believe
it is similar to one which Michael Polanyi would have given
if he had developed his philosophical work in the area of
ethics.

I cannot claim, of course, to speak for Polanyi.

He was a man of deep and enterprising thought, and one cannot
guess what rich and penetrating insights he would have
brought to the field of ethical studies.
Polanyi's epistemological work is highly developed,
and what he says about knowledge has import for many domains
of human thought.

Though he was a scientist and though he

raises epistemological questions in the context of scientific
work, Polanyi's expressed intent was to develop criteria of
knowledge that could be extended beyond the sciences into
the domains of art, religion, history, and politics.
22

That
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he never dealt explicitly with ethical issues, apart from
piece-meal remarks that may be gathered from his various texts,
does not preclude a development of his work into the ethical
domain as well.

Indeed, one can only assume from Polanyi's

own intent, that he would be happy to see such an effort.
The development of Polanyi's expistemology into
criteria by which we know standards of good, right, and value
is in some instances a straightforward inference.

The whole

tenor of Polanyi's work makes it obvious that an epistemology
of values is an appropriate development of his work into the
ethical domain of human experience and knowledge. 1 We must,
however, rely on Polanyi's own understanding of the process
of knowing:

we must draw out what remains tacit in his

thought concerning ethics and bring it to explicit form.
This process transcends simple inference (which is itself a
means of explicitating tacit knowing) in that is displays
I

entire gestalten of thought which seem to lie hidden and yet
accessible within Polanyi's work.
Ethicists properly distinguish between value theory
and normative ethics.

The first field deals with the notion

of value and questions of worth; the second deals· with

~ichael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
& Co., Inc., 1966), p. 52.

N.Y., Doubleday
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questions of what we ought to do or be.

To some extent

questions in the first field may be resolved independently
of those in the second.

In the analysis of Polanyi's epis-

temology, ·I shall deal with questions of value.

I shall take

up the grounds of normative theory in the analysis of his
ontology.

Generally, I shall show that what Polanyi says

about how we come to know and to justify knowledge claims
may, in Polanyi's own terms, be legitimately extended to a
description of how we come to discover values and justify
universal notions of worth.
In this chapter I will analyze Polanyi's fundamental
notion of tacit knowing and show that it is applicable to
our presupposed knowledge of values, I will argue that we
do in fact have a tacit knowledge of values.

In this context,

I will employ Polanyi's notion of "embodiment" to elucidate
the manner in which value-knowledge, as tacit, is rooted in
biological, bodily existence.

This tacit "body-knowledge"

will be identified with intuition, a notion which will be
extended to the fundamental mode of personal knowledge as a
whole.

I will discuss Polanyi's concept of truth and reality

in relation to intuition and will apply these epistemological
concepts to what I take to be a legitimate expansion of them
into an analysis of our knowledge of values.

Thus, we begin.

immediately with Polanyi' s fundamental idea and relate it' to
our presupposed value-knowledge.

25

1.

The Structure of Tacit Knowing in Value-Knowledge
The question concerning how we come to know may be

raised from within a variety of perspectives.

Our perspective

is governed by a particular epistemological question we are
asking of Polanyi:

How do we come to know values?

We can begin to answer this question by analyzing
what Polanyi calls the tacit dimension of knowing; thus, we
can begin by asking how tacit knowing can involve knowledge of
values.
A few simple examples will suffice to introduce us to
the notion of tacit knowing.
crowd?

How do we recognize a face in a

Obviously no single face is so radically different

from all others that it stands out because of these differences.
Rather, when we look for someone in the crowd, we already have
a sense of what we are looking for:

a familiar face.

But

what is it about a face that makes its features familiar?

No

one feature can account for this familiarity, nor can the expression it bears do so--though we do talk at times as if this
were the case, as when we say something like, "It must be John;
I'd recognize that nose anywhere".

But our knowledge that

this is the person we are looking for cannot be justified by a
close analysis of the person's features.

We know we have

found our friend but cannot specify in detail how we know this. 2

?.Mi-chael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 4-5.
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Again, we may examine the simple example of reading.
When we read, we attend to the meaning of sentences and to
the thought (argument, description, etc.) they communicate.
We could not do this if we did not know the words that constitute the sentence and the letters that constitute the
words.

Indeed, we would insist that we do know these even

if we were unable to account immediately for just how we
knew them when we weren't paying attention to them.

Again,

we are claiming to know something without being able to
specify in detail how we know it.

Nonetheless, we can point

to our understanding of the meaning of a sentence as evidence that we do know what we claim to know even though we
cannot tell how we know it. 3
These examples serve to clarify one feature of tacit
knowledge:

its nature as a kind of "silent" knowledge.

The

word "tacit" means "silent", and Polanyi employs it to
describe a fundamental feature of knowing:

every knowledge

claim relies upon knowledge we have but are not aware of
until we focus our attention on it.

It remains "silent"

until we address it and force it to speak concerning its role
in knowledge.
3
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 22.
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What is the structure of this silent or "tacit" dimension of knowing?
"rely".

The clue to this structure lies in the word

We rely upon knowledge of which we are unaware in

order to be aware of something else.

That upon which we rely

Polanyi calls the "proximal" term; and that on which we focus
while relying on the proximal term is called the "distal"
term.

The word "proximal" suggests nearness, and the word

"distal" suggests distance.

Thus, we rely on what is "close at

hand" in order to become aware of what is relatively more distant.

In the examples above, our familiarity with the features

of the person we were looking for was the proximal term of our
explicit, distal focus of recognition in a crowd.

And our

proximal knowledge of the letters of a word is essential to
understanding the "distal" meaning of the sentence.
mal terms, when focused

The proxi-

upon, are seen as isolated particulars

with no functional relation to the distal term, which.integrates these pariiculars into a coherent pattern. 4

But when

relied upon in an act of tacit knowing, the proximal terms of
knowledge form an essential functional relationship with the
distal terms.
We should note immediately that the fundamental structure of tacit knowing as a reliance upon unspecified knowledge
to attend to specifiable meanings is itself an "ontological
Essa s b Michael Polan i, edited
The University of Chicago Press,
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commitment".

5

Tacit knowing is not a critical stance which

throws doubt upon knowledge claims.

On the contrary, Polanyi

asserts that this central theme of his epistemology is a
description of an a-critical ontological commitment: a
depth commitment to understand what we experience as being
fundamentally real.

6

Let us clarify a few terms which P6lanyi employs in
regard to the dynamic of tacit knowing.

Polanyi identifies

the proximal term in the act of knowing with subsidiary
knowledge and the distal term with focal knowledge.

7

These identifications make semantic sense in that
the distal term appears as such only when we focus our attention on it; and the proximal term is subsidiary
form:

~o

such a

i.e., it "subsists" in a tacit way, silently support-

ing such a focus.

Thus, our knowledge of letters in a word

5
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 13.
6

I must remind the reader, however, that at this
point I am referring only to the structure of tacit knowing
in its barest and most essential features.
I am not saying
that Polanyi argues that we are committed to a particular
view of reality as a whole, but rather that the assumption
that experience bears on reality is an essential component
of any knowledge claim. This is an important claim and will
have a profound affect upon what w~ can say about valueknowledge.
7 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
p. 128.
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is subsidiary to the focal meaning of the word or to
sentences comprised of words.
The appearance of things within the functional
relation of subsidiary and focal types of knowledge is called
the "phenomenal" structure of tacit knowing. 8

The word

"phenomenon" means "appearance"; and Polanyi is claiming
that distal, or focal, knowledge is the explicit conscious
appearance of what lay hidden in the tacit dimension of
knowledge.

For example, focusing one's attention on a paint-

ing in an effort to determine style may enable one to notice
aspects of the painting which were not noticed before.

One

may notice, e.g. that broad, sweeping strokes and bright
opaque colors give the painting its ephemeral quality.

We

were not unaware of these stylistic techniques before such
an analysis; we were tacitly aware of them.

And because

we were tacitly already aware of them, we were able to raise
the question of style and seek out the stylistic techniques.
Thus, when we focused on them, they rose up out of the

8Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 11.
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still hidden depths of the painting and revealed themselves
for what they were: they appeared.
Concerning this aspect of tacit knowing, Polanyi
says, "This is the dynamic of tacit knowing: the questing
imagination vaguely anticipating experiences not yet grounded
in subsidiary particulars evokes these subsidiaries and thus
implements the experience the imagination has sought to
achieve". 9
The functional and phenomenal structure of tacit
knowing are clearly intimately related.

Our reliance upon

tacit knowledge in order to focus upon explicit objects of
knowledge is essentially the means whereby the tacit leaves
its silent hiddeness and appears.

So Polanyi says,

" ... We are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit
knowing in the appearance of its distal term.

We are

aware 10 of that from which we are attending to another thing

9 Knowin

by Marjor1e
pp . 19 9 - 20 0 .
lOMichael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 11.

31
in the appearance of that thing". 11
We should not be surprised, then, when Polanyi claims
that the appearance of something is essentially the meaning of
the particulars we rely upon in order to focus upon it.

The

joint meaning of particulars, as integrated into a comprehensive whole through focal attention, is called the "physiognostic'' meaning of the particulars known hitherto only tacitly. 12

llwe must, however, avoid identifying tacit knowledge
with the actual ap~earance.
Such an identification would
contradict the not1on of tacit knowledge since "tacit" by
definition is that aspect of knowledge that does not appear.
In what way, then, are we aware of what we know tacitly?
This question presupposes that tac1t knowledge is either
another kind of knowing which requires a different kind of
awareness from that which we have of explicit phenomena; or else
that it is the same kind of knowledge arbitrarily partitioned
from explicit phenomena. Polanyi does not intend tacit knowledge to be understood either as a different kind of knowledge
or as a different "intensity" of knowledge. We are aware of
the tacit dimension of knowledge through our awareness that
what we know explicitly is not the whole of what can be known
but is known as such by a reliance on other elements of knowledge which do not appear. Tacit knowledge is what we rely on
in bringing some particular aspect of knowledge to explicit
focus. This "bringing to focus" is itself an explicitation
of what was formally tacit. Our awareness of the tacit as
tacit is, however, reduced to a general sense that what we
see explicitly before us has undefined borders that point
outward toward areas of life of which we are not aware but
upon which we rely in order to be conscious of an explicit
object at all. Tacit knowledge, then, is not identical with
the ap~earance of an object, though we are aware of tacit
knowle ge in the appearance of a thing.
12Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
pp. 12 8-9.
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This term has within it the notion of appearance, since the
physiognomy of a thing is its surface appearance.

And this

aspect of meaning is also identified with the ontological
aspect of tacit knowing since Polanyi says that this aspect
is constituted by a reliance upon the particulars of an
.

. .

.

entity to atten d to t h e1r J01nt mean1ng.

13

An example of physiognostic meaning is the mere visual
appearance of any object.

Its shape, texture, color, etc.,

is presented as a coherent mass, a "physiognomy" of unique
features.

But ideas also have a physiognostic meaning, an

appearance of structure and pattern of dynamic flow, a conceptual content which is kin to the appearance of objects.
The concept of Good, eg., has a unique physiognomy composed
of various experiences which we denote as "good":

the shar-

ing of friendship and love, achievement in one's profession,
etc.

Thus, the shape and structure of any meaning,

whethe~

perceptual or conceptual, is its phys.iognostic meaning.
Intellectual knowledge of values can be seen to share
the same structure common to all other forms of knowledge.
Polanyi indeed applies the structure of tacit knowing to all
levels of knowledge from perception and motor skills to the

13 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y., Doubleday

& Co.,

Inc., 1966), p. 10, 13.
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highest intellectual endeavors. 14

He says, "The shaping of

our conceptions is impelled to move from obscurity to clarity
and from incoherence to comprehension, by an intellectual discomfort similar to that by which our eyes are impelled to make
15
I shall go into more
clear and coherent the things we see''.
detail about the various levels of tacit knowing shortly; but
for now we can establish at least some fundamental ideas about
value-knowledge if such knowledge is tacit.
To begin, values are meaningful as explicitations of
knowledge that is tacit.

This statement makes sense when we

note that for Polanyi all knowledge is either tacit or relies
on what is tacit.

Now, a value can indeed be interpreted

merely as an emotive preference or as an attitude.
if we

interp~et

But, even

a value in this way, we do not escape the

Polanyian dynamic of tacit knowing.

For the assertion "values

are only emotive preferences or attitudes" is itself a knowledge-claim about the nature of values (otherwise the "argument" for a preference theory could be seen merely as a
statement of personal preference on the part of the speaker
and would bear no persuasive force other than as an emotive
appeal).

And this knowledge-claim relies upon a tacit

awareness Of emotive preferences.

14 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 13.
15 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. 100-01.
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Thus, we must raise the question whether the distinction between emotions (or preferences) and conceptual knowledge is so clear-cut.

If emotions can be said to be a kind

of awareness (and indeed the notion of emotions of which we
are unaware in any sense is an odd one, denying even a
Freudian theory of the unconscious which states that we are
"aware" of them though not consciously), then we must ask
whether this awareness is knowledge in any sense.
such awareness is not conceptual knowledge.

Obviously,

But to deny

altogether that it is knowledge leaves us unable to explain
how we become aware conceptually of our emotional preferences.
Perhaps our only recourse is not to "proof" of such knowledge
but to an acknowledgment that, unclear as our notion of such
knowledge might be, our emotions must be understood in such
a

~ay

as to include a knowing awareness of them.
The notion of tacit knowledge as defined by Polanyi

best fits the description of this kind of knowing.

Every

knowledge-claim about the nature of values in general or
about the importance (or unimportance) of particular values
relies upon the knowing-awareness of these values, even if
we represent them as mere emotional preferences.

I.e., we

rely upon a tacit knowledge of preferences and ascriptions
of worth in order to assert anything explicitly about values.
Values are meaningful as explicitations of tacit knowledge.
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Polanyi, of course, does not speak of values in this
way, since he never accomplishes a description of value
theory in the context of a theory of tacit knowing.

But if

we adopt his theory as he states it, then tacit knowing is
well exemplified in the manner in which we hold and are
aware of values.
This does not mean that Polanyi is willing to explain
how we come to know things by claiming that we already know
what we are trying to explain.

Taken to extremes, this is

an absurd argument, since it would simply say that somehow
we already know what we are trying to explain.
of tacit knowledge is not so absurd.

But the notion

Tacit integrations are

the joint meanings of the tacit particulars comprising them.
Such meanings are tacitly more than any single tacit particular; as integrations, they are not just "sums" of tacitly
known elements upon which we rely to focus on certain ideas.
This "more" is a creative "more" in that the joint meaning of
tacit particulars is not identifiable with any idea previously
known tacitly and yet says in some sense what several tacit
particulars say "together".

Explicit values, then, are held

as integrations of· joint particulars which we rely on in
attending to the vague and unorganized notions of
order to ascribe a standard of worth to something.

valuing in
Statements
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concerning value-knowledge are rooted in tacit appreciations
of value or else tacit appreciations which are initially
integrated explicitly as values.
Further, value knowledge is not mere subjective assertion.

A more comprehensive understanding of tacit knowledge

will help us understand why values are not merely subjective.
Tacit integrations themselves are not just subjective
assertions proclaiming the meaning of more fundamental
beliefs.

We must remember that the tacit dimension of know-

ledge involves a commitment that our thoughts bear on reality.
The visions evoked in an attentive focus on some particular
problem are suggested by commitments that are already functioning tacitly.

In the case of value-knowledge, the problem

concerning how to ascribe worth to acts,

th~ughts,

feeling,

etc., evokes through attentive thought, visions of standards
of worth.

These visions are not just subjective assertions

because they are creative integrations of the joint meanings
of various experiences of worth:

times when we have con-

sidered one idea superior to another, or a person's life as
morally superior to another, or a way of life as better than
some other way.

We perceive certain things as better than

others (eg., we value human life over that of an insect; or,
we prefer our mothers over total strangers).

We evaluate

our situation and take preferred courses of action.

All of

these fundamentally human acts are acts of ascribing the
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worth of one thing, act, or situation over another; and such
worth-ascribing acts seem to be essential for human life.
Without some kind of order of preference, some kind of capacity for evaluation, human actions essential for life (food
gathering, social structure, etc.) would be impossible.

Thus,

we must conclude that we do have the capacity to evaluate and
that this capacity is rooted in a drive to make evaluative
sense out of life-experiences.
Insight into value, then, is rooted in concrete experiences, integrating their meanings into unified visions which
cannot be separated in any way from the experiences they are
rooted in.

The word "subjective" means for Polanyi simply an

assertion that is made outside of the tacit commitments one
.
. 16
1 lves ln.

Such assertions are generally shown to be subjec-

tive (and mistaken) in that they have little power to bear out
the reality we live in, a power possessed by valid integrations
of tacit beliefs. 17
Values, then, are integrations of the experienced meanings lived through in concrete situations of ascribing worth.
And such integrations are inextricably rooted in these

16 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 304.
17

Ibid., I>· 37.
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experiences and are not "subjective" in the sense of being
. h

unconnecte d Wlt

.

, .

exper1ence or aro1trary.

18

18To some exte11t we have already tried to clarify Polanyi's notion
of tatit knowledge. Polanyi spent no little effort in clarifying this
notion himself, though each effort leaves questions unanswered. Polanyi
never seems to make explicit just what tacit knowing really is in itself.
He defines tacit knowing essentially in relation to explicit knowledge,
each time relying on a phenomenological description of the manner in
which explicit knowledge relies on tacit knowing. Hence, we might observe
that Polanyi relies fUJldamentally upon description and an appeal to intuition in his attempt to establish a case for tacit knowing. His work Personal Knowledge is a massive attempt to demonstrate that the enterprise of
science relies upon a "tacit" theory of tacit knowing; but his argument
leads only to the persuasive assertion that the tacit dimension of knowledge must be acknowledged without detailing how we experience it in
itself.
Polanyi, of course, is in no position to describe tacit knowing
. in itself. Tacit knowing is known only in relation to explicit knowledge,
only as its support. In itself (if it could be separated from explicit
knowledge) it must remain silent. It can tell us nothing about itself.
Thus,. we cannot quite grasp this "awareness of awareness" in itself; we
cannot fully explicitize the tacit dimension. And this "criticism" of the
tacit dimension is precisely, according to Polanyi, part of the description of it. To argue that we are reduced to simply acknowledging that we
know in a tacit manner is to assert precisely what Polanyi means by tacit
knowing: that we always know more than we can tell, and this knowledge is
not amenable to proof. ~~- -~ ·-·----· ···· · ·
·

-

~·~~.

-----··----·

-

-

We can rail against this assertion of "unknowable knowledge", calling it nonsense and mere assumption. Polanyi's argument is only as convincing as the acknowledgment it foists upon us. But to be clear, this
does not mean that Polanyi is ·wrong. Even if we maintain either a standard of empirical verification or rational demonstration as a criterion
for the acceptability of a theory such as that of a dimension of "tacit"
knowing, the unfounded assertion of such a theory does not thereby demonstrate its falsehood.
If we are willing to accept a theory of tacit knowledge, despite
the difficulties that exist in distinguishing it from a Freudian unconscious or a Jamesian "fringe consciousness", then a claim that value knowledge relies on tacit knowledge is a proper claim. But still unclear is
_!he manner in which we "rely" on. tacit_ knowledge in order to focus our
attention -eXplicitly. ·we may consider the relation bebveen tacit
exP~icit to be one of several types: associative, causal, logical, inductlvely inferential, or as a relation of meaning. Though Polanyi often
spea~s of the last as th~ prop<=:r relat_ion between the tacit and tJle

and
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Having described the notion of values as rooted in
tacit knowledge of evaluation experiences, we may now turn
to a deeper analysis of how these experiences arise as tacit
forms of knowing.

We turn now to Polanyi's concept of the

body and its fundamental rule in perception and the unique
kind of knowledge we call skills.

eXplicit, he sometimes seems to include one or more of the other types I
have named. And he never clarifies in detail how "reliance" can be a
relation of "meaning" (in the sense that the eXplicit is the meaning of
tacit knowledge) in so far ar ''meaning" is defined as the .relation between
tacit and eXplicit!
Whether we must consider these other possible relations between
tacit and eXplicit as types of ''meaning" or meaning as a relation separate
from these others is an open question. But clearly we rely on tacit particulars to focus on a meaning we would have no access to without them,
regardless of how we define ''meaning".
Polanyi claims that we come to a knowledge of things already committed to their reality. One might accuse him of proposing a naive realism,
of believing that the world simply imposes its structure upon a passive
and intelligent mind which has the mere function of recording and manipulating the data as true comprehensions of reality. But this critique can
be avoided by an understanding of what Polanyi means by "reality". Reality
is not what realists take it to be: an objective structure passively
acknowledged. Rather, "reality" is a personal corrnnitment to continue pursuing truth in tenns of what is presently believed. The word "reality"
refers to a sense that we know something of what is there, though we can
make to absolute statement concernmg reality. Our "ontological connnitment" is not a subjective assertion or a claim of absolute, "objective"
knowledge. It i~ a_claim that we are personally involved in the proc~ss of the contmumg unfoldment of truth from perspectives which conto be confinned in their truth as we follow the intimations of
ht~ue
1gher truth inherent within them.
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z.

The Body's Role in Value-Knowledge
For Polanyi, the human body is the fundamental tool

for gaining knowledge.

He says '' ... all thought contains com-

ponents of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking, and all thought dwells in its subsi19
. ·
This "extenas 1· f th ey were par t s of our body" .
d 1ar1es,
sion" of meaning from the body outward is achieved by a kind
of projection of sense to a point farther away from the body
and back again to it.

For example, imagine a man in a dark

cave using a long stick to probe unseen territory.

The end

of the stick is pushed forward by the man's arm, sending
various kinds of data (holes, rocks, soft spots, etc.) to
his hand.

And these in turn are assimilated or translated

in terms of body knowledge:

three steps in this direction

will bring one to the edge of a cliff, two in another direction will encounter a wall.

More generally, we interpret

things in the world as "up", "down", spatially oriented,
and as temporal in relation to the fundamental tool of all
knowledge:

the body.

Polanyi calls the meanings revealed

in such interpretive projections "telegnostic" meanings,
which are essentially forms of knowledge gained by extension of the body in some medium. 20 Physiognostic and
19Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. x.

jorie

edited by ~far1969), pp. 128-9.

41

telegnostic meanings are just two ways of observing the same
phenomenon and, therefore, occur together.

Both are tacit

forms of knowledge which may be explicitated through selective
attention.

The former, however, refers to the structure of a

perception or conception, and the latter refers to the origin
of it.

Thus, they can be readily distinguished from one

another.
The role of the body is fundamental in knowledge. 21
It is at the same time in the world while it reveals the
world.

The body itself is known focally only as an object

in the world.

We "know" the body tacitly, of course; but we

have no explicit knowledge of its own spatial, temporal, corporal nature apart from an understanding of it in terms of
the world which the body tacitly gives us.

Polanyi sees this

body-world movement as a mutual dialectic of co-determination,
which means simply that one cannot be understood without the
other since each reveals the other to the depth that each is
understood. 22 This understanding of the role of the body in
knowing obliterates the distinction between "internal" and
"external" as determinative epistemological categories.

N.Y.:

Both

21 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 29.
22
Ibid., p. 12.
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internal and external are mutually given and neither has the
power to be the ultimate critical standard of the other.
"Internal" data are not under the authority of "external" criteria, nor are "external" data to be arranged by internal
patterns. 23

The world of knowledge, then, is a unified but

"bi-polar" world in which revealed and revealer are mutually
given in terms of tacit body-knowledge.
Skills are good examples of forms of tacit knowledge 24
that are still closely connected to the body.

When one learns,

eg., to ride a bicycle, one relies on tacit muscular coordinations that are never ·know.n in detail explicitly.

One might

be able to do it, but he cannot tell anyone else exactly how
he does it.

The body is more deeply aware of this "how"

than his conscious grasp is able to convey.

And one is said

to "know how" to ride a bicycle only as he masters it as a
skil1. 25
We should understand this knowledge, however, to be
held by the person.

At present we are considering the role

of the body in knowledge, but this focus should not obscure
the more comprehensive and unifying power of a personal hold
23Knowm
.

Grene, (Chicago:

Grene,

s b Michael Polan i, edited by Marjorie
1cago Press, 19 9), p. 126.
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on knowledge in which the body performs its role.

In tacit

knowing we must say that the person knows: though the exmaple
of the bicycle rider makes it clear that the person relies
upon the body's role in knowing more deeply than he can tell.
Perceptions of all kinds (the five senses, kinaesthetic senses, internal senses, etc.) are examples of tacit forms
of knowledge that are also closely related to our bodily
reality.

Polanyi asserts that we have an innate craving to
make out what lies before us, 26 to use our powers of perception
27
- That we seek to discover a
to discover a coherent world.
coherent world is very important.

Perceptions are not simply

passive receptions of objectively determined data. 28

We try

to make sense out of what we perceive in the process of perceiving it.

Essentially involved in developing perceptual

coherence (eg.,

~nowing

that square towers are not really

round when one views them from a distance) are one's beliefs 29
26Knowing and Being:
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago:
p. 120.
27 .

.

Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
University of Chicago Press, 1969),

..

Ibid., pp. 138-9.

28

Ibid., p. 79.

29
.
Jov'!ichael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
Unlversity of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 67.

The
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which act as a kind of reality screen30 for perceptions.
our senses must meet certain standards of coherence before
they can be relied upon, and these standards themselves develop
toward greater sophistication as our perceptions in turn inform us about the world.

Perception, then, cannot be separa-

ted from interpretation31 and the standards that support it.32
The essential mutual support of perception and interpretation makes perception something of a bridge between the
most body-oriented form of tacit knowledge (skills) and highly
sophisticated mental forms (e.g., science).

Polanyi says:

We know that perception selects, shapes, and
assimilates clues by a process not explicitly controlled by the perceiver. Since the powers of scientific discerning are of the same kind as those of
perception, they too operate by selecting, shaping
and assimilating clues without focally attending
to them.33

3 0we don't believe, e.g., that sticks bend when dipped
in water, despite what we perceive. We learn in this case to
perceive that sticks only a~pear to bend in such situations.
Our world remains coherent 1n such a case, despite the contradiction of our senses.
31Michael Polanyi, Notes on Prejudice (Chicago: University of Chicago, Special Collections Library, unpublished
manuscript 11/28/39) box 26, folder 1.
3 2Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towardsa Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1962), pp. 96-7.
3 3Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 11.
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I quote Polanyi here because I want to indicate that,
with perception, we have added an important facet to our
understanding of tacit knowledge.
kind of immediate feedback:
trying to do.

Skills are developed by a

we succeed or fail in what we are

But perception combines a drive toward success

(or coherence) with a development of standards to ensure this.
One can extend these elements of tacit knowing to value knowledge.

One could argue that the capacity to experience

insights into worth in respect to some things lies in a fundamental drive, a power to make evaluative sense of things which
is grounded in the aim of the body toward a fundamental

bio~

logical success.
This drive is aimed at discovering values that are
already there in a sense similar to the way one strives to
perceive what is before one.

The embodied evaluator tries to

clarify preferences, or senses of worth, that are tacit and
which are in part responsible for his successful survival.
His tacit world of preferences emerges as he engages in concrete situations requiring evaluative effort.

He "makes out"

the level of preference of an act, situation, or thing, not
as a passive reception of data but as an interpretive effort
in which t~e preference is revealed as a value essentially
related 'to human life.

Values do not exist in some Platonic

34Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical
Philosophy (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 99-100.

34
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realm of purity; yet they are discovered in so far as they
relate to fundamental human projectsr 35

35 one might question whether Polanyi is unintentionally vague concerning whether knowledge of the world or knowledge of the body is epistemologically primary. Thus, it
appears that he attempts to justify his theory about the "primary" role of the body by reference to a position that seems-mysteriously--to be neither in the world nor located in the
bocly, a position from which both are viewed synoptically.
But what is the justification for claiming such a synoptic
view?
We can clarify Polanyi's intent in this regard by
noting that the criticism misses the mark in accusing him of
vagueness and of importing an unjustified, unclear, and illdefined vantage point from which to view both body and world.
Polanyi is not residing in a "vague" position but rather an
ambiguous one. And I believe he does this intentionally and
justifiably.
Knowledge of the world is not, for Polanyi, reducible to a description of how sensory mechanisms join with
reflective capacity to create an "intelligible world". We
have already spoken of knowledge as inherently possessed of
an "ontological commitment" with which the independent force
of the world announces itself. Nor is the body reducible to
those descriptive categories employed by scientists to clarify the natural world, such that it would be only an object
among others in a natural world viewed and known through some
means other than the body. The body and the world mutually
disclose one another, and neither is reducible to a function
of the other. Polanyi appears to remain in a position of
ambiguity, gaining his "synoptic" vantage point through reflection on the historical origin of both knowledge of the
world and knowledge of the body: the alternating focus on
each in terms of the other as preserved in memory and as projected in each bodily move.
If our description of Polanyi's intent is correct,
as I believe it is, the question of primacy is resolved.
Neither the body nor the world perceived through its medium
~onstitutes the primary element of knowledge.
This ambigulty is at the root of any epistemological claim, since all
knowledge is rooted fundamentally in the world as mediated

47

3.

Truth and Reality in Value-Knowledge
For Polanyi, embodied tacit knowledge is intuitive.

That is, it consists in a spontaneous integration of particulars into a coherent object which relates directly or indirectly to the world as perceived through the body. 36 · This
intuitive aspect of tacit knowing is a part of all forms of
knowing from perception to the highest discoveries. 37 Polanyi
views the development of knowledge as a process of moving from

through the body. And this is true no matter whether the
more obviously body-oriented forms of knowledge such as
perception and skill-performances are involved or higher
intellectual feats of "embodiment" are involved. Hence,
values, rooted in a fundamental drive toward biological
success, are inherently body-mediated even though they are
developed and expressed in higher intellectual achievements.
The body, then, is a kind of "primordial" tool in
the discovery of values (though not all values are directly
related to a need or preference of the body). The survival
and maintenance of bodily existence depends upon certain
orders of preference (foods to eat, types of shelter, etc.).
The world appears as a hodge-podge of routes to the satisfaction of the person's needs, each value answering to a
personal need (some answering to "transomatic" needs). The
world is not an "independent" object in the sense of being
radically different from a subject. Like all forms of knowledge, values, understood as primitive, biological ones or
highly developed social ones, are tacitly known and mediate
a subject-object dichotomy. And, because they do this,
they appear in the "united" world as realities that correspond to our embodied existence.
36 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 60.
37 Knowin
by Marjor1e
p. 201.
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one intuitive integration to another by the interplay of
.
.
.
38
imagination
as supporte d an d gu1. d e d b y f ormer 1ntegrat1ons.
Thus, whether considering the grounds of discoveries or the
discoveries themselves, tacit knowledge is not the product of
deduction or induction

~ ~

but is an intuitive grasp of the

meaning of hitherto unrelated particulars of knowledge.

All

deduction and induction occur as relations between explicit,
formalized terms, which are themselves dependent upon tacit
forms of knowledge. 39 Even a contradiction, which puts a
dead-end to deductive or inductive knowledge, can be resolved
by an intuitive integration 40 which resolves the tension
between the two terms.

41

As intuitive knowledge, tacit knowing is said to b~
42
"irreversible".
This means that, once one has performed a
certain tacit integration, one cannot erase the knowledge
38 Know1ng
.
.
an d Be1ng:
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago:
p. 204.

Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
University of Chicago Press, 1969),

39rb·,
1Q.' pp. 170, 212.
4°rbid., p. 168.
41 The contradiction between the geocentric and helioce~tric theories in astronomy, eg., was resolved by an insight
W?1ch accounted both for the apparent truth of the geocentric
tneory and for the phenomena which could be explained best by a
heliocentric theory.
42
. .
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCr1t1cal Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1962)' p. 106.

'
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aained by it.

t:>

One can add elements of knowledge to a concept

achieved by such an integration by deduction or inference, but
the basic notion to which one adds (or perhaps subtracts) ideas
is irreversible.

From within the world is permanently trans-

formed, comprehended in deeper and richer ways.
Tacit knowing, then, is an intuitive, heuristic movement toward the meaning of particulars.

The meaning, once

achieved, becomes the ground for all future tacit integrations.
Tacit knowing exists in an inextricable relationship with explicit knowledge, which expresses the focal meaning of what
43
is tacitly known.
When made focally explicit, knowledge
. . 1 tests. 44 We can establish rules that
can b e put to cr1t1ca
are also explicit and which guide us in the way we employ
explicit statements, such as in mathematics or in rules of
evidence in a law court.

Such critical employment may enable

us to correct critically one statement in the light of another,
and this corrective device may even serve to confirm or invali. b ase d on tac1t
.
.
.
45
d ate a k now 1 e d ge c 1 a1m
1ntegrat1on.
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Thus, our

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 11-12.
44
Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 14-15.
45
Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1969)' p. 133.

so
claim on reality through tacit knowledge cannot be arbitrary.
Though tacit knowledge is "a-critical"
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in that is cannot be

judged as right or wrong by the critical standards or deduction and induction, it can be confirmed or invalidated by
critical rules. 47 There is, then, rational access to tacit
meaning since "tacit knowing" in another way of referring to
the deepest context for meaning of any explicit statement.
Thus, what we rely on in order to focus explicitly on something else is the tacit meaning of what we focus on.

Tacit

knowing and tacit meaning are fairly interchangeable terms,
.
1 cr1t1que
. .
.
b ot h . 48
an d rat1ona
may penetrate 1nto
Explicit, critical knowledge, then, is essential in
confirming or invalidating tacit integrations.

And such

intuitions are not true merely by virtue of being intuitious.
Their truth must be confirmed explicitly even though we are

46 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 264.

.

47 rbid., pp. 285-291.
48 copernicus, eg., might well have simply intuited as
a spontaneous, tacit integration the theory that the earth revolves around the sun as the most adequate understanding of
the meaning of the data he had before him. But the explicit
statement of his theory still required a complete critique by
logical rules, contrary data, etc. Such a critique served to
confirm the theory. But it also served to invalidate the
former geocentric theory.
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convinced of the truth of what we intuit.

49

Being convinced of the truth of our intuitions, then,
is not an adequate criterion for their acceptance as true.
such a criterion would be a mere subjective feeling of psychological certainty.

Our intuitions can be false, and this

falsehood must be admitted in the face of a failure of
rational confirmation.
Returning to our development of a Polanyian notion of
values, we can establish that Polanyi is both a cognitivist
and an intuitionist in value theory.

Worth-ascribing acts

aim at fulfilling a knowledge that one thing or act is better
than another:

they project a value and not just an emotional

preference. Values involve knowledge that x is better than y.
And this knowledge is of a tacit, intuitive kind in that it is
a spontaneous integration of particulars into a meaningful
pattern.

But this pattern must, in turn, pass muster before

a rational critique which applies explicit criteria (eg., of
universality and appropriateness) to it.

The result, if the

challenge of the critique is met, is a rational affirmation
of a value, the knowledge of which is rooted in a tacit
integration of hitherto unmeaningful particulars of human
experience.
49 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 9.
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One might be faced, eg., with several alternative
preferences, each of which seems to cancel out the other
(eg., attend to one's work, go to a movie, etc.).

Though

one cannot do all of these at once, a higher knowledge,
which remained tacit until focused upon under the tension
of this decision, can possible unite them.

Out of the effort

of trying to see clearly how to achieve some kind of unity
from this mass of contradictory preferences, there emerges
a plan of action, an ascription of the worth of one act over
another based· .upon a knowledge of "betterness", that places
all proposed

acts~in

perspective.

One might, eg., determine

that certain goals can'be delayed and still be meaningful
while others are more immediate.
sion of values becomes important.

Thus, the temporal dimenSome values may be

delayed in their realization, while others must be immediately pursued.

Functioning with this new insight, one might

order his preferences beginning with the most immediate one
and ending with the one that can be delayed the longest.

A

new insight, then, unifies this activity of worth-ascription:
an insight into value.
Of course, we are here already presupposing a sense
of "betterness" to which we are applying our temporal preferences.

The sense of "betterness" is deeply and tacitly

rooted in our sense of what tends to promote the projects of
our lives; and these projects include the fundamental attempts
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at pure, biotic achievement (food, shelter, etc.) as well as
the highest acts of self-sacrifice for the benefit of others
with whom we share life.

Thus, an insight into value (or

the "betterness" of one over alternative options of action)
is an insight into what promotes our most highly developed
sense of good, considered as the achievement of our projects.
Our projects come given at birth in the cry for life, but
even this fundamental project may be abandoned as we develop
higher insights into value which lead us beyond the biological need for survival.

Thus, though values are rooted in

biological experience, this experience can be reformulated
and developed into radically different senses of worth than
those primordially given at birth.
may

be~

The sense of betterness

priori in this sense; but it is

not~

priori in the

sense that man has a comprehension of value which is fixed
and only needs to be applied to particular instances.

Values

must be discovered as routes to new levels of human existence.
We can distinguish worth-ascription from value in
clear terms.

I speak of insights into value because I con-

sider Polanyi a cognitivist in that he implies that values
are grasped intellectually.

When we grasp a value, we grasp

that one thing, act, or state of affairs is better than
another and may argue for the validity of our position on the
basis of any number of reasons.

The ascription of the worth

of something is based upon such insights.

But sometimes we
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feel that something is better than another thing without knowing the reason why or even knowing the value we are aiming at.
We merely act in accordance with a preference that remains
blind.

This is worth-ascription in its purest sense.

And as

such, worth-ascription is grounded in a tacit knowledge of
the value it is based on.

We may analyze preferences to dis-

cern the values they are based on and offer these as the
ground of our preference.

But usually ascriptions of worth

and insight into value go hand in hand, so that is is not
necessary to distinguish clearly between them.
One's tacit integration of an order of preference,
of course, may be discovered not to be the "right" one.

The

consequences of one's order of preference may indicate that
one's ascription of worth is, eg., self-defeating in that it
dissolves the possiblity of achieving later goals.

Going to

a movie now, eg., may mean that one does not complete one's
work on time.

A critical analysis of one's order of prefer-

ence may reveal this and correct it--or else confirm that one's
original tacit integration has placed one's preferences in a
proper order.
trary.

Our ascriptions of worth, then, are not arbi-

They are grounded in tacit integrations that yield

insight into a right order, a value that can act as a standard for ordering our lives and achieving ultimately an
insight into the Good.

In this. sense, a self-defeating act

reveals the falsehood of one's value and, thus, reveals a
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negative criterion for right choice.
Our original tacit integration is a-critical.

But

this insight ·may be corrected, modified, confirmed, or invalidated by explicit developments of it.

One important feature

of this corrective or validating procedure is that it reveals
50
tacit knowing as a kind of "foreknowledge"
We make explicit
what we already know tacitly, and we shape the form of our
explicit knowledge through the guidance of the clues offered
us in our tacit knowing:
. ht S.
Slg

we "feel" our way toward new in-

51
As we move into the area of man's- higher functions

of concept-formation, this.foreknowledge becomes more important.

For here we discover that the search for understanding,

to achieve intellectual integrations that make deep and penetrating sense of the world, is itself an inherent desire in
52
man.
And it is a desire which aims at its own satisfaction.
We achieve this satisfaction by "sensing" our way to the resolution of intellectual paradoxes, often guided by conceptions we never previously thought had any bearing upon the

50 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,

Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 23.
51
. .
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Cr1t1cal Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

N.y.:

196 2) ' p. 12 8.

S2 Ibid . , p . 12 7 .
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the reality in question.

In this sense, such concepts are

heuristic in nature, forming an interpretive guide to new
insights which integrate wide ranges of previously unrelated
concepts. 53 Thus, intellectual desire, thrusting forth as
an energy of probing, reflecting, researching, integrating
54
imagination,
is a passion that finds its resolution only
in an understanding to which one is fully committed as bearing on reality. 55 Indeed, Polanyi claims that a feeling of
satisfaction, of resolution, is one of the marks of truth. 56
This does not mean, however, that such a feeling of
resolution or

satisfaction~is

the criterion of truth.

Polanyi's concept of truth does not permit any single, simple
criterion which can distinguish truth from falsehood in
definite, clarion tones.

Our beliefs, whether true or false, .

involve commitments to act as though they bore directly on
reality:

belief involves a passionate commitment to the

reality revealed to us in believing.

That is, believing is

reality-orientated, as I have already pointed out in my discussion of the ontological aspect of tacit knowing .

. 5\iichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Criti-

cal Phi)osophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 143.
54
.
Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago: The
Un1versity of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 57.
5

.
~ichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical
Ph1losophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 106.
5
\richael Polanyi, The · Study of Man (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 26.

\
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Polanyi's definitions of reality and of truth bear a
striking similarity.

Reality attracts our attention by

clues which create the tension that only a passionate intellectual research can satisfy.

And it has this power of attrac-

tion because it is independent of the knower and can manifest
itself in unexpected ways.S7

Similarly, an idea is true when

it is capable of revealing its own truth by continuing confirmations in yet unknown and unthinkable consequences. 58

We

have an "intimation" of reality in a true idea, 59 an intimation which confirms itself in new and unexpected ways as we
follow its limitless implications,60 an intimation which leads
us to patterns of ideas that are truly aspects of reality. 61

by M. Grene,
pp. 119-12 0.

Michael Polan i, edited
of C icago Press, 1969)

58Nichael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosoph¥ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1962), pp. vii-vii1; Michael Polanyi.
59Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social
Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz (N.Y.: International Universities
Press, Inc., 1974), p. 126.
6 0Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962),p. 252.
61 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 10.
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Polanyi's notion of truth should enable us to see
that, though no truth comes to us without our passionate commitment to it as truth, truth itself is not reducible to a
mere passion.

One must still ask whether our passions -

our commitments, are right. 62
The rightness of a passion or commitment canoot, however, be determined by traditional epistemological tests.
Polanyi finds fault, e.g., with the correspondence theory of
truth.63

The necessity of conceiving assertions as belief

commitments alone makes a correspondence theory of truth unacceptable, together with all of the criteria which might

6 2Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 134.
6 3 Polanyi has been accused of leaving no room for the
traditional notion of belief as "deciding to believe in" something. ("Michael Polanyi The Responsible Person," Walter
E. Conn, The Heythrop Journal, 17, 1976, pp. 45-7). To some
extent this accusation is based on Polanyi's identification of
the statement "P if true" with the statement "I believe P is
true" (Personal Knowledge, p. 305). Thus, tacit belief is
identified, in the eyes of his accusers, with explicit belief.
And this identification precludes faith as a decision to pick
up a point of view among other possible points of view. But
in reality Polanyi does not intend this identification to be
carried so far. Decisions to believe are different from tacit
belief; but they are not excluded by it. When faced with
several different interpretations of a text, e.g., one might
decide in favor of one without any evidence that excludes the
others.

59
determine whethe~ our ideas correspond with reality.

64

Briefly,

if we are committed to the beliefs we hold, it makes no sense
to "stand outside" of them in order to determine whether they
are true by virtue of corresponding to what reality "really"
is.

Polanyi holds that such a theory amounts to making truth

an unasserted assertion, which is a contradiction in terms.
We must acknowledge the

_"fiduciary" element of truth and

formulate a theory of truth that does not force us to deny our
commitments.
Polanyi has trouble also with other theories of truth.
He denies, eg., that the fruitfulness of a theory is in
itself a criterion of truth, 65 though it is an element of the
. . .
66
trut h -crlterlon.
The fruitfulness of a theory is its capacity to lead to new ideas and adventurous paths of research.
But some ideas can be fruitful and not true.

One might gene-

rate all sorts of interesting evidence to support a geocentric
theory of the unvierse and still be wrong, despite the massive
amount of evidence and supporting ideas that can be found.

The

problem is here that no continuous confirming evidence is
64 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 305; but cf. an earlier appreciation for correspondence-theroy language; Michael Polanyi, Notes on Prejudice (Unpublished manuscript, The University of Chicago Special Collections Library, 11/28/39), p. 1.
65Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 147
66
Ibid., p. 148.
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found--only more ideas:

Fruitfulness

per~'

then, cannot be

the final criterion of truth, although one must admit that an
idea which does not lead to new and more penetrating insights
into reality cannot be true.
The same thing can be said for coherence.
incoherent ideas cannot be true.

Certainly

But coherence itself is

only an expression of the stability of our ideas, not of
their truth. 67 Of course, we can expect an idea that is true
in one field of thought to be consistent at least with a
true idea in another field and to show signs of leading to
a more comprehensive truth. 68 But this consistency still
does not enable us to assert that consistency alone makes both
ideas true.
Polanyi is not left, however, without any guides of
truth.

We have already said that an idea must be fruitful

and coherent in order to be true, even though these are not
final categories of truth.

But, more than this, an idea is

usually considered worth following up for its fruitfulness
if it is accurately determined and well defined, if it is
systematically relevant to its own field, and if it is

67 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 294.
68 Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom (New York: Arno Press,
1975), p. 42.
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intrinsically interestinf as well as plausible.

69

Simplicity

is excluded as a guiding principle, since some true ideas are
70
more complex than false ones.
None of these "guides", however, are final determinants of truth.

Rejecting traditional theories of truth

while outlining certain marks of truth, Polanyi claims that
71
truth is knowable but not demonstrable as such.
He means
to separate the knowledge of truth from a theory concerning
how we justify truth claims.

Indeed, we can know true ideas

without being able to justify them as true by reference to
epistemological theories.
theory of tacit knowing:

This is precisely the claim of a
to grasp a truth is. always to

.
. d eeper t h an our own un d erstan d"lng~ 72
grasp a rea 1 lty
t h at lS
We always know more than we can tell.

We can know that what

we tell bears the marks of truth and that it bears on reality
in such a way as to enliven us to new worlds which confirm
the partial truths of our old world and go far beyond them.
69
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. 135-6.
701'Dl. d •

,

p. 166.

71 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 82.
72 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 43.
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But there are no "final" determinants of truth.
no unchanging truths.

There are

Polanyi says,

... man has the power to establish real patterns in
nature, the reality of which is manifested by the
fact that their future implications extend indefi~
nitely beyond the experiences which they were to
control. The appraisal of such order is made with
universal intent and convey~ indeed a claim to an
unlimited range of as yet unspecifiable true
intimations.73
In the end, we must credit our own personal judgment with
ultimate powers to discern truth and falsehood. 74
For this reason,

Polany~

stresses what I have de-

scribed as the fiduciary element of knowledge:
as grounded in belief-commitment.

its character

He points to our capacity

to doubt whether what we believe is true as itself implying
.
d . 75 He says,
. f o f some k.1nd to wh"1c h we are comm1tte
a b e 1 1e
We must recognize belief once more as the source
of all knowledge ... No intelligence, however critical
or original can operate outside such a fiduciary
framework.76

73
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
. Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 37.
74 Ibid., p. 265.
75 rbid., pp. 273-4.
76 Ibid., p. 266.
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And, concerning the impossibility of final criteria of truth,
we find him saying, " ... Any inquiry into our ultimate beliefs
can be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions.
It must be intentionally circular". 77
Polanyi does not mean, as do critical rationalists,
7 8 Rat h er,
. . .
. comm1tte
.
d to a stance o f se lf -cr1t1c1sm.
that h e 1s
he is committed to an "a-critical" stance in that he believes
that no critique is possible without reference to some
ticular frame of commitment.

par~

A stance of commitment must

always precede criticism, though all commitments can be criticized from within a larger context of knowledge to which one
is committed.
Such a position is tantamount to restating Polanyi's
fundamental tenet of tacit knowledge:
we can tell.

that we know more than

Doubt can imply a commitment or a possibility

of commitment to another frame of reference which itself may
be doubted.

Such doubt is tacit knowledge of other frames of

reference. and no frame is indubitable.

Yet, doubt implies a

commitment to other possibilities, a knowledge of other possibilities.

Hence, critique, though infinite, is always rooted

77 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 299.

Conn

'

78 "Michael Polanyi The Responsible Person", Walter E.
Heythrop Journal, 17, 1976, pp. 31-49.
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in a knowledge-commitment which holds itself as true.

Con-

travening evidence alone can discredit this commitment; but,
at the same time, such evidence opens new possibilities of
truth which form the ground of new commitments.
This means that knowledge is not just a passive
entertainment of mental pictures which may or may not be true.
It always involves a commitment to a truth that is larger
than our grasp of it, a commitment that is an investment of
our personal selves.

A change in beliefs is not just a

change of mind; it is a personal re-orientation within a new
.
79
context o f mean1ng, a new persona 1 1nvestment.
0

4.

Personal Knowledge of· Values
The tenor of Polanyi's argument concerning tacit

knowledge has been to establish the whole involvement of our
personhood in the act of knowing.

From the most fundamental

bodily perceptions to the highest acts of intellectual problem-solving, the bodily and i:r..·tellectual commitment of our. a persona 1 1nvestment. 80
se 1 ves 1s
0

79

Knowledge, in this sense,

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 105.
80

rbid., pp. 300-301.
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is essentially personal.

81

To say that knowledge is personal is not, however, to
say that it is arbitrary or subjective.

Polanyi asserts that

any knowledge-claim must be a responsible claim; it
must respond adequately to standards of truth that are
already present and relative to the field of knowledge in
82
which the claim is made.
This means that a personal claim to truth is at the
same time a claim that meets standards that are proposed as
universal, at least within the field (truth in art might, eg.,
satisfy other standards ,than those of scientific truth).
Polanyi says " ... The personal comes into existence by asserting universal irttent, and the universal is constituted by
being accepted as the impersonal term of this personal commitment".83

Concerning the "personal term", Polanyi says,

"Every factual statement embodies some measure of responsible judgment as the personal pole of the commitment in

81 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. vii-viii.
82 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 41.
\
83 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 308.
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in which it is affirmed".

84

This responsible judgment consti-

tutes the personal pole of the commitment because we identify
our commitments with ourselves, the most intimate recesses of
our personhood.

85

Thus, our personal commitment to our beliefs is at the
same time a submission to the unviersal intent of these beliefs,
for we submit ourselves to the universal standards of truth
. d 1n
. our asser t"1ons. 86.
impl1e

Clearly, claims of personal

knowledge cannot be subjective in the sense of being arbitrary.

For each claim can be faulted by its failure to meet

the standards of truth it claims to obey even in the process
of establishing them. 87
We participate in the act of knowing, then, by projecting our conviction as true by virtue of the universal standards of truth they imply and to which we ourselves submit, expecting that all other persons shall also submit to the.
we say:

Thus,

"I hold this as true and expect everyone else to take

84 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 312.
85 Ibid., p. 59.

86 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.y.:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 77-8.
87 The term "personal subjectivity" really means "personal responsibility"; Michael Polanyi, Remarks sent toM.
~oupise, Unpublished Manuscript, University of Chicago, 2/2/39.
Box 26, Folder 1.
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account of its truth when they make knowledge-claims.

No

one, including myself, should contradict this truth."

Or,

"This kind of idea is a good way of understanding such events.
Everyone, including myself, should understand such events
this way".

Or again, "All such things are instances of x

and should be understood as such".

And, as various claims

yield their universal standards, the domains of knowledge
(art, science, politics, history--ethics) distinguish themselves, and the standards of truth within them become more
.

.

88

Our personal commitment to universal standards
is a commitment to believe that they bear on reality. 89 And

d e f 1n1te.

only when we retreat from our commitment does reality seem
to fall into irretrievable

---g 0

doub~.

We may wish to formalize personal knowledge in terms
of highly defined statements, mathematical calculi,
tical probability, etc.

satis~

In doing this we must remember that

all such formalizations rely on what is unformalized, tacit,

88 Th . . d
.
b ecause t h e 1mag1.
.
lS
oes not mean t h at, JUSt
nation is active in projecting the pathways to truth, the
truth discovered is imaginary.
89 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
"Press, 1962), p. 132.
90

rbid., p. 379.
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in personal knowledge.

For example, defining always relies

on undefined (tacit) terms and on an undefined understanding
of how the definition functions. 91 Mathematics even relies
on tacit knowledge of what its abstractions refer to and of
92
how to apply it to the real world.
Thus, we must understand personal knowledge as represented in but not as identical to the narrower scope of its formalizations.

"Personal

knowledge" is a broad concept referring to the tacit and
explicit terms of knowledge.
To sum up Polanyi's notion of personal knowledge in
his own words,
It is the act of commitment in its full structure
that saves personal knowledge from being merely
subjective. Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling
claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be
true. It is an act of hope, striving to fulfill an
obligation within a personal situation for which I
am not responsible and which therefore determines
my calling. This hope and this obligation are expressed in the universal intent of personal knowledge.93

91

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
~-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
ress, 1962), p. 250.
92
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 21 .
. ~Michae~ Polanyi, P~rsonal Knowledge: Towards a
~ost-Crltlcal Phllosophy (Chlcago: The University of Chicaao
0
ress, 1962), p. 65.
·
9
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To summarize this discussion of personal knowledge as
a whole, we can return briefly to Polanyi's idea that conceptual knowledge is powered by a kind of intellectual need
for understanding, a need which "feels" its way to its own
satisfaction as it moves through tacit clues toward an insight which in some sense it foreknows.

This dynamic, in
Polanyi's opinion, is the answer to Meno's paradox. 94 We
recognize the answer to a problem because we know its answer
tacitly through the clues that can be integrated into an explicit statement.

Thus, as we develop and in turn rely on

our conceptions to approach new insights, we indeed create
new, sweeping intellectual visions in which we hope to catch
something of reality.

We follow and confirm our intimations

of reality, a reality which attracts us as the object of our
intellectual passion.
The visions we achieve, therefore, are satisfactory
only as visions of reality.

They cannot be mere imaginative

adventures which expend themselves as subjective passions
for mental pleasures.

We must be committed to what we be-

lieve in as bearing on an aspect of reality while being
willing to relinquish beliefs that show themselves as wrong
in the context of living through a commitment to them.

Like

Luther, we must say, "Here I stand and cannot do otherwise".
94

.Meno, line SOd, ff.
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If insight into the nature of reality relies upon
not simply a "sensory registration" of the world but rather
a total personal engagement with it in terms of our commitments, then insight into value as a proper ordering of preferences must be seen as a personal knowledge of valuerealities.

I.E., personal knowledge, if it can be extended

into other domains of knowledge besides that of science (as
we have seen that it can) can be extended to the domain of
knowledge which is constituted by the claim to know what we
should do.

We have a personal knowledge of values.

We might not be able to make this argument if Polanyi
' had restricted his notion of personal knowledge to scientific
knowing.

But obviously the general statement of this concept

implies a breadth of application which cannot be restricted
to the sciences.

We claim to know what is art and what

isn't, to know events in history, to know the objects of our
religious devotion, etc.

Polanyi indicates that knowledge

in any of these domains of experience is valid in so far as
it obeys the universal standards that are relevant to each
domain.

He does not impose a scientific model on the whole

of our knowledge claims, excluding those which are not
"scientific".

Rather, he describes in a phenomenological

manner the essential structure of any act of knowing, comprehends it as "personal", and understands this essential
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to apply to knowing acts in any domain of knowledge.
A personal knowledge of values cannot be excluded as
a possibility any more than can the claims of personal knowledge in other domains of knowledge.

Polanyi seems to allow

knowledge claims whenever the unique standards within a
domain are met.

Certainly we can view our claim to know

what we ought to value and to do as a claim of personal knowledge which is valid in so far as we meet the tinique standards
of the moral domain.

CHAPTER TWO
EXPLICITATION OF TACIT KNOWING
This chapter is devoted to one main issue:

the

development of explicit concepts from tacit knowledge.

Thus,

I am extending the argument of Chapter One to cover the assertion that both tacit and explicit forms of knowledge are
personal.

And I apply the dynamic of explicitation to value-

knowledge in order to argue that our value concepts are
instances of personal knowledge.

As a corollary, I

w~sh

to

assert that value assertions can be true or false.
Our visions of reality cannot be tested for truth by
criteria that stand outside of them or by criteria that are
a part of any sensible statement (eg., consistency, coherency).
They themselves set the standards by

w~ich

they are judged.

We project our visions as universal truths and submit our
thinking to them, confident that they deepen our insight into
reality.

The "correspondence" of our ideas with a detached

"reality", the fruitfulness of our ideas as their consistency, though "marks" of truth, cannot finally determine our
confidence that our personal investment is right or wrong.
This is left to our own judgment ultimately guided by hope
and a responsible submission to the standards we set for
ourselves as personal knowers.

Knowledge, then, is not to

'

be identified with the subjective passions that often empower
72
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it to develop nor with the cold formalizations that pronounce
memorial over passions long since spent.

Knowledge is respon-

sibly personal, full of visions that are both real and intimately human.
Polanyi's notion of personal knowledge can be extended to the domain of ethical knowledge, knowledge of the
Good. 95 I have already spoken of our everyday experience of
having to order our preferences by evaluating them, ascribing relative levels of worth to them.

Our innate capacity

to desire, to need and to reach out to satisfy our needs,
intimately related to our bodily existence in a world of
living beings, is a fundamental foreknowledge of values.

Our

desires and the more sophisticated evaluations that we make
all serve in turn as tacit evaluations which guide our
efforts to new insights into higher, more comprehensive and
workable value-structures, including insights into the esseni

tial nature of values themselves.

Thus, the structure of

tacit foreknowledge is applicable in the domain of value
knowledge just as it is in other domains such as science,
art, religion, etc.

Indeed, our highest conceptions of the

Good are explicitations of what we already know about it
tacitly in terms of values we live by.

95 I capitalize this term not because of any pretense
to Platonism, but because it represents the ultimate category
of the ethical domain.
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The need to evaluate, to order ascriptions of worth,
is itself a desire to know a proper hierarchy of value.

We

seek not only to discover and order experiences of worth, but
we also seek an intellectual clarification of values in themselves.

We seek not only to live through our values but also

to know them.

And this impetus to know values can be satis-

fied only by a commitment to achieve a deeper intellectual
insight into them, an insight which, in turn, serves as the
tacit guide to even more comprehensive understandings.

Thus,

the development of a value structure through reflective evaluation is intimately connected with the intellectual grasp of
values.

.

Evaluation leads to knowledge of values, and this

knowledge becomes the new platform from which we ascribe
worth and order our preferences.

Intellect and desire

coalesce here into a kind of intellectual desire for the Good.
We grope our way to higher conceptions of the Good by
relying on past comprehensions and present experiences.

We

seek an understanding of the Good that we can live in and
through which we can experience life as inherently valuable.
This means that we must be concerned about the rightness of
our values.

Values cannot be mere explicit statements of

what we want; we must learn to order our sense of worth, to
value rightly.

We must seek to evaluate according to our

knowledge of value, a knowledge we confidently assert as
right and which bears on reality.

We look for an
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understanding of the Good that is true and which therefore
leads us into a real sharing in the Good--in so far as we
understand it.
Of course, just as traditional tests of truth are not
applicable to Polanyi's epistemology, so neither are such
criteria applicable to our knowledge of the Good.

Theories

of the Good that are fruitful only in the sense that they
beget more complex theories cannot lead us to experience the
reality of a growing understanding of the Good.

On the other

hand, theories that are attractive merely because they are
simple may overlook the highly complex tacit background of
explicit value ascriptions or statements of value.

Again,

theories which try to build "models" of the Good as a whole,
models which are supposed to "correspond" to the reality of
the Good while asserting their function only as models, merely
attempt to construct another universe of discourse for the
real thing.

Such attempts overlook the bridge between sub-

ject and object formed by Polanyi's expistmology.

Values are

lived in through a commitment we cannot escape by fleeing
into the detachment of a model which somehow we "hope" corresponds to reality.

Nor can a coherent theory of

itself enable us to discover right values.

value in

We can always

justify what we want to do by coherent arguments and even a
coherent theory of values.

But such coherent theories do not

necessarily give us right values, values that manifest the
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nature of the Good.

We seek to know values that bear on the

reality of the Good, which continue to bear fruit as intimations of ultimate Good.
We see the Good which satisfies our search for right
values as an independent reality which attracts us to itself.
Like any object of knowledge, the Good is discovered piecemeal through individual and concrete experiences of valuing,
experiences that are an inherent element of human life.

Piece-

meal experiences reveal an attractive object in a piece-meal
way.

Nevertheless, they demand our attention and the eleva-

tion of our whole person, especially the intellect, to understand that object and approP.riate the quality of reality it
yields.

Our understanding of the Good is a temporal process

that unfolds a reality which alone is the fundamental base
of a comprehensive knowledge of values:

the Good itself.

Fruitfulness, coherency, consistency, etc., are all
marks of true intimations of the Good.

But they are not

final determinants of a true knowledge of it for the same
reasons they can determine no reality as finally known. Thus,
knowledge of the Good bears the same fiduciary element that
undergirds all other forms of knowledge.

We rely on tacit

knowledge of values--a reliance that is the full weight of
commitment--in order to attend to more comprehensive theories
of the Good.

The Good always appears from within the context

of our commitment.

We acknowledge particular goods, some of
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which may be circumstances; and the Good comes to clarity
from within these commitments through a graduatl explicitation
of their tacit components.

This explicitation of the Good is an act of personal
knowledge.

It is not arbitrary but obeys the standards of

truth that are maintained tacitly in commitments more lived
in that thought ought.

We "think out" our notions of value

and of the Good by trying to achieve comprehensive visions
that are grounded in and unify our various tacit comprehensions.
So, these explicitations must share the confidence we have in
our tacit knowledge that the reality of the Good shines
through our value-commitments.

Further, if we were to con-

sider them in isolation from the concept that unifies them,
we would find them consistent and coherent with the whole as
represented by the integration.

And we would find continued

and unexpected confirmation of our explicitations in the new
aspects of the Good which reveal themselves when in turn we
rely on these explicitations as tacit components of a new
vision.

Our intellectual achievements of new visions of the
Good obey standards of knowledge we ourselves have projected
as universal.

And with each new concept, we build standards
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by which we judge as true the knowledge of values that shine

forth from the Good.

Thus, in the act of asserting confi-

dently the new visions we achieve, we also submit ourselves
to the standards they represent.

:hese standards must be

viewed as standards set by a personal knowledge of values.
Thus, we have a personal knowledge of values and, ultimately,
of the Good.

We are called to this knowledge by the reality

of the Good that partially reveals itself to us in our experience of valuation and urges us to find satisfactory
resolutions of the tensions generated by contradictory acts
of valuation.

We seek a wholeness of life, and this whole-

ness depends upon a true knowledge of the Good.96
But how do these insights into value develop into
theories of value or explcit concepts?

I have already

indicated something of the movement of thought by which this
occurs.

But we may return to Polanyi's epistemology for a

96
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 318.
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more comprehensive view of the development of truth in general.

97

97 The difficulty in clearly distinguishing the personal
character of knowledge from both the subjective and the objective senses of knowledge cannot be lightly passed over. One
might argue that Polanyi does not escape subjectivism merely by
showing that the claims of personal knowledge are not arbitrary.
A claim can be subjective in a sense other than that of being
arbitrary; and, indeed, being arbitrary may not be the most
dangerous sense of subjectivity. More dangerous, in the sense
of more subtly illusory and misleading, is the concept which
seems to follow from a sense of reality, rational reflection,
a system of right b<:;liefs, etc., but is simply wrong. We believe something to be true, even with the usual justifications,
but our belief is ultimately ungrounded and wrong: it is subjective.
Polanyi may easily avoid the charge of naive realism
because of his insistence upon subjecting knowledge claims to
universal standards. But he does not thereby avoid the charge
that such standards are just as subjective as the knowledge
claim would be without its benefit. Hence, the knowledge claim
itself, grounded in what is itself ungrounded in anything other
than our decision to project our own notions as universal truths
t~ be obeyed by everyone, is subjective.
One might enjoin the critic to recall Polanyi's notion
that knowledge always involves an ontological commitment. Thus,
we never believe that we are only engaged in an act of belief;
we believe that our concepts touch reality and thus escape subjectivism. But this argument against the charge of subjectivism cannot succeed because it never qualifies precisely what
is known objectively. To claim that we have some grasp o-f--reality without specifying at least part of what constitutes
that grasp is no more to escape subjectivity than did Kant in
his distinction between phenomena and noumena. Polanyi's ontological commitment appears to have no more substance than Kant's
noumena. Hence, if Kant's phenomena can be said to be subjective in the sense that knowledge claims based on them have no
right to reality, so Polanyi's ontological claim remains ontologically empty and does not save him from the charge of subjectivism.
However, Polanyi might be saved from this charge if we
note that the subjective-objective distinction is itself
grounded in the Cartesian model of an ontology bifurcated by
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The explicitation of the tacit is a process of two
mutually supportive directions:

from a recognition of a whole

toward identification of the tacit particulars that are integrated to comprise it; and the recognition of particulars

two fundamental substances, mind and matter. The Cartesian
and Kantian dilemas of the mind-body dichotomy cannot be overcome as long as this model is maintained. But it is precisely
this model that is assumed in criticising Polanyi for not being
"objective".
Polanyi does not accept the Cartesian model; hence,
criticisms which are grounded in it miss the point. For Polanyi,
the world as known and the knower mutually disclose each other,
with neither being primary. The alternation from world to embodied knower and back again is responsible for the distinction
between~inner and outer, internal and external, subjective and
objective. But this distinction more adequately represents the
subjective as that which proves mistaken rather than that which
is truly "inner" as opposed to a truly "outer". Polany'i's ontological commitment is not restricted to assertions about an
"external" reality. It is a commitment to acknowledge that our
assertions are true in so far as they grasp reality, considered
as a continuously contirming series of concepts in which our
deepest tacit sense of what is real comes to make sense while
new vistas of research are opened to us. Our ontological commitment is not empty, as is Kant's noumena. It is as full as
the assertion concerning reality itself, while it also leaves
room for change and development--even eventual contradiction.
Such changes, even when implying that we were wrong in our
assertions, still leaves room for being right in so far as we
have experience to organize into concepts. To be "wrong" means
merely to ascribe to a model of exploration or understanding
which does not adequately account for what we come to know even
if it accounts for what we presently know.
Personal knowledge, whether of the moral domain of of
other domains of knowledge, is, then, neither subjective or
objective. But it avoids the scylla and charybdis of this
dilemma not by residing within the terms of the distinction
and attempting to mediate between them but by passing beyond
the distinction to the fundamental ambiguity of knower and
World, an ambiguity in which commitment and certainty also
mutually determine each other.
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tolvard grasping their integrated \vhole. 98

When we attend from

particulars to their meaning, we "interiorize" them; and when
we look away from the meaning toward the particulars, we
"alienate" them: we single them out by standing aside and
looking at them. 99 We may see interiorization as the act of
.
. 1 ars,100 wh ereas s1ng 1 tacit or subsidiary re 1 1ance
on part1cu
<

•

ing out particulars is a wav of_seeing them uncomprehenditigly
rather than understandingly in the context of their participation in the whole.
Polanyi calls this focusing on and singling out of
. 1 ars "d estruct1ve
.
. " . 101
part1cu
ana 1 ys1s

Despite the negative

overtones of the word "destructive", Polanyi does not mean
that such analysis is inappropriate to the development of
knowledge.

On the contrary, it is the means by which the

tacit becomes objectified in explicit statements.

We perform

destructive analysis whenever we single out an object in per-

:

ception, 102 trace out conceptual possibilities of the cause
98K now1n
.

an d

by Marjorie Grene,
p. 125.

99 Ibid., p. 146.
100

Ibid., p. 128.

M~chael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCr1t1cal Ph1losophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
. .

101

19 6 2) ' pp. 50-52 .

102Know1ng
.
.
an d Be1ng:

by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago:
p. 115.

Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
University of Chicago Press, 1969),
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of an event

103

or stop the bad performance of a skill in

order to focus on what we are doing wrong.

Thus, the ultimate

purpose of destructive analysis is to enable us, once we have
singled out and corrected a faulty element in perception, skill,
skill, or conceptual knowledge, to reintegrate it into a
. h we can re 1y w1t
. h renewe d con f"d
tacit wh o 1 e upon wh 1c
1 ence. l04
We cannot replace tacit knowledge by a continued

growth of

explicit statements developed under destructive analysis; we
can only correct and develop tacit knowledge by using such
analysis as a too1. 105 Tacit knowledge can be corrected in
the sense that mistaken assumptions which are often woven into
the fabric of basically true commitments can be isolated and
modified or eradicated from the functioning tacit integration.
Being tacit is no guarantee of being true, though tacit truths
are lived as well as "known".
tional only as tacit.

Some truths, indeed, are func-

Imagine, eg., replacing knowing how to

.ride a bicycle or tie a knot with a detailed description of
how to perform such skills.

103 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 57 ..
104 Knowing and Being: E~says_by Micha~l Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: Un1vers1ty of Ch1cago Press, 1969),
p . 12 5 . ; Michael Polanyi, Tacit Dimension (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1966), p. 19.
105 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 20.
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The process of becoming explicit, then, is a process
of destructive analysis.

The rules of procedure we adopt to

perform such analysis may vary with the object of knowledge
which we seek; they must only be adequate for isolating the
data we wish to make explicit:
~elds

a mathematical analysis

abstract, formalized data; a religious inquiry yields

knowledge different from that in art, history, etc.

Fact

and method determine each other in that only facts which
respond to the question posed by the method can appear as
true explicitations of the domain of tacit knowledge in which
one seeks truth; and these facts:in turn may guide our questions toward a more penetrating gaze which uncovers and
brings to light entire domains of tacit knowledge. 106
The word "explicitation" suggests making known what
is implied.

But the common understanding of implication can-

not be applied to Polanyi's concept of explicitation.

Apart

from the obvious sense of this word ln mathematics and logic,
it is also used to describe how "objective" forms of knowledge are contained in tacit forms.

But here we can see

that deduction does not itself define the whole process of

106
__ __

.Michael Polanyi, Histo-ry, Philosophy, and the
Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.:
-~rno Press, 1975), pp. 1, 161.
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elucidating the tacit, though it may be one part of the process.

The explicit appears as such more through a free play

of the imagination guided by certain questions than by a process of chain-logic (though such logical thinking does not
preclude the discovery of new ideas which are more "traditionally" implied in tacit thoughts).
The existence of explicit concepts does, however,
. a tac1t
. d"1mens1on
.
imply t h at t h ere 1s
o f k now 1 e d ge. 107

have already shown why and how this is so.
note

I

We need only

here that, since knowledge develops by an alternation

of destructive analysis and re-integration of particulars,
Polanyi's creative sense of implication functions on both
sides.

We "see" the tacit particulars we wish to single out

because they respond to a question we are asking of the
whole, such as "Why doesn't it behave as I expect if I
understand it properly?"

We see elements of knowledge as

"contained in" the whole; but we may arrive at the knowledge
of them through means other than deduction.

Nonetheless,

because there truly is a "containment" of the explicit in

lO?Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 12.

The
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the tacit and of tacit notions within explicit statements, we
may reasonably say that they are related by implication.
Further, since knowledge develops by an alternation
of analysis and integration, we may see the dangers of stressing as worthwhile, only the "objective" side of knowledge.
The benefit of formalization is that when we rely on it to
attend to new problems, it opens new vistas of insight. 108
Partial formalization·is essential in knowledge.

But

one cannot objectify everything; and one ought not to try.
The possibility of systematic errors, 109 mi~application of
facts or procedure, etc., are only mechanical difficulties
which nevertheless form permanent barriers to total formalization of knowledge.

So when Polanyi says "I start by rejecting the ideal of scientific detachment" 110 he means that
the attempt to define the scope and limits of knowledge by
the borders of explicit statements is inherently a misguided
ideal.

Such an ideal does not properly represent the way

108 Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the
Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.:
Arno Press, 1975), pp. 5-6; Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowl~dge:
Towards A Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 29.
109Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 19.
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in which we actually gain knowledge, 111 as I have already
demonstrated; and it ends in the absurdity of defining ad
infinitum every speck of cosmic dust while losing the crucial
perspective of knowledge as a human reality born in and sup·
I 112
porte d b y persona 1 cornrn1tment.

The loss of the human perspective leads us to an
absurd, Laplacean mechanical interpretation of the universe. 113
And this is a universe in which even the highest concepts of
justice, morality, custom, law, Good, and evil are reduced to
111 Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thou ht and Social

Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz N.Y., N.Y.: International
Universities Press, Inc., ~974), p. 60.
112 This loss of perspective is Polanyi's major criti-

cism of the drive to perfect formalization. Most positivists will admit, of course, that perfect formalization of
knowledge is an unattainable ideal. But, they might insist,
this is no reason to stop seeking the ideal. After all,
small victories are better than no victories at all--or
fleeing the battleground altogether! But Polanyi is saying
that even these "small victories" must be put into a perspective whose knowledge-content exceeds the "field" of
formalization if they are to yield any sense at all. And
this perspective is gained only by recognizing that it represents a personal though intentionally universal commitment to view reality in a certain way--a way not justified
by the terms of formalization alone.
113Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 153
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statistical descriptions of what people believe.

114

Human

experience becomes something to manipulate through prediction
and control rather than valuable in itself as the prime re..
115
vealer of th1ngs.
The ideal of total formalization, then, is a rampant,
uncontrolled orgy of destructive analysis uncorrected by a
human effort to understand from committed perspectives.
Reality presents itself with its richness of experience and
knowledge to those who engage the whole of their persons in
it and who develop their knowledge out of an engagement that
seeks a universal perspective for all formalizations.
How, then, does an explicit understanding of values
develop in the light of this analysis?

We

~ave

already

shown how the knowledge of values develops tacitly from
human experience and the need to order ascriptions of worth.
We may now apply the process of destructive analysis to the
development of value-knowledge.
is, as

we

For if knowledge of values

have shown thus far, a matter of tacit knowing,

then it must become explicit in the same way in which the
-~-----

--

114Michael Polanyi, Scientific Thought and Social
Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International
Universities Press, Inc., 1974),p. SO; Intellect and Hope,
ed. by Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1968), p. 54.
115 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 197.
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tacit dimension becomes explicit in other domains of knowledge.

The burden df unfolding the unique explicitation of

value-knowledge lies upon us, since Polanyi does not develop
his theory of tacit knowing in this area.
In the process of finding our value-structures inadequate to meet the new situations to which they inevitably
bring us, we single our particular values, making them
"objective" and "theoretical".

From experiencing friendship,

eg., one might conclude that the good in friendship lies in
the fact that friends are available to help us.

This may

lead to our igTioring friends except in times of trouble.
And, when we discover that they are no longer available to
us because of our long neglect, we may suspect that something
is wrong with our understanding of the value of friendship.
Thus, we focus on this value, objectifying it for the purpose of gazing at the structure we have bee~ living in.

We

raise this value out of tacit waters like the hull of a boat
in order to inspect its structure for seaworthiness.

Clear-

ly, this value is part of our whole value structure just as
the hull, hidden below the waters, is an essential part of
the boat.

And once structural repairs or even rebuilding has

been done to this section, the boat will be renewed and fit
again for travel.

The hull is resubmerged, where it tacitly

supports a renewed voyage.

In the case of our value of
\

friendship, we may observe that our error lay in failing to
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to see that the good of friendship lies in a two-way sharing
of help and understanding.

We may then place renewed confi-

dence in our re-structured understanding and come again to
rely on our value of friendhsip in life.
Thus, our theoretical and explicit gaze on this value
led us to a renewed understanding of the value which was able
to function tacitly and resolve the"tension of the question.
Our gaze contemplated the inadequate structure, tracing out
possible lines of re-structure toward the sense of adequacy,
still tacit within us, which we required.

Thus, even this

tacit sense of adequacy is contained within our sense of the
failure of our value, the object of our

g~ze.

We cannot

escape the tacit ground of our values by objectifying them;
but we can deepen and improve this ground by correcting our
tacit misunderstandings explicitly--and then returning them
to our tacit confidence.
We should be warned, however, that an understanding
of values and of the Good cannot be identified with a
theoretical structure.

Personal knowledge of these ethical

realities includes the tacit understanding that grounds all
of our explicit theories, including the standards to which
we submit them.

Polanyi would not accept as valid any

approach to values or the Good which attempts to capture
their reality in a theoretical structure.

This is evident

in his assertion that concepts of justice, morality, custom,
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laW, Good, and evil cannot be reduced to descriptions of
what people believe.

And such would be the case if we turned

our understanding of values into a description of them.
Here Polanyi explicitly admits the reality of these
experiences and indicates that they have an independent importance in determining how we should understand the knowing
process.

His point seems to be not only that these ethical

notions cannot be comprehended by mere description but also
that the realities they denote whould be acknowledged in
every knowledge-claim and that such acknowledgment is part
of the reason why we should not attempt to objectify all
knowledge.

Our tacit commitments, it seems, being acts of

the whole of our person, are confidences which include moral
realities within their scope as well as conceptual commitments.

What we believe is importantly connected to our moral

commitments.

That is, there are some beliefs we feel we

ought to have (eg., belief in friendship) and others we feel
we ought to deny.

We are influenced deeply in the selection

of the beliefs to which we commit ourselves by our moral
beliefs. Polanyi even asserts 116 that we ought never to

116 r am touching here on ideas which are developed
later concerning Polanyi's explicit moral assertions. We
shall find that Polanyi believes there are perversions of
our moral entanglement with knowledge and that its true
function is a moral commitment to truth. But in this section I merely want to establish the basic structure of valueexplicitation and how it functions to deepen our understanding of moral realities. We can also acknowledge here that
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accept beliefs that deny the reality of moral values. 117

we are involved in a domain of knowledge that is an element
of all knowing since it strikes at the heart of commitment,
which is at the root of tacit knowing. But we must wait for
later chapters for a careful description of how knowing
itself is in part a moral act.
117 one might question whether Polanyi's concept of
explicitation can be classed as a methodology. Methodologies, one might argue, establish knowle;dge claims by means
of rules which are explicit and well known. Hence, logical
truths obey rules of logic, scientific truths obey rules of
induction, and other truths obey rules appropos and commonly
know to pertain to the mode of knowledge in question. But
although Polanyi includes deduction and induction as modes
of explicitation, he seems to view explicitation as a much
broader activity than one that can be regulated entirely by
rules. Indeed, rules seem to be more a crystallization of
certain modes of explicitation than an ~ priori guide of the
process.
Does this mean that processes of explicitation which
do not obey already established rules--as in deduction and
induction--are still valid? I believe Polanyi would answer
"yes" to this question on the grounds that insights are not
justified by the rules by which we are guided to them but by
the intimations into reality to which they provide access.
Further, the rules which these insights establi~h in our
act of universalizing our understanding in terms of new insights to which we oursel~es submit become the guideposts
to them. We do not arrive at new discoveries via paths
already well-trod.
Explicitation, fundamentally, becomes a process determined only by a free play of imagination when we are in
pursuit of new truths. The experience of insight itself, as
a novel and powerfully renewed access to reality, establishes
the route only after the fact. This means that imaginative
freedom is the fundamental methodology of discovery, even
when that freedom makes use of rules which it embodies and
transcends.
If this extended meaning of "methodology" be
accepted, especially in the light of the rules which insight
establishes, then explicitation in any sense and in any
domain of knowledge is a methodology.

CHAPTER THREE
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter, I wish to extend Polanyi's notion of
conceptual knowledge to a social, interpersonal ground of all
knowledge.

We shall see that we do not understand the dyna-

mic of the achievement of knowledge unless we take into account
the essential communal nature of our deepest experiences and
the communal bond in which they are grounded.

This bond is

immediately relevant for drawing out the ethical implications
of Polanyi's thought, since it is essential for an ethic that

.

some notion of the nature of interpersonal realities be established.

Polanyi's concept of "conviviality" meets this need

and lends itself handily to the development of a notion of a
social code of ethics.
I shall apply the concept of "tradition" and of "connoiseeurs" which Polanyi develops in the context of a socially
grounded epistemology to value-knowledge and push his concept
of discovery to a notion of value-discovery.

Thus, I will

argue that we learn ethical truths from within the communal
bond, ind~eli_them in the process of coming to maturity, and
move toward the Good (which is the "whole" in which individual
insights into value participate) as an end.

The process of

maturing can "break out" of the traditional

mores of society

and lead to individual and communal grasps of moral truth
92
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which are entirely novel.

In establishing that the dynamic of

tacit and personal knowing can be applied to the domain of
moral knowledge, I will have completed the epistemological
argument for moral knowledge.

1.

Indwelling and Conviviality in Value-Knowledge

We must now precede to an understanding of how our
individual insight into worth, our personal comprehensions of
value, enliven our lives and extend themselves to the human
community as a whole.

To accomplish this, we must return to

Polanyi's notion of knowing, particularly his concepts of
indwelling and conviviality.

Indwelling is the deepest form of commitment.

We be-

gin the process of discovery by pouring ourselves into the
subsidiary elements of a problem and continue to spill ourselves further and further into tacit clues until we arrive at
the discovery fully committed to it as an aspect of reality.
For Polanyi, this is the sense in which the existential dictum
"existence precedes essence" has its appropriate meaning.

The

"thrusting forward" of our existence into a position of com-
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mitment in relation to a discovery that follows it is the way
we make the truth our own.

Imagination strains to find a path

to a superior life of the mind.

Existential choices are made

in response to a tacit insight into potential discovery and
follow a "gradient" of understanding toward this expansion.

Although whole worlds are rarely ever chosen; there
is a personal center of control capable of responsible choice
according to already established criteria. 118
Considered as fundamental in man's being, existential 119
considered as depth

"world-new"

changes,

changes, do not impair the

rationality of our personal judgment; they merely affect our
calling. 120

118Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 81.
ll9Polanyi' s sympathy with existnetialism in s·o far
as it affirms commitment as fundamental in knowing should not
be construed as an alignment with existentialism. Polanyi
agrees that existentialism has affinities to his notion of
indwelling. But existentialism, in his view, has not faced
the fact that science itself is the product of commitment/
decision. Existentialism forces a dichotomy here, setting
itself up as a revel in relation to scientific thought. Thus,
existentialism fails to take up Polanyi's task: to find a
concept of knowing that applies to both science and existential
thought.
(Points from a conversation with Paul Tillich, Feb.
21, 1963, Box 25, folder 4, pp. 3-4 of University of Chicago
collection).
120Knowin
by Marjorie Grene,
p. 134.

Michael Polan i, edited
C 1cago Press, 1969),
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Polanyi then extends the use of the term "indwelling",
unlike existential thought to both science and the humanities.
Indwelling, as tacit knowledge, is characteristic of all knowledge.121

It is a kind of "interiori:ation" of kno1dedge in

that we inwardly identify ourselves with an object of knowledge.
I have already shown how the dialectic of destructive
analysis brings forth explicit, focal knowledge.

Another way

of saying this in regard to indwelling is that there is a
dialectical production of meaning through the alternation of
,..
k·now 1 e d ge. 122
.
.
f rom a context ror
indwelling an d a 1 1enat1on
In this sense, indwelling is a term which also opposes the
123
meaning Polanyi expresses in the terms "looking at".
121 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 17.
122 Knowing and Being: Essays By Michael Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
p. 148.
123 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 18; Interesting examples of this are reading and playing the piano. One is aware
only of the meaning of sentences in reading as he indwells the
words and letters. But a confusion in meaning may send one
back to a close, explicit scrutiny of the words where one may
discover that a misspelled word changed the entire meaning of
the sentence. Beginning from a different point of view, corrected by an explicit (alienated in relation to indwe1t) grasp
of the words of the sentence, one goes on to grasp the point
of the entire work. Similarly in pl~ying the piano, one indwells the musical scores from which one plays. But a difficult finger movement may require that the pianist explicitly
scrutinize a certain part of the score for a better sense of
how to procede. The music stops, and the indwelling has become
an alienation from the music. But immediately the music begins
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Thus, Polanyi says we use theories (as well as systems
of signs, notations, etc.) by dwelling in them; and this dwelling can be gusied by a shaft of focus.

Indwelling requires a

surrender of oneself to a context of meaning and consists in a
living in rather than a controlling of experience.

Through in-

dwelling we control neither ourselves nor our environment.
- f

attitude is that of contemplating the content o

.

exper1ence.

Our
124

Music, poetry, painting, and all arts lie on a continuum of indwelling somewhere,between science and worship. 125
I contend that knowledge of ethical realities--values, orders
of worth-ascription, intimations of the Good--also belong on
this continuum.

Our tacit knowledge of values, eg., is a form

of indwelling a reality to which we are committed.

As indwelt,

ethical realities are not merely ideas we constitute by reflec-

.tion

upon past experience.

An indwelt perspective does not

again, this time with better execution and much improvement. In
both cases (the reading and the music) the alternat~on of indwelling and alienation deepened the comprehension, the meaning,
of the performance.
124

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e: Towards A Post-Critical
Philosophy (Chicago: The University o
icago Press,
, p.
; onternplation, then, is impersonal only in the sense of being a complete par~icipation in the object rather than a detachment from it. Contemplation
1s self-abandonment (p. 197) an abandonment to all levels of intellectual
~ife. Polanyi, reverses the usual sense of "contemplation" here. He reJects the notion that contemplation is the same as "theory" or "sight" from
an objective distance.
12

~icahel Polanyi, Personal
_thilosophy (Chicago: The Univer-=s....,.i7
ty~o~r;r.....--:-~:-----=~'?{'"7~--~,_..----
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seek the ideological essence of any reality, including ethical
realities.

We find ourselves confronted with an aspect of

reality we can only acknowledge as intimately ours and yet as
something we have discovered, something we can contemplate and
to whose reality we can abandon ourselves.

The personal know-

ledge of values and of the Good, then, should be seen not
merely as a product of "existential commitment" (in the sense
of "making" our values).

We find ourselves already indwelling

them; and we develop this indwelling with increasing capacity
to appreciate ethical realities and to order our lives in
accordance with them rather than to make them subservient to
our lives.

.

We must turn, then, to a more comprehensive view of
the nature of the ethical realities we indwell.

Polanyi says

that all knowledge, as committed indwelling is convival:
Since both individual and interpersonal commitments are related socially and established institutionally, the perspective of commitment widens
here to the whole of humanity pursuing its course
towards an unknown destination.l26
The pursuit of knowledge, according to Polanyi, is not simply
an individual affair.

It is communal--or convivial--not only

in the sense of being a necessary achievement for each person
in community but more specifically, in being the necessary
. _126 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCr1t1cal Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 328.
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basis of any individual, personal engagement in truth-seeking.

Polanyi argues for the interpersonal character of
knowledge in a number of ways.

One of these is to tackle the

question of knowledge of other minds in a direct manner.

In

reference to knowledge of others, Polanyi states "mind is not
the aggregate of its focally known manifestations, but is that
on which we focus our attention while being subsidiarily
aware of its manifestations".l27

The parallel here between

tacit knowing in general and this knowledge in particular is
intentional.l28

We never, e.g., merely observe the external

workings of another body.
presence of something else:

We see the body as a clue to the
the mind.l29

Thus, "A man's

mind can be known only comprehensively, by dwelling within
the unspecifiable particulars of its external manifestations."l30

Such an approach side-steps questions of solipsism

12 7Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 263.
128Michael Polan,i, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
& Co., Inc., 1966), p. 32.

N.y. : Doubleday

129I~id., p. 31-32.

130 Michael Polanui, The Study of Man (Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 33.
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or of how the other is "inferred".

The same dynamic that

fundamentally governs all acts of knowing permits real
access to the personal quality of the other.
Further, a belief in truth as a communal achievement,
a belief essential to science, requires that one open up to
others in an attitude of fairness and tolerance, that one
believe that he shares with others a disposition to the
truth. 13 1

This participation of the knower in the shared

attitude of the other increases steadily as we proceed to
higher levels of existence until, in the case of knowing
others, indwelling is so full that there are no longer two
logical levels.

We apply the same standards in knowing the

other as we do in knowing ourselves and, thus, transcend
mere scientific "observation". 13 2

We come to know that

we do not know others by observing their bodies or see what
they see by observing their neurological processes. 133

131
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societb
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 7 .
132Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man, (Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 94-5.
133Meaning, Michael Polanui and Harry Prosch, The
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1975, p. 49.
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An immediate result of this realization is that we can
no longer ask merely for the cause of an act since the cause
becomes logically distinct from the reasons for an act.

And

when we ask for the reasons of an act, we encounter the person
instead of an object of positivistic, mechanistic science.

134

our appreciation of others, manifested in our respectful attention, is a fellowship in which we acknowledge that we share
with him the same firmament of obligations.

We understand

135
.
each other as capable o f respons1"bl e c h o1ces.

p o 1 any1.

refers to this understand1ng as a !!communal art of confidence.n 136

And he asserts that we must commit ourselves to

this art as an act of trust, of faith.

Only be adhering to a

choice to trust others even when this trust is most unfounded
can we discover friendship or a true human bond.

And this

134

scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred
Schwarz, International Universities Press, Inc.: N.Y., N.Y.,
1974; Polanyi identifies this encounter with Martin Buber's
ni-Thoun encounter of persons, an encounter in which love
becomes possible. But, more than love, Polanyi says that the
I-Thou encounter necessitates that we move from the assertion
of facts (as in science) to a continuous encroachment on the
area of moral and civic commands; Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,
(Chicag()":
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 346.
135

Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 66.
136

Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 71.
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principle is valid not only for dyads and small groups but
also for the whole range of social interplay.

Faith, con-

sidered as "indwelling" is a method of discovery in all human
relations and a condition for human disclosure and truth.
And it makes possible the good works that are based on the
recognition of trust. 137

A belief that others are motivated

only by ambition, greed, lust, and violence is responsible for
producing and forwarding these motives in any society. 138
But aside from these ways of approaching the problem
of how we know other persons, there is abundant evidence of
an interpersonal coincidence of tacit judgments continuous
from language to the pre-linguistic interaction of powerful
emotions (e.g., sympathy with another's pain).l39

Sentiments

of fellowship, e.g., exist prior to articulation and form
the ground of our capacity to trust in any formalized community.140

So Polanyi can say, "The tacit sharing of knowing

137 Notes on Prejudice, 11/28/39, box 26, folder 1.
138 Ibid.
139Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 205.
]40Ibid., p. 209.
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141

Communication occurs only when both speaker and listerner rely
mutually on one another's correct understanding and use of words.
Both must trust the authority for correctness and one another's
proper obedience to it.

Trust and authority must be combined.l42

And, when it is, any linguistic move between persons contributes
to this conviviality in so far as it is a reaching out and a
sharing. 143

This may not in itself form an organized society,

but it is the sine qua~ of such. 144

And it sets the stage

for impersonal obligations to the community.

This sharing of experience is one kind of conviviality.
A second kind is participation in joint activities.

Such par-

ticipation affirms communal existence and, by identifying the
life of the group with antecedent groups, establised historical
continuity and reconciliation within the group.

It confirms the

l41Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 203.
14 2rbid., p. 206
143rbid, p. 210.
144rbid., p. 212
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convivial existence of the group as transcending the indi145
vidual.
The conviviality of knowledge does not mean that man
is incapable of pure thought undertermined by social influences.

But such thought must be done within the limiting

structures of society to which one must submit since they are
beyond the scope of one's own personal responsibility and are
the framework on which one relies. 14 G Evidently, Polanyi does
not consider our tacit, convivial sharing to be an "influence"
in the negative sense of
cally opposing ideas.

blocking our original or even radi-

It is clear, however, that tacit shar-

ing is an influence in so far as it grounds the dynamic of all
thought in any culture.
Polanyi refers to this positive sense of "influence"
as the "authority" for thought.

Clearly, we must rely on the

authority of others in the community who are accredited with
knowledge of things we do not know. 147 This does not mean, of
145
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 211. Polanyi, offered this about ritual, but I think
this point of view can be extended to all shared activities,
Si~ce they all require evidently the same mutual indwelling.
146
Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago, The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 68-9.
147
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 163.
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course, that we should submit ourselves
points of others.

naively to the view-

Thoughtful submission to authority includes

some opposition to it. We accept authority as competent but not
as supreme. 148 Thus, reasonable submission includes conflicts
149
in views and changes in belief and values on both sides.
The authoritative traditions of the past are not just "handed
down" but are our interpretation of the past as we view it from
• 1 ar pro b 1 ems 1n
.
the context o f part1cu
t h e present. 1 5 0

ne re-

TtT

mold authority to meet the problems with which we struggle and
yet rely on it as a universal measure of what is right for the
community as a whole.
This is possible, of course, because we are capable of
learning the rules of a skill, art, or science through the
tacit dynamic of knowledge.

And, more than that, we are capa-

ble of teaching these rules to others and of using them to improve our

p~rformances

by re-integrating into our performance
the understanding represented in the rule. 151 In teaching

these rules to others--or to ourselves--we must never impress

148 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
1962)' p. 164.
149 Ibid.
150

rbid.,. p. 160.

151 rbid., p. 162.

Towards A PostThe University of Chicago Press,
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our particular slant which we give them on others.

They must

be free to respond in their own creative way to the authority
that binds the community. 152

We are not the perfect

embodiment of our own rules.

Tradition, then, is the convivial embodiment of knowledge and requires an active, creative response as it is
transmitted.
elements.

It is composed of both explicit and tacit

Where no explicit prescription exists, the tradi-

tion must be learned by example from the master as an "art".
The apprentice submits uncritically to his authority (but not
naively!)
unaware.

and thus learns rules of which even the master is
He learns the tradition of the art and often sur-

passes the master. 153

His skill is then called "connoiseur-

ship".l54

In this sense, the learner must believe before he
can know.

He must rely on others;

he must submit to the

152Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societt
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 4 .
153Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
19 6 2) ' pp . 52 - 4 .
15 4 Ibid., pp. 54-5.
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At the same time,

he must bring his own modifications to that to which he submits, even though radical dissent still implies a partial
submission.

For he cannot dissent from something in which

he has absolutely no involvement.

Traditions are always in a state of creative renewal.
They invite their own opposition.

Thus, the personal element

must appeal to a tradition not merely as it is but as it
ought to be.

The person aims at a reality which is both

embodied in the tradition and transcends it.

His view of

this transcendent reality from within the tradition is the
ground of the modification of the tradition.

This dynamic

is universal for science, law, religion, and other domains. 1 56
All creative activities are based on traditions of a structure
similar to those found in science.
The discussion of knowledge of the Other, conviviality, submission to tradition, and connoisseurship leads
naturally to ethical implications.

Indeed, the description of

155Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 208.
156Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 56-7.
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the ontological and epistemological link which Polanyi unfolds
in relation to the other leads us to see quite easily how one
might, in Polanyian terms, argue for a communal or convivial
knowledge of values and of the Good.
The importance of indwelling in value knowledge shows
itself on two levels.

First, since all integrations of mean-

ing involve a tacit indwelling of clues, then any assertion
that X is valuable (i.e., tends toward the Good) or that X
manifests an insight into the Good must rely on a tacit
indwelling which allows us to perceive the value or insight.
Such assertions represent meaningful integrations, if we .
take Polanyi's epistemology seriously.

And the fact that we

do make such insights leaves our insight into value to be
explained in the same manner in which Polanyi explains how
we come to know in general.
The parallel seems obvious.

Polanyi does not attempt

to justify all knowledge claims by some fundamental, unquestionable datum.

Indeed, the tenor of his epistemology would

rule against such an attempt.

Instead, he begins with a

description of how we come to have the knowledge we claim to
possess and developed from this perspective.

Thus, a legiti-

mate extension of knowledge into the ethical domain need
only begin with the same starting point:

with a description

of how we come to meaningful integrations of insight into
Value.

It is consistent, indeed necessary, for a Polanyian
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thinker to investigate the standing of knowledge claims in
the form in which they are made by an analysis of the tacitexplicit dynamic that underlies the experience to which they
refer.

Thus,

we

can assert with confidence that claims of

value-knowledge are appropriately analyzed and justified in
the light of such a dynamic; and value-assertions are, therefore, integrations of meaning which we perform as an act of
personal knowing through an indwelling of a tacit awareness
of various partial insights and feelings into value.
Value-knowledge comes to explicit focus through a
personal indwelling, more specifically, of the value-laden
communal experience.

Even if we cannot agree with Polanyi's

argument for an intersubjective reality, we cannot deny the
importance of such a reality for the ethical domain.

If we

indwell an intersubjective reality, and if value-knowledge
is made explicit from an indwelling of tacit value-awareness,
'

then we indweil an intersubjective, value-laden reality from
which we integrate our personal values.

An intersubjective

reality means a communal field of values.
This intersubjective sharing of values can occur on
an explicit level, of course, as when people discuss points
of view and persuade others to their own viewpoint.

But the

argument for an intersubjective sharing of values finds its
focus in the tacit realm of communal life in which a fundamental ontological congruency between persons makes common
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values, tacit or explicit, possible.

Without an intersub-

jective sharing of values, we are reduced to a solipsistic
inference that others feel and believe as we do.

But an

acknowledgment of this sharing enables us to understand that,
when we acknowledge the personal reality of another, we also
acknowledge a fundament of values that binds us together
as human being.
The intersubjective sharing of values, then, makes
ethical life fundamentally a communal affair.

Our insights

into value are grounded most deeply in a tacit sharing
within a community of shared values upon which we rely in

.

coming to our own insights.
The other elements of the model of the epistemological
community of tacitly shared insight must be extended, if we
are to be consistent, to value-knowledge:

i.e., authority,

tradition, connoisseurship.
The community which we indwell forms the tradition
which we take over for ourselves in ascribing worth (and
standards of worth) to things, events, persons, acts, etc.
We indwell a tradition of values which we project as we face
present issues and orient ourselves to the future.

These

values are to some extent reconfirmed in each of our acts,
forming, by "repetition", a continuous tradition of value.
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We cannot, of course, "look at" our standards in the
process of using them.

We attribute absoluteness to them

because we rely on them absolutely.

Yet this reliance is

itself temporal and constitutes the continuity of tradition.
Even if the capacity to rely absolutely is potentially eternal,
however, there is no necessary reason why such absoluteness
should itself be employed as a value.

We must remember that

we are responsible for the continuance of the value-tradition
through our indwelt commitments.

Otherwise, we lose sight

of the perspectival character of all knowledge, including
value-knowledge. 157

Such a loss would condemn the free

growth of cultural life and destroy society's capacity for
. . 1 t h oug h t. 158
or1g1na

Thus, having a tradition of values does not mean that
we cannot meaningful oppose the value-standards of our community.

True, we learn what values are and how they aim at

achieving the Good from within our community.
son is free to discover

But each per-

new realms of human value that may

surpass those of his community to the extent that assertion

157Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
Press, 1962), p. 184.
158

Ibid., p. 220.
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.
. mora 11 y o f~±ens1ve
of the latter 1s
to t h e d"1scoverer.,159

We can, thus, change the standards of worth by which
our community lives.

We can, as the "master" of a new under-

teach others a new aspect of ethical
s t a ndl· na
. eo of val•1es,
._
reality.

And when they become connoisseurs, firmly entrench-

ing the master's teachings in the community, they themselves,
relying absolutely on what they have learned, can come upon
new discoveries which again demand dissent.

They are,

indeed, the authorities of the ethical domain until a new

159 For example, one man's ethical insight might perceive that there is no real relation between the sacrifice of
children and the productivity of crops. The value of child
sacrifice plummets in his view; he sees such activity now as
futile, self-defeating (since it robs the fields of potential
workers), and generally abhorrent. This departure from the
normal understanding is not due in this case to ignorance or
a lack of "connoisseurship" of values; he is skilled in the
art of ordering his ascriptions of worth within his community
and has placed his confidence in the standards of his society.
But, let us say he is a farmer whose crops failed after the
sacrifice of his first-born son. His confidence in his community's value of sacrifice is shaken; he has lived by them,
and they have failed him. He now sees the abhorrent act for
what it is, released from the blindness invoked by a belief
that only such an act could protect the crop that helps feed
the community, He takes up a position of dissent, not wishing to overthrow the tradition but to re-make it in a more
humane way. Perhaps he finds the freedom to do this and perhaps he does not. But, in Polanyi's view, he should be
allowed the freedom of dissent since this is the way in which
the tradition is both re-vitalized and re-molded. We should
all recognize that we are not the perfect embodiment of our
value-standards and that our standards may not represent the
Ultimate Good.
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ethical reality begins to assert itself in the form of
160
dissent.

160 we might question Polanyi's notion of "indwelling"
in respect to its vagueness. The clearest notion available for
understanding what Polanyi means is that of a sharing of ideas:
two or more people with the same idea. But obviously, even if
the model is relevant it is not adequate for understanding the
importance of the term "indwelling". Even Polanyi w·ould reject
it as an adequate model.
More specifically, Polanyi is referring to a tacit
sharing not only of ideas but of habits and patterns of life.
Such sharing occurs on two levels. First, Polanyi seems to
assume an "ontological congruence" of persons within a culture
in which the sameness of influential factors produces human
beings who share a fundamental "sameness". Second, the culture itself tends to reproduce itself in the shape of individuals
who learn to share common assumptions and patterns of life. The
second kind of sharing can be understood to some extent as an
explicit sharing of ideas. But obviously Polanyi intends even
this kind of sharing to have its tacit dimension.
The tacit dimension of this sharing and that of the
"ontological congruence" which constitutes the first level of
sharing is ·supposed to constitute "indwe 11 ing". Polanyi wishes
to distinguish between indwelling as an intellectu~l act and
indwelling as an existential act. He means by this distinction
only to divide a partial act (intellectual) from a whole (personal) one. Indwelling includes intellectual forms of indwelling as part of a total, personal involvement in culture.
B~t these distinctions, though they help explicate
Polanyi's concept of indwelling to some extent, cannot serve to
eliminate the vagueness of the term. Ultimately, "indwelling'',
in its most significant sense as "ontological congruence", seems
to rely upon an assumption of a sameness of being throughout a
"field" which includes persons and the cultural or "civic" environment. Polanyi seems to want to retain a strict epistemological meaning for indwelling; but his epistemology is constistuted by a description of the tacit-explicit dynamic, the
ontological assumption remains an U?grounded ground. One must
accept it or else find an alternative way to explain indwelling
strictly as an epistemological act, unless the ontological
assumption can be grounded within the purview of Polanyi's
Philosophy. Polanyi himself does not resolve this issue.
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This does not mean that Polanyi gives us no guides to
its resolution. His notion of ontological commitment, eg.,
allows us to understand how all of our beliefs carry with them
a commitment to consider them as aspects of reality. One might
argue that indwelling, considered as a self-interpretive concept, itself reveals the aspect of reality to which it refers:
the "sameness" of the person and the cultural environment which
makes the "ontological congruence" possible. This insight may
not itself resolve the problem of how to understand dwelling,
but it points in the direction of an answer that would be impossible to unfold in the context of the present work.
The problem of indwelling extends specifically to the
problem of the Other. Polanyi claims that we know the Other
by indwelling the tacit clues to the presence of mind so that
mind reveals itself naturally as the meaning of these clues.
Hence, we do not infer the presence of mind but perceive it as
the meaning of the clues we indwell.
Polanyi seems to adhere too closely to the language
in which the traditional problem of other minds is stated. He
appears to be interested in establishing a means by which we
know the presence of mind in others and, thus, appears to be
bound by the Cartesian metaphysical difficulties which are
responsible for the problem in the first place .. He ends up
asserting the existence of mind as though it were a metaphysical
entity in itself.
But before we are misled by appearances, we should recognize that Polanyi's main objective in discussing the problem
is to illustrate how the notion of indwelling overcomes the
problem even in its traditional statement. The point is that
knowledge of others is not an inference but part of the perceived world; Polanyi is not attempting to justify the metaphysical separateness of mind in accordance with a Cartesian
mental~ty,

Again, however, we might question the assumption that
indwelling represents some sort of "ontological congruency" in
which the Other is, in some sense, "part" of ourselves and our
perceived world. Polanyi does not offer any specific justification for this assumption in regard to knowing others. Indeed,
he appears to acquiesce to Cartesian dichotomies. But again,
his .1otion of ontological commitment may release him from the
fangs of this critique. Indwelling, in the perspective on ontological commitment, lets us see the Other as an aspect of
reality in the sense that, under ordinary conditions, we are not
deceived in our belief that we are dealing with real others who
are real in the same sense and manner in which we are. This
;----
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~ew

values, then, are discovered as part of a process

of "breaking out" of old ones.

To understand this more clearly,

we must return to Polanyi's epistemological understanding of
"breaking out".

z.

Discovery in Value-Knowledge:

Breaking Out

We may recall some of the things we have already established.

Personal knowledge claims to establish contact with

a reality beyond the clues on which it relies.

It commits us

passionately and beyond comprehension to a vision of reality
which we can neither verify or falsify in its own terms.
live in it as we live in our own skins.

We

Yet this passion

answers to a demand for universalizability, which is true objectivity.161

The relations of tool to purpose, meaning to

meant, and part to whole are sustained through the belief that
they are discovered and not created by the knower. 162 We may
have appetities, including intellectual ones,

whic~

we aim at

I

satisfying, but the

discover~r

seeks a solution to a problem
that is satisfying not only for himself but for everyone. 163
ascription of a value of reality to the OtheY need not involve
acceptance of the reality of a Cartesian "mind", Its intent
1s_to l0ave ~he ultimate mystery of personal reality in tact
~~h1le assert1ng that others also participate in such a reality
1n a manner that is accessible to us.
~n

161
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 64.
162
Ibid., p. 63.
163 Ibid., p. 301.
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Discovery is a response to our convivial obligations as it
draws us beyond ourselves.
Discoveries are made by pursuing possibilities suggested
. .
know 1 e d ge. 164
by existing

But when it occurs by leaping beyond

a hitherto accepted structure toward a new heruistic vision, it
is called "breaking out".

The old structure is thereby de-

molished, and a new one leaps into sight.
At the root of such "breaking out" is the constantly
. d . 16 5
questing, rest 1 ess nature o f t h e h uman min

Th e questing
.

mind has the power to break out into new visions because higher
levels of meaning are essentially accessible through the framework of tacit reliance, a framework that has the power to evoke
within the searcher the process and means of discovering them.
Such creative releases, then, are controlled by their own poten. 1"lties.
.
166
t1a
The language of discovery should not be confused with
the language that describes a natural event.

A discovery is a

uniquely human achievement, not an event that can be described
like other events in the world.

Discoveries differ from inani-

mate events in that 1) the field evoking and guiding them is
164
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p.67.
165 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 196.
166 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 90
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not that of a stable configuration but of a problem; 2) their
occurrence is not spontaneous but due to an effort toward the
actualization of certain hidden potentialities; and 3) the
uncaused action which evokes them is usually an imaginative
thrust toward discovering these potentialities. 167

One can locate the premisses of science in the means
by which we get out hidden and potential discoveries.

It is

in the process of discovery and verification that the premisses of science exercise their guidance over the judgment
of scientists. 168

Thus, recognizing a problem and seeing it

as worth solving is a discovery in itself.l69

This means that

science neither precedes by a prescribed operation from clues to
discovery, nor does it yield an established manner of verifying (or falsifying) a theory.

The history of science and its

controversies demonstrates that discovery is always separated

167Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 89.
l68Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 165.
169 Ibid., p. 120.
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from its clues by a logical gap.

170

The surmises of scien-

tists are born of imagination seeking discovery.

And imagina-

tion is not so much a logical as a creative thrust; it risks
defeat for this reason, though it never seeks defeat.

171

And

when we break through to discovery, we do so with the conviction of trust because discovery itself is the satisfaction of
the intellectual desire that points to the solution compris.
lng
1"t . 172

A discovery is original when it allows persons to see

~ore deeply into the natureof things. 173

When a strenuous

search beyond the tradition of knowledge loosens bits of a
solution, the discovery may be achieved in an original way
1 74 p 1
.
.
.
o f t h ese b 1ts.
· o any1. d oes,
by an e ff art 1 ess 1ntegrat1on
however, distinguish between intuitions that indicate the
potential for discovery ("antieipatory" intuitions) and those
that are claims of discovery ("final" intuitions). 175
-~ ~17o~--

-· · -·

This

·

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
~Post-Critical· PhilQsophy_ (Chic~go: __ The_ Unbz:e:r:si_ty of Chi~ago
Press; 1962), p. 167.
..

~ ~~-

171Mithael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,-----. ---~---Y'· :__ _l)_()Ub 1 ~d~y _&- Cg. ~'- I Il.C.. L_19~6 6) p ·-~6 9 • - -- -- -- ~~"- ·-- -~~ - -- -- ~~- -- - .
. 172Michael Polanyi, Personal_ Knowledge:.. Towards- a~~

Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
'Press, 1962) ,_ p. 1~0.
l 73·Ibid . , p . 1 78 .
174 Knowin
by Marjorie Grene,

and Bein
Chicago:

p. 201.
175 Ibid., p. 202.
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distinction shows that intuitions themselves may be integrated
into "higher" intuitions.

Thus, an idea given in intuition is

pondered by the imagination, which is let loose to ferret out
a path of possible clues, guided by intuitive feeling.

Then
17 6
.
1 f 1ntu1t1ve
.
. . 1y as a poss1. b 1 e cone 1us1on.
.
it o ff ers 1tse
We may recall here Polariyi's notion of irreversibility.

No discovery is irreversible if it is achieved by a procedure
following definite rules.

Thus, true discovery is not a

strictly logical performance.

Only the gift of originality,
'

which leaps across a logical gap, can yield a true discovery.

1 ......
11

True discovery, then, is irreversible in the sense that, once
it has occurred, we cannot see things again in the same way.
We must observe, however, that, though true discoveries leap across logical categories, they are not entirely without guidel~nes for acceptance.

P5lanyi says they must show

a sufficient degree of plausibility; they must be accurate,
systematically important, and intrinsically interesting; and
. . 1 . 178
th ey must b e or1g1na

The criterion of plausibility, of

course, does not yield demonstrability and is itself based on
intuition. 179 But let us remember that such intuition is tacit
17

~reaning, f.lichael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 96-7.
1 77 Knm..ring and Being:

The

Essays by Michae 1 Po 1anyi , edited by
r.Iarjorie Grene, (C~icago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 123.
178 I b"d
1 . , pp. 53 - 4 .
179 rb·d
1

, '

p, '76
I
,
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and convivial.

We cannot even let strong confirmation of some

important predictions make an implausible theory acceptable,
since even false theories can predict true consequences.

This

may mean that we risk rejecting a theory that is true; but this
risk is less than the consequences of setting predictibility up
180
1 cr1ter1on.
.
.
.
as t h e f 1na

p·1na 11 y, we must remem b er t h at t h e

criterion of interest means for Polanyi not a "subjective
interest" but an objective interest:

an idea that is "of

interest" or shows promise in advancing the truth of a domain
of knowledge.

181

In addition, Polanyi reserves a central place for the
notion of beauty as a criterion of true intellectual achievement.

Even scientific theory, in so far as it calls attention

to its own beauty as a partial criterion for its validity as
representing empirical reality, is akin to a work of art and
to the mystical contemplation of nature, both of which claim
18 z
.
t o d o t h e same t h 1ng.

Th us, 1nte
.
1 lectual b eauty is a guide

to the participative flow of passion in knowledge and is a

180

Know ina
by Marjorie Grene,
p. 79.

Michael Polan i, edited
o C icago Press, 1969),

181.Ibid.,p .82
.
182

. .
~ichael Pola~yi, Personal Knowledge:
Towards a Postfr1t1cal Ph1losophy (Ch1cago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 133.
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183
mark of truth.
How important is intellectual beauty?

Polanyi says

that the vision that accompanies discovery is less than knowledge in being still a guess and more than knowledge in being
a foreknowledge of the yet unknown.
indispensable guide to knowledge.
suing trivialities.

This vision acts as an
It protects us against pur-

It suggests what is reasonable and

interesting to explore and what is plausible.

Only a grasp

.
"f"lC b eauty can evo k e t h"lS v1s1on.
. .
184
of sc1ent1

Nonetheless, the intellectual beauty of a theory is
not the same as artistic beauty.

It is too harmonious and

does not combine incompatible elements by imaginative integra.
185
t lOll.
Its beauty is the beauty of harmony and synthetic
compatibility, not of juxtaposed elements.

Even so, it has

the power to reveal the truth about nature, though this power
should be distinguished from that of mere formal attractiveness.186

Polanyi is correct to distinguish between a new

183 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards Cl. PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 300.
184 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 135.
185 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 106.
186 Know1ng
.
.
Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
an d Be1ng:
University
of Chicago Press, 1969),
by Marj erie Grene, (Chicago:
p. 149.

r

'
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insight into the nature of things and a mere formal advance.

187

The inherent rational excellence of intellectual beauty
often overrides both counter-evidences or verifications of a
theory.

A theory may be more acceptable because of its intel-

lectual beauty despite certain counter-evidences to it and
despite verifications of it on other levels.

188

Such considera-

tions should militate against ·any doctrine that discoveries
shoul d b e

II

·
• 11 . 189
pure 1 y o b JeCtlve

This discussion of discovery confirms much of what
seemed obvious in the flow of Polanyi's epistemological thought.
And it has a bearing on how

we

describe the discovery of new

values.
We find ourselves passionately committed to the values
we share in our community.

We live in them as a passive accept-

ance of our communal life.

But we are constantly moving beyond

the borders defined by the values we live by.

They themselves

suggest new possibilities of truth within the ethical domain,
possibilities we must develop because of our need for an adequate system of values and knowledge of the Good.

If such a

187 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. ISO.
188 rbid., p. 14.
·189 Ibid., p. 15.
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knowledge is clearly necessary for individual survival, then
it is even more so for the development and maintanence of a
community.

For association of persons can function without

shared values, if we understand "community" to mean a sharing
of vital interests.
Following new possibilities of ethical truth, developing new insights into what is valuable and what is not is an
inevitable process of communal life.

Developments in other

fields of knowledge (science, technology, etc.), eg., may force
entire communities into a re-evaluation of their ethical standards of value.

But in every community at all times there will

be adventurous souls who are born to discovery.

And some of

them will be discoverers of knowledge in the ethical domain.Guided by problems unnoticed by the masses, they will seek out
the hidden potentialities of their communal value system.

Thus,

they exercise their imaginative skills or integrations of
thought, striving to bring new forms into being.

Such adven-

turers, masters of the tradition, are those who break out of
tradition and discover new values, new intuitions of value,
which will serve eventually to enhance the life of the community--or disrupt it irreversibly.
The discovery of new insights into value is not a deductive or inductive enterprise, though these may be employed
in the process of the discovery.

As in all fields of thought,
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a true discovery in the ethical domain is an irreversible
tacit integration, a leap across logical borders to more profound meanings.
There may be many guides to this leap.

We may be

motivated by a number of subjective reasons and interests.
But the idea that promises to satisfy these reasons and
interests is not a valid insight into value and the Good unless it is of "objective" interest.

An idea is worth pursuing

if it presents a plausible solution to the difficulties of
the present value system, reflects an accurate and adequate
comprehension of the tradition, relates in important ways to
a new system of values which is in the making, and is

intrin~

sically interesting in the sense of promising deeper access to
ethical realities.

Insights into ideas which confirm them-

selves in the community as guided properly by these concerns
generally lead to new life to the community.

Finally, the

harmony or "beauty" of an insight is a mark of its integrative
power and may be at times our sole reason for pursuing it over
other possibilities.
Discoveries in the ethical domain of knowledge, then,
are rational in nature.

They make sense of things yet uncom-

Prehended by the inquiring mind and follow rational guides
in doing so.

Discoveries of values of new comprehensions of

the Good may not be found at the end of an unbroken chain of
deductive logic; but they are rational.
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Discoveries of values aim at being universal.

We have

already noted how they project universal standards that they
submit themselves to.

But they also aim at the highest intel-

lectual concepts possible:

universals.

Again we return to

Polanyi's epistemological thought for a view of what he means
by a universal.
The movement of discovery, as tacit knowledge, may
penetrate its object in stages.

That is, each aspect may be

itself a cue to a more comprehensive entity.

Indeed, we pass

from more tangible entities to less tangible entities as we
progress in knowledge.

But, just for this reason, the less

tangible entity is the more real since it has a wider range of
. d e f.1n1te
.
.
f uture man1.f estat1ons.
.
190 Polanyi calls
1n
con f.1rm1ng
these "less tangible entities" wholes. 191

190Know1n
.
by Marjorie
p. 168.

191

we shall deal more extensively with his doctrine of
wholes or universals in the section dealing with his ontology;
but for now it is important to note only that we make sense of
things by considering them in a variety of levels. Elementary
entities combine to compose complex ones. But these complex
entities are not simply aggregates of elementary ones. They are
wholes which make sense on levels of understanding which are
higher than those which comprehend their composing elements.
(cf. Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and William H.
Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 2.
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Polanyi says that when we focus on wholes we are subsidiarily aware of their parts, though, as already noted,
not necessarily with a difference in the intensity of the two
192
kinds of awareness.
Something that is subsidiary to the
whole participates in sl;3taining the whole, and this sustenance constitutes its meaning within the framework of the
1

framewor~

0

193
f th e '-'hole.
n

wve re 1 y on th ese par t"lCU 1 ars

11
'

Wl"th -

.
.
194
out nam1ng
t h em as we f ocus on genera 1 mean1ngs.

Universals, then, are developed from a tacit reliance
on knowledge of individuals:
ing as a comprehensive entity.

a universal is their joint meanThis entity is real in that it

has the power to disclose itself in still hidden and yet confirming ways. 195 Thus, universal concepts may anticipate
future instances of particular things or events, even though

192

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 58.
193

Ibid.

194 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
p. 166.

195

Ibid., p. 149.
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there will be some individual differences between each par196
ticular.
Polanyi considers the :miversal or "whole" to function
at times as a heuristic "empty" center of our groping concepts.
we are capable, as we seek a discovery, of focussing on a center that still is empty and yet "brings out" the joint meaning
197
of particulars which is yet unknown.
Thus, Polanyi says,
'' ... The understanding of a whole appreciates the coherence of
its subject matter and acknowledges the existence of a value
•
• 1 ars 11 . 198
that is a b sent f rom t h e const1tuent
part1cu

This is

why Polanyi says that the less tangible a thing (or focus) is,
199
. .
.
t h e more menta 1 an d conceptua 1 1s 1ts mean1ng.

196Know1ng
.
and Being:
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago:
pp. 170-1.

Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
University of Chicago Press, 1969),

197 Ibid., p. 171.
198 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 327
19 9 Know1ng
.
.
Essays b y M.1c h ae 1 Po 1 any1,
. e d.1te d
an d Be1ng:
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
pp. 189-190; Nonetheless, he does not want to be identified as a
"conceptualist". He affirms, as I have shown in some detail
already, the reality of minds, classes of things, justice, etc.
And he is adamant about his criticism that if our theories regarding the impossibility of the reality of such things is not to
block our kno1vledge of such coherences, we must develop an epistemology that will explain how their meanings are no less real than
those of science and perception (cf., Michael Polanyi and Harry
Prosch, Meaning [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975],
p. 68.).
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To precede with our argument, the knowledge of values
and of the Good aims at universals that are no less real than
those discovered in other domains of knowledge.

This does not

mean, of course, that Polanyi thinks of the Good as a Platonic
reality which is either perceived or unknown in its entirety.
Ethical universals are discovered gradually as our knowledge
of the Good extends over more comprehensive areas of human life
and becomes less and less tied to concrete aspects of human
experience.

This loss of tangibility is the mark of the devel-

opment of a universal.

Particular values, tied strongly to

concrete experiences, are integrated into more comprehensive
values.

These bear more directly on the reality of the Good

as universals that impinge upon all areas of our lives.

In

this .sense, particular values become the tacit clues upon
which we rely for this higher integration.
Universal values are the deeper and more comprehensive
meanings of particular values.

They are the hidden realities

which our commitments to particular values are trying to discover and live by.

Our particular values seem incomplete be-

cause they do not yet encompass a whole toward which we are
called by the intangible reality of the Good.

We dwell in

them and yet seek beyond them until at last we are ready to
break out of them toward a higher vision, a vision that so
deepens the meaning of each that all are united in it.
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This higher vision then becomes a universal in two
senses:

it becomes the universal standard by which we deter-

mine what a value is and to which we submit all of our valueclaims.

And it is universal in the sense of bearing univer200
sally (in regard to all values) on the reality of the Good.

200 one might complain that Polanyi's notion of discovery is nothing other than a stock intuitionism in which
the only appeal for justifying an idea is a demand that others
promote the same intuition in themselves. Such intuitionism
smacks of an arrogant subjectivity which is attempting to pass
as justified objectivity.
I have already dealt at length with the question of
whether personal knowledge is subjective or objective and will
not repeat that argument here. We can take note, however, that
Polanyi's intuitionism is not an attempt to establish a traditional objectivism and is certainly nqt a subjectivism in default of such an attempt. Polanyi's intuitionism is an intuitionism of personal knowledge in which the justifications are
numerous enough to guide minds to a proper access to intuition.
Polanyi is not demanding that everyone put forth some mysterious effort in order to see things as he does. He abides by
intuitionism in so far as he insists that original discoveries,
novel integrations of meaning, are leaps beyond rule-guided
thinking which is beset by built-in justifications. But he
does not leave us with no guides to an insight into new discoveries; even if a justification comes "after the fact" of a
discovery, like a trail blazed by an explorer, the discovery
is still justified in so far as it opens new vistas of reality
for all who follow behind to see.
Polanyi, then, intends to frustrate our expectation
that discoveries are made by following a pre-established
methodology. There might be common procedures and justifications in the various domains of knowledge; but these constitute descriptions of methods by which discoveries have been
made rather than rules by which they must be made.
Polanyi is quite willing to accept the common criticism that a discovery which leaps beyond the usual rules of
thought might well be wrong. Of course one can always be
wrong, even when rules are followed. But wrong ideas have
certain earmarks which give us early warnings of their untruth; and they show their falseness in time if we remain
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Conclusion
In this section on Polanyi's epistemology, I have
tried to show how his epistemology represents a way of knowing that may be extended into the ethical domain.

In so far

as Polanyi's epistemology is concerned, I have tried only to
show how we develop and justify our knowledge of values and
of the Good.

I have reserved the question of knowledge of

the right for the next section on Polanyi's ontology.

I

believe I have shown how the ascription of worth becomes involved inextricably with a knowledge which grows into the
highest visions of the Good.
committed to discerning the truth. Falsehood is a risk we
cannot avoid even if we attempt to explain discoveries without
recourse to intuitionism.
Polanyi intends to resurrect a form of medieval realism in his notion that the less tangible reality is the more
real one. But we should not absurdly accuse him of claiming
that something is more real tust because it is less tangible.
Air, eg., is not more real tan lead just for being less
tangible. The lack of tangibility must occur in a specific
way: the higher reality is less tangible in the sense of being
more general (and not more "ethereal").
Polanyi's notion of the universal differs from the medieval (and Aristotelian one), however, in that his universals are
not statements of absolute realities. His universals, although
our most general understanding of things, are themselves guides
to a fuller experience of reality. Universals are constituted
by our most penetrating and original discoveries; they are
the most real because they give us the most intense and wideranging access to reality in so far as we follow its leadership to its own self-confirmation. Thus, for Polanyi, universals are not the end-points of thought but are developed as
growing parts of the process of corning to know reality.
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Value knowledge, like all knowledge, develops out of
our incarnate indwelling in a communal world in which we
satisfy our personal and communal needs for survival, companionship, and knowledge according to standards we ourselves
project.

We can draw a line of continuity within the struc-

ture of tacit knowledge from the most fundamental perceptions
and skills to the most sophisticated visions of various domains
of human experience:

science, art, history, religion--and

ethics.
Value knowledge, then, is tacit knowledge or else
relies on tacit knowledge for the validity of its explicit
assertions.

That is, we rely on tacit experiences of worth

of our needs to make and order our ascriptions of worth in
order to objectify notions of particular values.

The motive

of such objectifications may generally be our need to understand what we are doing and what we mean by ascribing worth
to something; and the notion toward which we move in satisfying this need is that of value.
No single level of knowledge, however, is ever fully
satisfactory.

As we develop our notions of value, we become

familiar enough with them to indwell them as tacit forms of
our thought.
world.

They become fundamental in the way we view the

But, as masters of the tradition, we begin to trace
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out by imaginative thrusts new possibilities of thought which
answer the inevitable questions that arise out of such indwelling.

We dissent from tradition and project new standards of

thought for what counts as a value and as a vision of the Good.
And we submit ourselves to these standards, indwell them, and
move intellectually toward a tacit integration of our total
knowledge of values, toward an intellectual vision of the Good.
Our knowledge of the Good is knowledge of a universal
which draws us toward itself as we commit ourselves, step by
step, to its reality.

Our knowledge is personal; thus, we

commit ourselves to the reality of what we believe and submit
ourselves to the standards of truth our beliefs imply.

We are

personally engaged in the reality of the Good and discover
values--and an ultimate vision of the Good--as we come to understand this personal engagement.

We move from a tacit compre-

hension that guides us by subtle feeling toward itself as an
explicit and universal vision forms, a vision we contemplate
as an intrinsic element of our communal life.
Briefly, this is the vision of values and of the Good
which I think Polanyi would agree to as a legitimate extension
of the structure of personal, tacit knowing into the ethical
domain of human experience.

We turn now to Polanyi's ontology,

which we will extend into a knowledge of the right.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE PARALLEL OF KNOWING Al\JD BEING IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A NOTION OF FREE AND RIGHT ACTION
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
This chapter introduces the argument for moral knowledge and action based upon Polanyi's ontology.

Rather than

leave epistemological and ontological issues separated, only
later to be joined loosely by some third consideration, I
discovered that Polanyi's epistemology and his ontology can
be viewed as intimately connected.

Knowing itself is an

action and can be described in ontological terms; and Polanyi's
ontology can be viewed as an ontologizing of his epistemo~ogy.

Thus, there is a parallel between the knowing

act viewed epistemologically and the same act viewed ontologically.
Given this parallel, it becomes possible to view the
knowing act as an act to which moral categories are applicable.

That is, knowledge of a value is at the same time a

commitment to act in certain ways.

Thus, knowledge of the

Good is a move toward the Good, a move that obeys standards
of right action just as knowledge must obey standards of
truth.

In essence, I find a parallel between knowledge of

value-truth and commitment to right action.

In the argument

from ontology, I emphasize the concept of right action rather
132

133

than the knowledge of values.

For I believe Polariyi's

ontology has more to say about the being of man (particularly
his advancement of himself as a

bio-p~ychic

organism) than

about his knowledge.
Man's advancement toward the Good and the consequent development of higher insights into the Good follows
the ontological dynamic described by Polanyi in his interrelationship of higher and lower principles.

Just as

higher principles rely on lower ones (which support them),
so higher moral insights depend upon less penetrating visions
of the Good and are not possible without them.

Our moral

knowledge "emerges" into novel shapes, and, vis

~vis

the parallel between epistemology and ontology, our actual,
biotic lives function under new principles.

I argue in this

chapter that Polanyi's notion of freedom can be directly
applied to moral responsibility for decisions and actions.
Thus, in this chapter, I present the fundamental ideas of
Polanyi's ontology and draw out the tacit dynamic of moral
development that may be inferred from it (if we begin with
the presupposition that we do know something about moral
life and that we commit right and wrong acts).
1.

The Origin of a Notion of Right Action
We may now turn to the notion of right as an exten-

sion of personal knowledge in the ethical domain.

To do

this, we may return to Polanyi's epistemological language.
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We have established that persons come to know values
and gain insights into the nature of the Good as they attempt
to grow and live successfully within the community of human
beings.

The solution of life-problems is essential for any

living organism, and man's intellect seeks for a way of
ordering life which solves the increasingly complex
he finds confronting him in communal life.

problems

Values are ascrip-

tions of worth to an object, act, or event.

They are ordered

into a functional, organic hierarchy which meets the needs of
'

the individual, needs that are informed by communal life.
From an epistemological point of view, the scope of
a value is determined by our intellectual grasp of the object
it refers to as desirable, whether inherently so or as a
means to something that is.

But Polanyi's view of the intel-

lect aces not allow us to reduce the notion of a value to an
intellectual grasp of the worth of something.

We have ob-

served that tacit knowledge requires the reliance of the
person as a whole upon ideas which form the ground of new
discoveries.

This reliance is never classed, however, as

mere intellectual reliance in the sense of remaining strictly
within the realm of ideas.

Indwelling is an act of the whole

person; even within the realm of ideas alone, it represents
a commitment to pursue a line of thought.

But such pur-

suance itself is a form of activity and not merely a passive
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idea.

And it necessitates all kinds of action, whether physi-

cal, mental, and social in its own support.

The indwelling

of tacit knowledge necessarily involves human action as well
as human thought.
The ordering of goals to be pursued according to a
hierarchy of ascriptions of worth is in itself an ordering
of human activity.

Knowledge of values can be true or false

in the sense that it may or may not be an ascription of worth
that responds adequately to the problem of successfully
ordering one's life.

A "true" value opens up a route to

further value-discoveries and continues, despite changes or
even reyersals in our commitment to them, to confirm our
knowledge of the aspect of reality they reveal.

A false

value manifests itself as such by its systematic contradiction of our committed hierarchy of values or by its incapacity to resolve value-dilemmas.
Since value-knowledge can be true or false in so far
as it is part of our grasp of reality, we can view the
actions they involve or imply as being right or wrong.
Actions which support and sustain or are directly involved
in pursuing the values held to be true are right actions.
Those which fail to do so, whether by omission or commission,
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may b e wrong act1ons.

201

Thus, valuing is a human activity

which, in so far as it involves actions in pursuit of the
truth of a value, may be right or wrong.
Let us remember that the personal knowledge of values
is informed deeply by our necessary involvement in the community of persons.

Thus, a personal knowledge of values is

also a projection of those values as universal standards to
which each person submits.

We judge the truth of our values

by the universal standards of value-knowledge to which the
community of which we are a part submits.

And, thus, we also

submit ourselves to the standards of action or behavior which
support the values of the community.

Communal value-·stand-

ards imply communal actions which pursue these values; and
these actions cannot be random but are ordered toward realization of these values.

This ordering is a standard of

behavior to which we submit ourselves as we order our lives in
pursuit of our communal values.
201 r

Thus, committing ourselves to

·
·
1 b ecause one
rna k e t h.1s assert1on
con d.1t1ona
might assert a value or advise an action which appears relevant to the situation but may actually be irrelevant. In
addition, the value or action advised may be universally acclaimed as a true value and a right action; but under certain
circumstances, it may not be helpful or harmful. One might
conceive of a man who is young and swift of foot being
approached by a mad man with an ax. He might drop to his knees
and begin to pray for his safety--certainly no one would condemn prayer as a valued action. But, after all, one can run
and pray at the same time! Praying--if immediately ineffectual
a~d the only action taken--seems to be-a wrong action in such
Clrcumstances, particularly if the safety of the man's family
is involved.
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a value is a commitment to certain standards of behavior.

We

find ourselves obligated to certain standards of behavior and,
thus, pursue values by doing what we ought to do.

Our actions

are right in so far as we do what '-.re ought to do.
A hierarchy of values constitutes the indwelt tacit
realm upon which we rely in order to attend to an ultimate
vision of what we aim for:

the Good.

We gain a personal

knowledge of the Good in so far as our knowledge of values
is adequate to reveal it.
Thus, our knowledge of what we ought to do, of what
is right, is part of this hierarchy and opens the way to a
knowledge of the right.

A right is .a universal standard of

behavior which not only indicates what actions ought to be
taken in pursuit of the Good but also what actions may be
taken by all persons who submit to the standards of right.
Thus, an obligation to pursue the Good according to the standards represented in the hierarchy of values found in one's
community is also a right to pursue the Good in this way.
An obligation to right action implies a right to pursue the
Good rightly.

Thus, we can see that the concept of a per-

sonal knowledge of values

rna~

be extended to that of a tacit
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commitment to standards of action which pursue these values
. . 1 concept o f a r1g
. h t 202 as- d e f.1ne d
and to at 1 east a m1n1ma
by the values we seek to realize.
Doing right is a demand of our value system, a demand
authorized by our total personal commitment to it.

The in-

sight toward which our standards of right action aim and out
of which they flow is that of justice.

Just as values are

grounded in and aim at the Good, so do right actions aim at
justice. 203 That is, standards of right are developed and
corrected in the light of what they reveal about the rightness
of actions within the context of the community; and these standards become standards of justice in so

fa~

as they judge in

general what constitutes the communal rightness of an action.

ZOZI will forego · an indepth discussion of human

rights since I wish only to make the formal point here that
standards <bf the Good also tacitly imply standards of right
and wrong and that these standards are known inthe contexts
of personal knowledge. One might imagine that a grasp of
fundamental human rights might be achieved by a comparison
of relative value standards among a large number of cultures. But I wish only to establish the formal point that
knowledge of values and insight into the Good implies knowledge of right action and, therefore, also a concept of a
right.
203 r am no t go1ng
.
.
.
to en t er 1nto
a d eta1.1 e d d.1st1nction between retributive and distributive justice. But I
shall define justice fundamentally as a rightness of action
Within the community of persons. And this definition, though
minimal, applies to both retributive and distributive forms
of justice since each of these aims at the Good through right
action within the society.
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Standards of right--and rights--are judged by the insight into
justice which they afford; and this insight, universalized as
are all personal commitments, establishes the goal toward which
right actions aim and judges what constitutes wrong or injust
actions.
We do, then, have a personal knowledge of right and
wrong as a part of our knowledge of values and of the Good.
This knowledge, of course, depends upon the particular values
we pursue and the insight into the Good that these afford us.
But no insight into values or the Good is unattended by at
least some vague notions of the direction action must take to
meet the standards implied in such insight.

Thus, the intel-

lectual grasp of a value is itself a move toward a higher life
in which the whole person is committed, involved, and participating.
2.

The Parallel Between Epistemology and Ontology
In attempting to understand the transition which one

can easily make in Polanyi's
ontology, we may

~e

works from epistemology to

helped by observing the parallel between

tacit reliance in knowing and the development of levels of

.

being as we find it in Polanyi's ontology.

We may then see

more clearly how a knowledge of values involves an activity
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of pursuing the Good through right action.
I am not simply surmising that there is a parallel
between the order of knowledge and the order of reality in
Polanyi's thought.

He asserts this explicitly:

Viewed in themselves, the parts of a machine are
the machine is comprehended by attending
from its parts to their joint function, which operates
~machine.
To this structure of knmving there correspond two levels controlled by different principles.
The particulars viewed in themselves are controlled
by the laws of inanimate nature; while viewed jointly,
they are controlled by the operational principles of
the machine. This dual control may seem puzzling.
But the physical sciences expressly leave open certain variabilities of a system, described as its
boundary conditions. The operational principles of
a machine control these boundaries, and so they do
not infringe the laws of physics and chemistry, which
operate within these boundaries.
The same dualism holds for biology. Biologists will
tell you that they are explaining living beings by
the laws of inanimate nature, but what they actually
do, and do triumphantly well, is to explain certain
aspects of life by machine-like principles. This
postulates a level of reality that operates on the
boundaries left open by the laws of physics and
chemistry.
This opens up a perspective to a whole sequence of
levels, all the way up to that of a responsible
humanity.204
meaningl~ss;

We can see that the dual activities of "looking at" and "at'tending from" have their foundation in the existence of distine~

levels of functioning within the organism.

Such levels

204 Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
PP. 153-4
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manifest themselves in the way the principles determining the
stability and power of an organism exercise a multi-leveled
control over its parts.
This kind of multi-levelled control extends to nature
as a whole.

While particulars viewed in themselves may be

controlled by inanimate nature, viewed jointly they are controlled by operational principles known only by a joint comprehension of the particulars.

Polanyi's epistemological

dualism of reliance and attention, then, parallels the ontological dualism of control and

f~nctiOn

in organized systems.

Just as one relies on elements tacitly known to attend to a
focal, comprehensive object, so ontological principles also
show a hierarchy of reliance; thus, all entities develop and
function by the principles or laws that apply to single elements themselves as well as the laws that control the comprehensive entity formed by them. 205
Polanyi extends his parallelism of epistemological
and ontological realms especially to living organisms and
to man.

He claims that the operations of living organisms

resemble an integration of particulars by means of tacit
knowing.

Living organisms survive by solving life-problems,

and their survivial is

contingent~upon

such solutions.

Thus,

living organisms may succeed or fail in solving their

ZOSK now1n
.

by Marjorie

pp. 153-4.

Michael Polan i, edited
o
icago Press, 1969),
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problems.2° 6

And, to fail or suceed is living.

Their solu-

tions may be as primitive as the extension of a pseudopod
toward a fixe4 object or as sophisticated as a scientific
theory!
We have already noted how we use the body as a tool
for our subsidiary awareness of the world.

Our body is not

an object to us, but the means through which the world appears.
Further, the tools (machines, ideas, etc.) we use in exploring the world become an extension of our body.

Thus, we are
\

subsidiarily aware of them in attending to the world through
them. We "pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them
as parts of our own existence. We accept them existentially
Know1ng,
·
th en, 1nvo
·
1ves an · 1n
· t enby dwell1·ng 1·n them". 207
tional change of being.
grasping an object of

Knowing is a way of intending or

knowle~ge

as well as a way of being:

a pouring of oneself into a subsidiary awareness of particulars in order to skilfully achieve the comprehensive whole~ 08
Polanyi, then, acknowledges that knowing is an act of being,
And, as such, knowing is a shaping of the knower's being.
206Kfi0W1n
.
by

Marjori~Grene,

Michael Polan i, edited
C icago Press, 1969),

PP. 153-4.

207Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. 58-9.
208 Ibid., p. 64.
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Knowing is an intimate ontological participation in the whole
of reality.

Thus, Polanyi's epistemology is itself an entrance

into ontological knowledge.
We see, then, that knowing itself is an activity which
in turn must be described ontologically.

This ontological

description relies upon tacit knowledge; and tacit knowing
may be described by the same dynamic principles that pertain
to the ordered activities of all things.

Man's knowing acti-

vity is itself an emergent reality in the universe of events.
We have already anticipated this conclusion from an analysis
of Polanyi's epistemology.

Now we may enter into his ontology,

particularly his ontology_of man the knower, with confidence
that such concrete analysis-will lead us to the ordered activities that obey standards of right.

We precede then with an

analysis of the fundamental notion of change and development,
209
which Polanyi iunderstands as a form of emergent evolution.

2o9w e can ralse
.
.
.
.
.
t h e questlon
o f startlng
polnts
ln
relation to Polanyi's parallel of epistemological (tacit)
reliance and ontological reliance. Do we begin with his ontology and base upon it the doctrine of tacit knowledge? Or
do we instead begin with an epistemological doctrine and
reflect "tacit reliance" in an ontological doctrine?
Clearly, Polanyi begins as an epistemologist. But
his own starting point does not throw light on this question,
since he adduces no reasons why one ~ begin with the epistemological question. The fact that he does raise the issue
of tacit knowledge first in his works may be only accidental
to the question at hand.
Fundamentally, we are asking whether we ought to
make a beginning with the insight into the nature of reality
that Polanyi reflects in his ontology or with a statement of
"truth" about the process of coming to know. Do we begin
With methodology or content?
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3.

Knowing and Being in Emergent Evolution
Polanyi appr~aches fundamental ontological questions

from the point of view of a scientist.
pays

Close

More specifically, he

attention to the biological sciences as an entrance

into a wide-ranging understanding of man and the nature of
reality.

Polanyi does not answer this question for us. He
begins with epistemological methodology, but he does not make
methodology "primary" merely by beginning with it; and he does
not derive, in a logical progression, an ontology which reflects this methodology because it is derived from it. Nor
does he make his ontology the "tacit" ground of his methodology. In short, he does not give primacy to methodology or
ontology any more than he gives primacy to the body or theworld in the knowing act.
But I do not think that we can accuse Polanyi of arbitrarily and naively opting for one beginning over another,
despite appearances to the contrary. The point is that
Polanyi could begin with either methodology or content and
still maintain his position 1n both. If he were, eg., to
begin with a description of the ontological dynamic of hierarchical reliance, the ontology itself would necessitate a
concept of ~acit knowledge. For the description of ontological reliance would have to be extended to the bio-psychic act
of knowing and would consider knowing as an ontological aspect
of the human being. The ontological reliance of one act of
knowing upon another translates, in epistemological terms,
into the reliance of explicit i_deas upon tacit knowledge.
Similarly, the explication of tacit knowing necessitates the
ontological dynamic which Polanyi expounds and extends beyond
acts of .human knowing to the fundamental dynamic of reality.
If methodology and content mutually imply one another, then
one can begin with either and comprehend the other. It makes
no difference where one begins; the implications of one's beginning will make explicit the other term. Polanyi's position,
~hen, is that methodology and content are so intertwined that
1t does not matte~wher~ one begins as long as one begins with
a commitment to truth, a commitment generally taken for granted
Whether one begins with an epistemology or an ontology.
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The reason why Polanyi considers biological science
so important is that value-free observation is impossible
within it.

Even at the vegetative level we accept the

interests of the living organism as the standard of our evaluation of it.

We say that an organism succeeds or fails.

Thus,

the biological sciences are convivial in a way in which the
.
.
.
1nan1mate
sc1ences
cannot b e. 210

Further, biological know-

ledge cannot be just a matter of statistics and prediction.
In order to bring order into biological knowledge, one must
look at its multiplicities and pay attention to characteristic shapes, markings, etc.

This is done, of course, within

a prior system of morphology and has the appearance of scientific sophistication.

But this morphology is grounded in

a kind of phenomenological approach to the content of biological study. 211
Such an approach, combined with the acknowledgment
of value (in the sense of the success or failure of the biological organism) as a legitimate category of understanding
210

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. Sl.
211 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 353.
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in the biological sciences, enables Polanyi to extend the
knowledge and manner of knowing in biology indefinitely
toward more wide-ranging theory.
Biology is an extension of the theory of knowledge
toward a theory of all kinds of biotic achievements, of which
knowledge is only one.

Biology is an analysis of the bio-.

legist's commitment in understanding the realities upon
.
.
.
212
which a living organ1srn
re 1.1es 1n
t h e strategem o f 1.1v1ng.

Thus, for Polanyi, it forms the basic theoretical ground upon
which an understanding of reality can be based.
In view of this, Polanyi envisages a knowledge of
"knowers" preceding from biology to a sort of "ultra-biology''·

One moves from knowledge concerning primordial,

vegetative commitments to that concerning primitive activeperceptive commitments.

And from this point one moves on

to intelligent commitments with universal intent and ultimately to a study of the convivial intellectual and emotional life of human peers where observation is replaced
by pure indwelling where we may recognize another as superior to us.

At this point we may even a-critically accept

the other's standards as our own, forming ideals which con.
1 po 1 e o f our persona 1 comm1•t ment. 213
s t 1.t u t e th e un1versa
212

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 347.
213 rbid., pp. 378-9.
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Thus, Polanyi envisions levels of knowing life from the most
. t•~c knowing to a human knowing beyond our own
primitive b ~o
capacities.

Again, we must keep in mind that this development in
knowledge cannot be separated from our claim of a parallel
development in the order of being.

A science that moves from

biology to ultra-biology is also essentially both an evolving
science and a science of evolution.

Polanyi is firmly commit-

ted to a theory of evolution as fundamental to his understanding of reality.
Polanyi says "The evolutionary process forms a continuous transition from the inanimate stage to that of living
·
an d k now1ng
persons ... 11 214

And he asserts in the Tacit Di-

mension that evolution is a continuous process. 215

Thus far,

we cannot find anything that contradicts or adds to traditional scientific understanding.

But Polanyi's understanding

of evolution is not really so traditional.

Le~

us note

that two basic theories concerning evolution separate Polanyi
from traditional scientific evolutionism.

First, Polanyi re-

jects the idea that accidental mutation and natural selection
is responsible for all evolutionary development or that all
214

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 345.

215

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. SO.
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evolutionary change can be explained solely in terms of
these.

He asserts that a sort of gradient of meaning is
216
operative in addition to these forces.
A key idea in describing this gradient is to be found
in Polanyi's notion of emergence.

He says, "Evolution can be
21'"'
understood only as a feat of emergent". 1 The notion of
emergence involves novelty in evolutionary change.

An emer-

gent reality cannot be explained by a deterministic theory
concerning the dynamics of its composite elements.

A creative

development is released, evoked, even controlled, but not
determined by its accessible meaning potentialities or by the
releasing agent of the change. In this sense, the creative
development is emergent. 218 Thus, the development of a new
and higher species of animal, eg., would be explained not
merely as accidentally successful mutation but as a move of
the organism toward a more successful mode of life.

The poten-

tial mode of life "releases" or "evokes" the organism to seek
a more successful mode of life, a mode discovered through a
"feeling out" into various possible responses to complex
stimuli.
216 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 173.
217 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 390.
218 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 177.
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This does not mean that emergence is inherently a
mystery or a movement motivated by "magical" forces.

All

emergent realities can be understood as produced from prior
elements.

But just how the production occurs may remain

.
.
unspec1'f"1a bl e f rom t h e po1nt
o f v1ew
o f t h e knower. 219

Thus,

while one may conceive emergence as an explanatory notion in
itself, one may remain unable to specify exactly how any particular emergent reality comes into being.

Polanyi says,

eg., that the emergence of new life forms are inexplicable in
220
.
.
terms o f p h ys1cs
an d c h em1stry.

One can say with certainty, however, that nothing
that ought to be can be determined by knowing what is.

The

boundary conditions between the lower and the higher levels
of development are left open and the higher emerges by principles not contained in the lower levels. 221
A corollary to this principle is Polanyi's assertion
that solutions to problems and higher visions of reality
"emerge" in the same way and are part of all evolutionary

219 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy ~Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962, p. 394.
220

Ibid. , p. 383

221 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 44-5; we shall analyze
in some detail Polanyi's notion of "higher" and "lower" levels
in later sections.
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2 22
innovations.

As ~arJorle
'I
.
. Grene h as po1nte
.
d ou t , 2 2 3 p o 1 any1.

is anxious to avoid the paradoxes that attend the extension of
Cartesianism into science, such as a biology without reference
to the categories of life.

The process of evolution, in

Polanyi's vie,v, has led to our capacity to seek and discover
truth, to articulate and preserve it.
placed in one by all creation.

This points to a trust

Polanyi views it as a sacri-

ledge to contemplate any actions which may lead to the extinction of humanity. 224

We must recall that, for Polanyi, to live

. man ' s ca 11"1ng, 225 a ca 11"1ng note d 1n
. t h e movement
b y trut h 1s

of evolution toward a higher humanity.
What then, are the key elements that account for or
describe the feat of emergence?
tive power of potentials.

~v"e

have mentioned the evoca-

Another factor is that of randomness.

Randomness cannot be handed over to the consequences of accidental motions.

We must try hard to avoid even accidental

order; yet randomness is most easily achieved when we do not
222

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) pp. 87-8.

z'J~~Marjorie

Grene, The Knower and the Known (London:
Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 185.
224

Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 69.
225

rbid., p. 70.

The
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know how exactly to produce it, such as when we shuffle a
deck of cards.

In

s~ch

a case, we can observe the randomness

as such, but we can never specify in the detailed and exact
terms of the system below the emerging one how the lower one
produced the randomness. 226 Polanyi says, "Random impacts
can release the functions of an ordering principle and suitable physical-chemical conditions (eg.) can sustain its continued operation; but the action which generates the embodiment or a novel ordering principle always lies in this prin. 1 e 1"t se lf . 227
c1p
Randomness, then, cannot be precisely defined, though
it can be clearly recognized as such.

The background of any

focussed figure, for example, is relatively random.

Randomi-

city can be overcome by stability; but too much randomicity
can overcome stability, a principle necessary to the growth
and functioning of living beings. 228 Emergence, then, is an
achievement of a unique tension between an ordered being and
a new order discovered through random exploration.

And this

tension, necessary to emergence, aan be dissolved if there
is either too much randomness or too much order.

226 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
jritical Philosophy (Chicago:
962), pp. 390-92.
227 Ibid., 401.
228 Ibid., pp. 37-40.

Towards a PostThe University of Chicago Press,
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The emergence of a new order is more a process of
"maturing" into it than that of a sudden leap:

"Novel forms

of existence take control of a system by a process of maturation". 229

Furthermore, these "maturing orders" are establish-

ed generally through changes in
individual mutations.
"phylogenesis". 230

~

rather than through

Polanyi calls the emergence of type

And he classes phylogenesis as a develop-

ment of fundamental potentials of being:

" ... phylogenetic

emergence - is a process of maturation which differs in the
most curious manner from that of ontogenesis; for it is a
maturation of the potentialities of ontogenesis." 23 1

This dynamic of emergence is the key to understanding how Polanyi can assert human freedom to act as one chooses.
Polanyi extends the notion of creative emergence to individual

22 9Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled
Critical Philosophy (Chicago-:~~~~n-1~v-e_r_s~1~ty~-o~~~----~r-e_s__
s_,
1962, p. 395.
230 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1966), p. 48.
2 31 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A Post
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 400.
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creative acts.
4.

232

Freedom
Let us examine two related images that apply to this

notion.

First imagine a graph on which a sloping line indi-

cates a gradient from a higher chemical

z3 2 Ob v1ous
.
1y

~oncentration

of

P o 1 any1. 1s
.
.
d uc1ng
.
.
re1ntro
1nto
contempor-

ary philosophy--and science--the notion of finalism. Besides
Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality) and Teilhard de
Chardin (The Phenomenon of Man) he is one of the few contemporary philosophers to do so.
I could rehearse here the various arguments against
finalism and ask whether Polanyi escapes what might be considered fatal charges against it. But rather than defend
Polanyi here, I think it is better to clarify in what sense
he is a fina~ist.
.
.
Polanyi's finalism lies in his assertion that the
movement of an organism from a less successful mode of life to
a more successful one is not accidental but is guided by a
tacit "feeling toward" a higher level, which "exists" as a
potential mode with "powers" to guide the movement as a whole.
This finalism rests at first upon a purely descriptive notion
of how higher, more complex levels of functioning rely upon
simpler and more primitive ones. From a purely descriptive
point of view, such a finalism might make sense. When the
reliance of the higher upon the lower as well as the supposedly obvious "goal" of the lower in the higher can be spelled
out in the presence of both terms (the lower and the higher).
Such a description migh~ an alternative way of describing
reality as a fait accompli.
But Polanyi wishes to extend his notion of evolution
to present biotic achievements in such a way as to make the
higher term of an evolutionary movement still a potential term.
For this reason, Polanyi's finalism must face up to enquiries
concerning the status of being for such "potential" realities.
For they cannot be said to exist in any tangible manner, yet
they appear to have tangible causal relations. Clearly,
Polanyi does not develop his ontology deeply enough to explain
how the tangible relates to the intangible in terms of actual
causality. And he does not develop the distinction between actual being
and potential being in any clear way other than to define such a distinction in terms of the finalism or teleology inherent in things.
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something to a lower concentration of it.

The line indicates

the temporal interval that lapses as the solution passes into
a state of chemical change (a state of perfect distribution
of the soluble substance, eg., as a salt).

The gradient

slopes in the direction of a minimization of potential energy;
i.e., the chemical bonding that will occur in the solution
actually takes place:

it is transformed into kinetic energy.

A related image is that of the energy generated in
a chemical reaction as the reaction moves from less stable
to more stable configurations.

Again, potential energy is

collected into meaningful patterns that tend toward stabi233
lity. Polanyi is indicating in these examples
that the
heuristic tension in a mind seems to be generated much as
kinetic energy in physics is generated by the accessibility
of more stable configurations.

He does, however, note one

difference between mental heuristic tension and chemical
reactions:

the former are often deliberate, whereas the

latter never are.

In Polanyi's view this excludes the pos-

sibility that the dynamic of personal knowing--and being-is causally determined.

Certainly the efforts of the person

are not random or free in the sense of being absolutely noncontingent.234

But this does not mean that human acts are

233
Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 176.
234 Polanyi does not adhere to a Sartrean sense of radical freedom, since he asserts that the mind guides its efforts by its intentions.
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. d 235
are d etermJ.ne
.

We must look for a more common-sense

meaning of freedom in Polanyi's works'.
Mental acts are temporal.

As such, their

assertion

is a matter of making decisions which cut into situations
fraught with the risk of hesitating too long or acting too
hastily. 236

These decisions may appear to be determined

only if we accept "scientific" standards of explanation as
valid for decisions and attempt to fulfill them in action.
But they are really indeterminate in so far as they are
achieved by an intensification of uniquely personal intimations.

One can decide, eg., whether be will strive to ful-

fill self-set standards of behavior or not.

Decision is

not to be understood in terms of causal methods.

Indeed,

every act is engendered by a commitment that has two poles:
the universal standard (the determinant)
commitment (the indeterminate). 237

and the personal

Concerning this latter,

Polanyi says, " ... the personal pole of commitment retains
its autonomy everywhere, exercising its calling within a
material milieu which conditions but never fully determines
its- actions". 238
23 \iichael Polanyi and Hairy Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 176.
23n_

·

·

l_'he

'"Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: The University o
icago Press, 19 2 ' p. 314.
237 Ibid., p. 396.
238

rbid., p. 397.
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In Polanyi's view, then, indeterminacy and creativity
are logical implications of tacit knowing.

The unspecifiabi-

lity of tacit clues makes a deterministic model impossible.
Since the knowledge that would make determinism possible--that
of the entire mental state of the person--is ruled out by the
dynamics of tacit knowledge.

Thus experience itself is indeterminate, constantly novel. 239 And, as a result, one cannot consider reality or human action to be anything less than
creative and novel.

Polanyi's parallel between the dynamic

of knowing and the structure of being and its dynamic of
emergence means that novelty in experience is novel--undetermined--development in human activity.
Human reality, then, is a free, creative, emergent
reality.

Like all living organisms, man's life is defined in

terms of its movement toward success in surviving and developing toward its calling.

In the case of lower animals, this

calling may extend only to the ordered activities that enable
them to feed themselves, find adequate shelter, and form a
primitive community.

But in man this calling extends to

responsibility for his free decisions.

Man is called toward

achievements which require that he take in hand his own freedom and move with responsibility to fulfill and continue to
develop the standards of action which fulfil the highest
239 "A Bridge from Science to Religion Based on Polanyi's
Theory of Knowledge''. William Scot, Zygon, 5, S0-57, 1970.
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goals his intellect can grasp.
Man's freedom and his responsibility are given together.

We are free to act as we wish only in relation to

ordered activities or standards of action which have supported
our existence and which demand that we responsibly support
them or find better ways of ordering life.

Our freedom allows

us to act to our disadvantage, to act against accepted standards, even to overthrow them.

We can move toward ultimate

anarchy if we wish, destroying communal standards of behavior
and refusing even the most primitive biological needs.
calling is just that:

Our

a guiding vision that requires respon-

sibile and creative development; it is not a mechanically
determining impetus toward unthinking, blind response.

But

this freedom must acknowledge its relation to the organization
of life in which it is grounded and accept responsibility for
how it shapes--or destroys--this organization.
This freedom is moral since it involves making decisions, making a difference in things.

And this difference

has no determinative reasons other than the act of choosing.
But this does not mean that we must buy Sartre's notion of
radical freedom in which values do not exist until we have
chosen them.
intellectual.

Polanyi considers this view unnecessarily antiFreedom is most essentially freedom when

. f ree t o ra1se
.
.
.
th aug ht 1s
quest1ons
a b out 1ts
own f ree d om. 240
240 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 4.
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And such a question points not to a radical, ungrounded free241
dom but to a freedom with definite grounds in conscience.
This does not mean that moral freedom can never be
arbitrary.

Arbitrary choice is justifiable as a heuristic

process since it is only by narrowing our focus (arbitrarily)
in some respect that we are able to perceive certain patterns
hitherto unknown.

Arbitrary choice is a "guide" or "fruit242
ful belief" which leads us to new insight.
Polanyi, then, accepts the existential tenet that

morality demands moral commitment in the form of decisions.
Indeed, he extends this concept through to an assertion that
no animal can be certain that its purpose will be successful
and that every movement is a commitment which takes the risk
of failure. 243 But he condemns existentialism as a hybrid
of scepticism and moral perfectionism.

It employs ·moral

scepticism to blast existing society as artificial, ideological, and hypocritical.

And this only means that moral

passions themselves become filled with contempt for their own

241
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 65.
242 Michael Polanyi, The Re ublic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theory C icago: Roosevelt University,
1962), p. 2.

243s c1ent1
.
.f.1c Thought an~ Social Reality, ed. by Fred
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc.,
1974), p. 59.
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ideals! 244

The distinction between good and evil is then

eliminated, and appeal to moral ideals is seen as futile and
245
dishonest.
Polanyi does not reject the moral tradition of his
culture by means of a radical scepticism.
delusions of moral perfectionism.

Nor does he hold

Instead, he holds that

freedom must be rooted in tradition and that no generation can
be radically self-determinative.

But this acceptance of tradi-

tion must be integrated into a system cultivating radical progress.

Not all labor for a common purpose can be determined by

the will of the people, since public will is known only
fragmentarily and requires for its fulfilment individual initiatives aiming at fragmentary problems.

This freedom which

allows a certain amount of directionlessness in a society is
nonetheless indispensable to the pursuit of social self.
246
1mprovement.
In the realm of ethics, then, Polanyi is a firm believer in t·he sort of human freedom that makes us morally
responsible for our actions.

Ascribing creativity and novelty

to the most fundamental dynamic of reality, especially of
244 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.y. : Doubleday & Co., Inc.~~~p. 58.
245 Ib.id., p. 5~.
246 Knowin
by Marjorie
p. 71.

Michael Polan i, edited
J.cago ~Pre-ss-,--1969--) ,

r
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life, he must naturally regard man as responsible not only
for his total evolutionary emergence to higher levels of
being but also for his individual decision to participate
responsibly in the life-standards of the community.
But how does this free power to organize life toward
the emergence of higher forms actually create "levels" of .
reality?

We must investigate further the nature of Polanyi's

.
h y o f rea 1"~ty. 24 7
concept o f a h ~erarc

247 clearly, Polanyi identifies that human freedom
over which so much philosophical ink has been spilled as
the power of choice. More specifically (since even determinsts believe in "choice", if only as the last consideration of a series of deliberations), Polanyi believes in the
power of human beings to inject novelty into the world through
both arbitrary and reasoned choices.
Again, Polanyi's argument for freedom is not so
much an argument as a description of change. If he has an
argument at all, it rests on the principle that, since we
cannot ever totally describe an event, we cannot prove a
determined chain of events. Here Polanyi injects the unspecifiability of tacit knowledge into an age-old issue with the
intention of resolving it on epistemological grounds. But
clearly his argument commits the fallacy of an ad ignorantium.
Merely because we cannot specify the reasons whyan event
occurs does not mean that there are no unknown reasons.
In so far as Polanyi argues the issue of freedom,
he commits the ad ignorantium. In so far as he considers the
ontological dynamic Gf freedom, he merely describes the event
of change without a functioning presupposition of determinism.
Such a way of preceding is not a resolution of the philosophical issue of freedom. It is hardly anything more than an
assumption of freedom decorated by elaborate description. And
one might observe that this lacuna in Polanyi's philosophy is
an important one since he emphasizes political and social
freedom (which can only be seen as rooted in this deeper, ontological sense of human freedom) as the key to man's emergence into higher realities.
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The only classification possible here is simply to
note that, if Polanyi has no conclusive argument for human
freedom, neither has anyone produced a successful argument
for determinism. Thus, since both freedom and determinism are
unproved, one might as well accept one rather than the other
and include his assumption within a consistent world-view.
Polanyi is at least consistent with his option for freedom
throughout the whole of his thought. The point here is that
I am attempting only to accept and clarify Polanyi's own somewhat uncritical acceptance of moral freedom with the aim of
showing that his notion of freedom is an important element of
his tacit ethic. I believe Polanyi accepts moral freedom as
a radical choice of world-views. We may disagree with his
choice; but we can hardly deny the important ethical consequences of it. And this latter point is the one I wish to
advance.

CHAPTER FIVE
"RULES OF RIGHTNESS" AS LEVELS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY
This chapter carries forth the momentum of the previous chapter.

We may now see that Polanyi's ontology is

very much oriented around a hierarchy of being in which
higher levels rely on lower levels (which in turn support
and participate in higher levels).

This notion is extended

to the moral realm in which man is viewed as freely pursuing
the Good through a process of maturing toward the achievement of wholly novel modes of human being, modes which represent new insights into value, right, and the Good.
In this chapter I apply Polanyi's notion of "rules
of rightness" (which he applies to the structures of reliance and marginal controls in the functioning of organisms
and machines) to the moral domain.

Just as the stabiliza-

tion of processes tend to create rules of correct functioning (rules of rightness), so moral structures which work
and which keep access to moral truth open tend to stabilize
into rules of rightness.

These rules are moral rules or

codes by which we judge beQavior. Our moral concepts, grounded
in individual and communal experience, tend to be expressed
in the form of rules by which actions are judged to be right
or wrong.

These rules do not, however, preclude emergence

through insight into new forms of moral life; and it is at
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this point that Polanyi's ontology seems to coalesce with the
moral domain:

his concept of "ultra-biology" describes not

only a "scientifically" conceived destiny of man but, by
reference to Teilhard de Chardin's noosphere, touches difinitely upon a concept of a moral end of man.

This chapter

ends the discussion of Polanyi's ontology, having moved this
discussion from the key elements of his ontology to a conception of man's;ultimate organismic

~estiny

which coincides

with a moral end of man.
1.

Levels of Being
To trace Polanyi's thinking on this subject in more

detail, we can develop more deeply

hi~

thesis that each

level of being (including life, human reality, etc.) relies
for its operations on all of

~he

levels below it.

Thus,

each higher level imposes on the one immediately lower to
'I

it a boundary that harnesses it to the service of the higher,
a control that is transmitted stage by stage to lower
levels. 248 This structure does not, however, make the higher
levels reducible to the terms of the lower (we cannot, eg.,
l'f
. terms o f c h em1ca
. 1 structures ) ; 24 9 nor can
.
exp 1 a1n
1 e 1n
one account for the principles of the higher level in terms
248,,.~now1nq
.
.
an d Be1n~:

Essay~ by Michael Polanyi, edited
by Mariorie Grene, (Chicago? University of Chicago Press, 1969),
p. 234.
249 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 85.
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of the lower (we cannot reason from chemical knowledge to
the necessity of the properties of life}:so
Again, this ·ontology parallels the dynamic of tacit
knowledge:
... the two-levelled logic of tacit knowing performs
exactly what is needed for understanding this
mechanism.
Tacit knowing integrates the particulars of a
comprehensive entity and makes us see them forming
the entity. This integration recognizes the higher
principle at work on the boundary conditions. left
open by the lower principle, by mentally performing
the workings of the higher principle. It thus
materializes the functional structure of tacit knowing. It also makes clear to us how the comprehensive entity works by revealing the meaning of its
parts. We have here the semantic aspect of tacit
knowing. And since a comprehensive entity is con-.
trolled as a whole by a higher principle than the
one which controls its isolated parts, the entity
will look different than an aggregate of its parts.
Its higher principle will endow it with a stability
and power appearing in its shape and motions and .
usually produce also additional novel features. We
have here the phenomenal aspect of tacit knowing.25 1
Lower levels, then, are highly illuminating to the
higher levels of reality when viewed as part of the operational principles of the higher.

The higher level defines
the conditions under which the lower may operate, 252 whereas

ZSOKnow1n
.
by Marjorie Grene,
p. 155.
251 Ibid., p. 218.
252
Michael -Polanyi, Persenal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 133.
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lower levels define the conditions for the success of failure
of systems in so far as the higher relies on them. 253 Thus,
Polanyi says, "Everywhere the potential operations of a higher
level are actualized by their embodiment in lower levels which
254
makes them liable to failure".
Polanyi uses the terms "marginal conditions" and
. .
11255 to d escr1.b e t h e re 1 at1on
.
b e t ween
"bound ary con d 1t1ons
higher and lower levels.

Higher levels exercise control over

lower ones by shaping them, when they fulfill the conditions
higher levels lay down, into new entities functioning under
principles different from those formerly governing them.
consider the difference· between hydrogen and oXygen

Eg.,

as separate

elements and these two in chemical combination as water.

The

gaseous state of these two elements functions by principles
appropriate to gases until they are mixed together under the
proper circumstances.

When they combine to form water (which

is the only element they can form under certain conditions,
since they are bounded on all sides by the higher principle
254
Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 67.
255 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 55, 40-41, rsp.)
253 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 382.

166

of their combination), they fulfill the conditions of the principles governing water.

The principles governing the struc-

ture of water in this case are the boundary conditions which,
when "crossed over" by the combination of hydrogen and oxygen,
create the unique properties of water.
Levels of reality, then, seem to "slope upwards"
toward more and more complex entities governed by principles
which exercise control over the lower principles upon which
they rely.

Polanyi intends to describe the hierarchical

development of reality as a teleology toward higher levels
of reality.

He argues that even mechanisms of various kinds

acquire their organization by reference to som'e aim, goal,
or purpose that

i~

to be achieved by it.

This purpose can-

not be deduced from the physical and chemical laws that make
.
. man1"f ests 1tse
.
lf 1n
. 1ts
.
.
mac h 1nes
poss1.bl e, 256 but 1t
organ1zation toward a function relying on but not defined by the
elements making up the machine.

Thus, Polanyi is a "final-

ist" in that he believes all things organize themselves to
ends not defined by the elements of combination themselves.
This finalism is explicitly applied to the development of human activity.

The achievements of human life act

as heuristic guides to a yet hidden reality and, because they
form a base on which to stand as well as elements of a higher
256 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 169.
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achievement, every achievement has the power to promote the
257
realization of a new level of insight or activity.
Polanyi
orders the grades of commitment, eg., as primordial (biological commitment to life and centralized functioning), primitive
(active-perceptive centering), and responsible (requiring con.
d e l"b
. ) . 258 Human l"f
.
sc1ous
1 erat1on
1 e, th en, moves f rom pr1~
mordial biological commitments to responsible moral ones as
a multi-levelled, finalistic movement toward higher centers
of organization and operation.
Polanyi's notion of levels of reality may be extended
to the ethical domain.

We have already seen how values may

be developed in a hierarchical

order.

Now we may see more

concretely how we may order our action in society to preserve these values and promote stability in standards of behavior.
The human organism controls its behavior in increa~
ingly complex ways as it pursues its goals.
seen, its goals are not merely biological.

But, as we have
The person lives

in a community in which he finds his support and to which,
to some extent, he is responsible.

His responsibility is

defined by his inescapable participation in the community.
257 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 399.
258 Ibid., 363.
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He has an obligation to sustain and forward his community's
values because his own life is to a larg.er extent than he
can explicitly ever know, identified with the community.
This much has already been established.
Moral acts are acts motivated by the concern to submit to the moral standards of the community in order to
in its life.

sh~re

They constitute an "organismic" participation

in the community which attempts to dwell successfully in the
community.

As such, they are guided by an insight into right

action in specific situations (or what seems to be right).
This insight orders action, guiding a person's choices concerning what he does.
a principle:

This ordering is done in the light of

what is deemed right.

And this principle be-

comes a "higher level" control of behavior, shaping individual
acts into complex and related acts which aim at the right.
The higher principle, the right, relies upon individual acts which, considered separately, have no bearing on
the right.

For example, fulfilling one's obligation to pay

taxes relies upon acts like filling out the tax forms properly, figuring the required mathematics, and sending the
check for the required amount.

Right action relies on the

complex of ordered actions that fulfill one's tax obligation.
A failure in any of these destroys the possibility of meeting one's obligations (despite the fact that a mathematical
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error would not be viewed with the gravity that would pertain
to a refusal to send the required sum).
The higher principle, however, is not reducible to
any one of the separate acts which achieve the right, nor are
they reducible to the series of acts as a whole.

The goal of

such acts is the sense of acting rightly, and this goal shapes
behavior by defining the conditions of a right action.

In

each specific ethical action, the right embodies itself in
particular acts upon which it relies in order to exist.

And

these particular acts are no longer to be viewed in their
isolation but rather as elements of one movement toward right
. t h e et h 1ca
. 1 d oma1n.
. . I 2 5 9 Thus, an attempt at r1g
. h t act1on,
.
1n
informed by the values and standards -of the community and by
one's own ethical insight, transforms the elements of human
behaviour into entirely different and novel types of acts.
There is, if you please, a "phylogenetic maturation" in human
ethical behavior toward higher and higher guiding principles
which aim at transforming the whole of human activity into
new and still hidden shapes.
Of course, this maturation is all a matter of freedom.
We are free to choose to act rightly or to act with disregard

259 An attempt to save a drowning man, eg., is not
stmply "swimming" but rather a complex of acts whose character
is irremediably changed by the relations established between
them in fulfilling, as a whole, the end toward which they aim.
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for what is right.

The development of the person within the

community depends upon a commitment to seek higher truths
and right action.

One can choose to act against the community

and against one's own interests; and one can even oppose the
-------

community in the interest of a higher insight into right than

that possessed by his community.
We can see, then, that, if we extend Polanyi's notion
of a hierarchy of reality into the ethical domain, human
actions themselves become levels of human reality--indeed,
the highest levels of biological existence.

Human actions

can be graded from sporadic, blind attempts at survival to
committed, cooperative and partic-ipative sharing within a
community of persons.

Each level introduces a new depth of

insight into right action in general and manifests itself as
the boundary conditions for all of the right actions which
participate in it.

Clearly, then, ethical action is an

instance of the development of human reality toward higher
levels of a hierarchical arrangement.
2.

Rules of Action
Insight into right, based upon a responsible commit-

ment to communal values, then, is an ordering principle of
behavior.

We can understand what this means by investigating

the ontological meaning of an ordering principle.
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Polanyi defines an operational principle as any "collection" of parts which function according to a principle
which orders activity in a way not defined by the parts so
ordered. He distinguishes, however, between the actions of
an ordering (or operational) principle from the conditions
. .
.
261
Thus, the prinwh ic h re 1 ease an d susta1n 1ts act1ons.
ciple is not identical to the parts that functionally constitute it and upon which it relies.

It is in fact the origi-

nator of the potential within an open system, a group of
elements which can be harnassed and developed into new functions--and even

n~w

elements--by a principle that stands out-

side of them until released to function by the presence of
these elements. 262
Once harnessed by an ordering operational principle,
the composing elements tend to endure within
is produced.

th~

order that

For example, life, once produced from non-

living matter, tends to remain life and resist breakdown.
Thus, the ordering principle is an initiator of an order which,
by a momentum of its own, tends to stabilize a new order. 263
261 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 382.
262 Ibid., 384.
263 Ibid.
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This is why the ordering principle is often innovative.

Once

having stabilized a system, it can effect random motions which
. h er 1 eve 1 s of order. 264
discover even h 1g
Polanyi credits living organisms with improvising
alternative ways of achieving the end of an ordering principle as well as the capacity to achieve higher levels of life.
These "equipotential" modes of alternative orders within a
single ordering principle are part of the originative power
of the principle. 265

Living organisms centralize their

efforts and split this center into relatively self-regulating
sub-centers of organization. 266

And the result of this split-

ting or distribution of regulative functions enables the
organism to explore randomly alternative ways. of integrating
its life toward ultimate purposes--or discovering new purposes.
In relation to the development of persons, Polanyi
I

says that the unconscious, spurred by conscious effort is
capable of changing consciousness by reference to an original
insight.

He calls this power to originate a change in
264

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 386.
265

rbid., p. 337.

266 rbid., p. 356.
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.
. or1g1na
. . 1.1ty. 267
consc1ousness
morp h ogenet1c

Th_us, the mor-

phogenetic principle is the top operative principle through
which equipotential processes have their being as a comprehensive rightness under the principle.

They all disappear if
. pr1nc1p
.
. 1 e d.1sappears. 268 Thus, thought
the morp h ogenet1c
itself, together with the general consciousness of the person,

develops by the same processes applicable to all other aspects
of reality.
Polanyi himself sums up this discussion of the power
of originality in ordering principles.

He distinguishes

three types (or stages) of originality.· First, we are resourceful enough to find alternate ways to achieve our goals
even when normal means are cut off.

Second, we are capable,

of course, of normal maturation toward our goals.

And third,

we can discover altogether unprecedented operational prin. 1 es. 269
Clp
All of these ways ensure a continued, creative
movement both of a personal knowledge of the right and of our
power to order our lives rightly.

267 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
To\vards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 339.
268 Ibid., p. 340.
269 Ibid., p. 399.

174

An insight into right is, then, an ordering principle
which collects previously unrelated acts into a unified movement toward right action.

This insight is something different

from the action of pursuing the right in the sense that it is
the condition which releases and sustains the actions which
aim at establishing the right.

It is the originator of our

potential to order our actions rightly.
Decisions to act rightly establish eventually an
order which has a power of its own to stabilize and resist
destruction.

Such decisions are grounded in an insight into

right action and are the effective, originative agents of
order.

They establish systems of behavior, not merely iso-

lated acts; for they are informed by insights that yield
principles covering wide-ranging areas of action.

Thus,

once a general principle of behavior is decided upon and
grounded in commitment, a certain "stabilizing" force tends
to establish this commitment as a general order of behavior.
And from the base of such an ordered system, the person may
direct his surplus energies toward an imaginative exploration of alternative ways of fulfilling his obligation to
right action or even discover higher obligations.
Thus, moral action may seek out "equipotential"
alternatives which bring change and development to the moral
order.

A system of moral behavior need not be a total, com-

prehensive control of behavior.

Instead, the moral prin-

ciple (eg., refraining from doing injury to others) may,
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need a special response in times of war or personal attack.
The general principle may require modification through the
allowance of extenuating circumstances for protective action
which may necessitate harming others.

And such exceptions

may open a community to new principles, eg., those governing the conduct of war or the treatment of prisoners.

Thus,

new insights into what is right--as well as new rights--are
discovered and put into practice.
The growth and development of moral principles is
partially the growth and development of the person as a
whole.

Moral principles are .sustained by the continued com-

mitment, indeed the life, of the whole person.

And the

behavior that is collected, shaped, and which constitutes
the moral principle in action is in turn sustained by the
principle itself.

If the principle ceases to exist as a

prime motivator of the person, the behavior cannot continue
its ordered behavior.

The moral act ends as a moral power.

We are morally free, of course, to devolve morally.
We can refuse our commitment to moral values and cease
acting morally.

The reasons--or causes--for this are myriad.

But we can also choose to fulfill our moral objectives, find
alternative routes to them, or discover new ones.

Moral

life, like all aspects of life (such as knowing), is creative and not determined by external circumstances.
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We may not extend this inquiry into the dynamic of
moral action toward the establishment of a general sense of
moral rules.

We have spoken thus far about moral principles

but not as they are codified through the tradition of the
community.

To understand how such codification occurs, we

must turn to Polanyi's notion of "rules of rightness",
Operational principles, embodied in a system of
action, are called "rules of rightness". 270 These rules
codify the successful functioning of a system, whether the
system is that of a machine or an organism.

They account for

why a system functions in a way which accomplishes its goals.
Thus, the rules tell us how a thing or system is supposed to
work; and they are determined by a careful observation of
the standards of functioning directly bearing on the success
of the system. 271 This pertains both to machines and biotic
achievements with the difference that, in biotic achievements,
rules of rightness are discovered not by analyzing fixed
structures but by a skillful connoissuership·of their forms
.
.
2 72
of ach1evement.
But in both machines and living organisms,
rules of rightness constitute a rational strategem for success.273

270 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e:
Critical Philosophy (Chicago:

1962),

p ..

329.

271 Ibid., 345.
272 rbid., pp. 342-3.
273 Ibid., 332

177

Rules of rightness pertain not only to somatic, biotic
achievements in general, but specifically also to the act of
knowing.

Thus, Polanyi speaks of intellectual rightness as a

species of general rightness of response which involves the
whole person. 274 It is in this context that Polanyi defines
. h tness o f an ac t"~on. 275 And , by ex t ens~on,
.
trut h as t h e r~g
~e
can see that insight into right action is a truth upon which
we base our action.
Rules of rightness pertain, then, both to right knowing (defined as truth) and right acting (based on truth).

Thus,

subjectivity and error in knowledge and perception break the
rules of rightness that pertain to them just as abnormality,
malformation, or disease interferes with the proper function.
f a 1"~v~ng
.
.
2 76
~ng o
organ~sm.
We can easily understand. how Polanyi's notion of rules
of rightness can be extended to the ethical domain of knowledge and action.

On a personal level, the truth of right

guides us to right action.

And our actions tend to systema-

tize, to become "rules" of action based upon moral truths to
which we are committed.

Thus, because we participate in the

community of persons, we also develop rules of rightness that

274 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Postjritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
962)' p. 368.
275 Ibid., p. 320.
276 Ibid., p. 361.
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are shaped by this participation.

We establish within our

own commitments to act rightly an obligation to submit to
the rules constituting right action within the community.
This submission is, of course, a free act.

And it

is, as we have seen, a creative one in that we can seek new
means to achieve communal as well as personal goals and
establish new, universal rules of rightness to which we ourselves submit.

Such ethical rules may be taken up by the

community, systematized, and developed into the custom, ethic,
or law of the community.

As rules, they may be explicitly

developed and modified.
We have, then, established in Polanyi's notions of
a hierarchy of reality and rules of rightness a continuum of
human activity from perceptual rightness to moral rightness.
He claims that beyond sentience in motive and knowledge in
the person is the effort to do the right and know truly\ in
2 7 7 An d , 1 est anyone
. d epen d ent rea 1 lty.
.
th e presence o f an ln
doubt that my extension to the moral realm of his concept of
doing "rightly" is an exaggerated employment of his biological ideas, we may note this statement:

277 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
1962), p. 363.
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Our inquiry into the logic of machines is, therefore,
capable of generalization over a domain extending
from mathematics to physiology. And we may add to
this domain, as further rules of rightness, the principles of ethics and law.2J8
Further, we must note his explicit hierarchy of levels within
man:

1)

embryological life; 2) vegetative organic functioning;

3) perceptive-motor activity; 4) conscious behavior and intellectual action; 5) moral sense, guided by his own standards.
Each level gives rise to the next by morphogenesis, Polanyi's
general word to describe the dynamic of creative emergence as
we have described it. 279
3.

The Ultimate Aim of Human Reality
We may now turn to a general view of the goal toward

which individual cultures and the entire human race moves.
Such a view will allow us to see how profoundly Polanyi considers the moral development of man.
Polanyi would admit that deep cultural forces create
changes in culture.

Indeed, the knowledge claimed by a cul-

ture extends to all that is believed to be right and excellent within it, including the utterances of prophets, poets,

278 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
19 6 2) ' pp . 3 3 2- 3 .
279 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) pp. 36-7.
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' 1eg1s
. 1 ators, sc1ent1sts,
.
.
1 ea d ers 1n
. h"1s t ory, e t c. 280

But

Polanyi is not really a proponent of the idea that change
comes only through cultural forces.

He believes that the

superior knowledge guiding a free society is formulated by
281 Th
. d 1n
. 1ts
.
.
great men an d ern b od 1e
tra d"1t1on.
us,. th e 1"d ea 1 s
of a culture are proposed through individual insights and
are learned only when an entire culture follows them.
Polanyi advises us to study the influence of great men if
we are to understand cultural growth, including growth of
moral ideals.

He calls this study an extension of biology:
"ultra-biology". 282
Human greatness is man's power to transcend the

culture in which he participates toward higher ideals and
values which will open new vistas for the entire culture.
The possibility of human greatness includes, of course, the
potential for devolution toward the demonic.

But, con-

sidered as forward moving, human greatness can be recognized
only by submission to it.

Only by a commitment whose value

reaches out toward what greatness discovers can the discovery be recognized for what it is.

Human greatness

stretches communal tacit knowing toward a knowledge and a

281 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
T§6z), p. 397.
282 rbid., p. 377.
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standard projected by one man: " ... man stands rooted in his
calling under a firmament of truth and greatness". 283 The
power of a living, vital morality lies in this commitment,
.
.
284
. h mora 1"1ty b ecomes
wit h out wh 1c
a convent1on.
Toward what end does moral development strive?
Polanyi has indicated that acts of knowing and of moral intent
hope to capture aspects of reality:
serving the Good, etc.

the Good, the right as

The search for truth moves forward

in the hope that other findings will coincide with and supplement each other toward the development of one truth. 285
From the ontological point of view, this transcendence toward
one truth is a transformation of man from a

self-~nterested,

survival-conscious organism to a person transcending the concerns of individuality and death.

The body becomes no longer

an instrument of self-indulgence but a condition of the calling of man. Polanyi calls this development "noogenesis" 286

283
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 380.
284
Ibid.
285

Ibid., p. 315.

2 8 6 ob .
v1ous 1y, - p o 1 any1.

din's Phenomenon of Man.

.
.
..
d b y Teilhard de Char1s
1nsp1re
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the development of new heuristic passions which reveal worlds
of human greatness and freedom. 287 This development reaches
beyond even individual societies to the highest fundamental
principles of humanity.

Such principles are so wide-ranging

as to create a "cosmic field" of hidden but infinitely great
. 1 . 288
potent1a
Polanyi, inspired by Chardin's works (The Phenomenon
of Man, p. 200), calls this "cosmic field" the "noosphere".
The noosphere is composed of a holistic development of linguistic, mental, and social realms toward a completely novel
creation.

The change and development of a system, eg.,

scientific knowledge, is not specifiable in terms of strict
rules.

The guide of heuristic activity is an intimation of

a hidden reality, and the change occurs as a self-modification of an entire interpretive framework.

Each noospheric

development is believed to be real and entitled to the claim
of universal validity. Such change develops the noosphere 289
290
. 1nnovat1on.
.
.
th roug h ontogenet1c
At last we can understand Polanyi's integration of
truth, right, and free emergence.

He says, " ... the emergent

287 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
I9 6 2) , p . 389 •
288 rbid., p. 405.
289Ibid., pp. 395-6.
290 Polanyi's term for a change in a level of being or
the transformation from one level in the hierarchy of being to
another.
·
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noosphere is wholly determined as that which we believe to
be true and right; it is the external pole of our commitments,
the service of which is our freedom.

It defines a free

society as a fellowship fostering truth and respecting the
right". 291 Moral development is part and parcel, then, of a
complete development of man into a reality in which truth,
right, and freedom are the highest motivating values.
Polanyi moves into religious language to describe the
emergence of the noosphere toward its highest insight of
truth and commitment to right and justice.

He says

The stage on which we thus resume our full intel-.
lectual powers is borrowed from the Christ-scheme
of Fall and Redemption. Fallen man is equated to
the historically given and subjective condition of
our mind, from which we may be saved by the grace of
the spirit. The technique of our redemption is to
lose ourselves in the performance of an obligation
which we accept, in spite of its appearing on reflection impossible of achievement. We undertake the
task of attaining the universal in spite of our admitted infirmity, which should render the task hopeless, because we hope to be visited by powers for
which we cannot account in terms of our specifiable
capabilities. This hope is a clue to God ... 292
This religious language sums up the absoluteness and totality
with which we procede toward higher insights and higher life
as human beings.

It shows the ultimate ground of moral and

291 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

i~itical Philosophy (Chicago:

62), p. 404.
292 Ibid., p. 324.
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total human development as our highest comprehension of this
life, a comprehension that can be manifested only in religious
language.

And Polanyi affirms that this cosmic panorama is

intended to offer us a framework within which we can define
responsible human action, of which moral decisions are a
.
1
.
293
part1cu
ar 1nstance.
We may conclude this section on the ontological
thought of Polanyi with a brief summary of its relevance for
an extension of his ontology to ethical standards of action
and knowledge of the right.

We began by pointing out the

parallel between epistemological and ontological thought in
Polanyi and how this parallel enabled us to speak of tacit
reliance in knowledge in terms of a reliance of one level
of reality upon another.

Thus, I see knowledge of the Good

as a reliance of behavior upon standards of behavior to
achieve the Good.

Tacit commitments in knowing the Good thus

become tacit support for the standards of action which support the values of the community.
The notion of and commitment to right action in the
community of persons is a matter of emergence into higher
forms of moral life.

What we termed "discoveries" in our

discussion of Polanyi's epistemology is termed "emergence"
{

293
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 52.
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when viewed ontologically.

Emergence is a free, creative

act which occurs on all levels of reality, particularly in
biological reality.

Thus, one level of reality, higher than

another, relies on it for its own existence and controls the
basic scope and limits of lower, less complex realities.

But

these higher levels themselves may, by a free exploration of
alternate modes of reaching their specific aims, discover
higher realities which control their own and, thus, release
this higher reality to an effective and active embodiment in
lower realities.
Moral realities are controlling principles of behavior
which rely upon individual acts and are embodied in them.
Man emerges from individual self-assertion to an acknowledgement of his communal participation and then toward the ''ultrabiological" transcendence toward concept of the Good and
right which are contained only tacitly in culture.
The right is a responsible action in respect of communal standards to which one submits in pursuit of the communal Good even when one's understanding of these transcends
what culture believes and is committed to.

It emerges free-

ly through responsible commitment and evolves toward more
wide-ranging principles of control of human thought and
action.

It establishes rules of rightness which enable com-

munities to function by virtue of custom and law.

But these

rules themselves develop as humanity emerges from ignorance
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to the Good toward a free movement to higher moralities.

We

come at last to Polanyi's cosmic panorama in which the highest vision calls us constantly to give embodiment to ever
new vistas of the Good, the right, and continued free emergence.
We may now turn to Pola.nyi' s notion of symbols to
clarify an important point concerning moral knowledge and
action.

And here we must grapple with an argument recently

put forward by Harry Prosch.

CHAPTER SIX
THE INADEQUACY OF SYMBOLS FOR UNDERSTANDING
THE ETHICAL DIMENSION OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter I wish to take up Polanyi's conception
of metaphor and symbol.

My aim is to show how these relate

to the extension of personal knowledge into the ethical domain.
Opening with a brief statement concerning the consistency of certain

chapter~

of Meaning, with prior works of

Polanyi, I move into an explication of Harry Prosch's view of
how these chapters relate to ethics.

I take issue with his

view that the Meaning material is the primary source for un-

.

derstanding how to extend personal knowledge to ethics. Prosch
believes that only with this material can one finally construct the outline of a Polanyian ethic.

I have already shown

how value, right, and the Good can be understood in Polanyi's
epistemological and ontological works; so, I disagree that
Meaning is essential to understanding a Polanyian ethic, though
the text is helpful in demonstrating how symbols function in
the ethical domain.

I argue that one can understand the devel-

opment of ethical knowledge and action in Polanyi's works without reference to the power of symbolism, except for those particular incursions of symbols developed around important events
or great persons.

I do not think such symbolism is necessary

for the development of a Polanyian ethic, but I do think it
187

188

plays a role in such development.

And in this way I differ

from Prosch, who thinks a Polanyian ethic cannot be conceived
apart from the power of symbolism.
The text of Meaning has been attacked on the grounds
that it does not represent the ideas of Polanyi, a criticism
grounded in the credit of authorship:
Harry Prosch.

Michael Polanyi and

Some Polanyi scholars (eg., James Wiser,

Loyola University) have raised the question whether the hand
of Prosch is heavier in this book than that of Polanyi.

I do

not think Prosch has in any way distorted Polanyi's later
thought, however, and I think various evidences and testimonies concur with this opinion.
The texts most likely to be questioned in Meaning are
Chapters five through ten.

Prosch is responsible for the

division of this book into chapters.

But the texts themselves

are essentially the ideas Polanyi set forth in a series of
lectures at the Universities of Texas and Chicago in 1969.
Polanyi specifically requested Prosch's aid in developing
these lectures for publication and studied the text Prosch
prepared for ten months before approving it.

I think the

main reason questions are raised about these chapters is that
Polanyi is breaking new ground in them, extending personal
knowledge to areas he had never considered befDre such as art,
myth, religion, and poetry.

In the context of such a study,

he developed a concept of symbol which enables us to
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understand how personal knowledge functions in these areas.
Thus, because Polanyi breaks new ground so briefly and tentatively before the end of his academic career, some raise
questions whether he ever broke it at all.
A close study of Polanyi's previous work, however,
indicates clearly that what Polanyi says in his later work
does not contradict or seriously modify his earlier work.
His notion of symbol in fact relies on his concept of sensereading and sense-giving, which is grounded in his concept
of tacit knowing.

One cannot understand what Polanyi means

by a symbol without relying on his earlier work (though one
can understand his earlier work without reference to his
concept of symbol).

Thus, his concept of a symbol is con-

tinuous with his earlier development of tacit knowledge in
other areas.

Prosch denies authorship of Meaning in any

way except as a spokesman for Polanyi's own thought, even to
the extent of making the word "I" self-referential for
Polanyi.
On both external and internal evidences, then, I
conclude that Meaning is a valuable text--indeed the only
text--for understanding Polanyi's concept of symbol and how
it applies to the domain of ethical knowledge and action.
I am not alone in this conclusion, as it is shared by Don
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Musser 294 and other Polanyi scholars.
The only serious problem with Meaning's application
to ethics is the application Prosch himself makes of it in
his article on Polanyi's ethics. 295 Here we are dealing with
Prosch and not directly with Polanyi.

And so his application

of Meaning to this area is fair game for critique.
I agree with much of what Prosch says about the possibility of developing an ethic from Polanyi's works.

He

points out that the motivation for Polanyi's work in epistemology was an attempt to counteract the destruction of moral
ideals by positivist scientism (p. 91) and that moral ideals
are just as real as scientific discoveries for Polanyi.

He

even argues that Polanyi intended his epistemology to apply
to the discovery of moral ideas just as peadily as scientific
ones, though he does not show in any detailed way how this
can be done.
He indicates, as I have argued,

that~ethics

involves

a hierarchical and teleological movement toward the Good 2
which manifests itself as a reality (pp. 92-4).

Moral prin-

ciples are, then, higher operative principles which rely on
29 4Review of Meaning, Don Musser, Zygon, 12, Sept.,_
1977' p. 259.
295 "Polanyi's Ethics", Harry Prosch.
19-72, 91-113.

Ethics, 82,
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but cannot be reduced to such levels as the neurological and
the physiological and which project standards of behavior to
which they themselves submit (p. 95).
a point I shall also stress:

Prosch further argues

that ethics must take up free-

dom as a prime ideal if culture is to develop in all areas of
science, art, religion, and morality (p. 95).
Clearly, Prosch outlines a direction of thought in
his article with which I can in large part agree.

Indeed, I

have tried in my previous chapters to argue in some detail
for the positions Prosch only indicates as a fruitful line of
research.

But he goes on to apply Meaning to ethics in ways

of which I cannot approve.
We remember that Polanyi calls the

inte~ration

of

joint clues which produces the appearance of something of the
"semantic" meaning of the thing. 296 Originally he extended
semantic meanings to include all meanings achieved by man and
not just linguistic ones.

For example, perception and sounds

are included as well as conceptual meanings.

But in Meaning

he wishes to be more specific about linguistic meanings and
to distinguish them clearly from non-linguistic meanings such
as those integrated in perception.

296K now1n
.

by Marjorie
p. 145.

Thus, in Meaning he

Michael Polan i, edited
1cago Press, 1969),
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. . mean1ngs.
.
297
. mean1ngs
.
restricts semant1c
to 1"1ngu1st1c

This

is the only explicit change from past positions that Polanyi
makes in Meaning.
In the context of the restriction of semantic meanings to linguistic meanings, Polanyi considers integrations
in which the subsidiaries bear on a focal meaning to be "selfcentered".

That is, they are made from the self as a center

298
.
.
!£ t h e ob Ject
o f f oca 1 attent1on.

Th.1s 1s
. th e pa t tern we

have already seen in our discussion of Polanyi's epistemology.
It is the fundamental "from-to" pattern.

And we have seen how

in moral knowledge we rely on present value-commitments to
focus on new insights into value and the Good.

Concerning

reliance upon signs in order to focus on new meanings, Polanyi
says "This reliance is a personal commitment which is involved
in all acts of intelligence by which we integrate some things
subsidiarly to the center of our f~cal attentiori. 299
Polanyi distinguishes between linguistic meanings
that are sense-giving and those that are sense-reading.

Sense

reading is the act of making sense out of clues that are present before us, such as is performed in scientific discoveries.
297 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 74.
298 Ibid., p. 71.
299 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

Critical Philosophy (Chicago:
1962), p. 61.

Towards a PostThe University of Chicago Press,
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sense giving is the act of creating new meanings out of
apparently unrelated meanings, eg., a technical invention.
our moral lives require both sense-giving and sense-reading:
we must understand moral values and standards in order to
submit to them; and we must responsibly create new visions of
value and right.

Thus, Polanyi says that the growth of intel-

ligence in language is a combination of sense-reading and
sense-giving. 300 Indeed, even the most fundamental linguistic achievement reveals this combination.

The definiton of

words depends ultimately an some kind of ostensive gesture,
a kind of sense-giving.

And picking up the meaning of this

gesture will depend on our tacit
is meant. 301

abi~ity

to "sense-read" what

We must remember, of course, that sense-reading and
sense-giving are both tacit acts and that both refer to
reality.

Polanyi does not distinguish between the linguistic

mode and the "material" mode.

Language is not a mere conven-

tion for expressing thought (this is nominalism in his view).
The use of language requires a tacit indwelling in the meanings it conveys, whether by sense-reading or sense-giving.
And our personal judgement stands at the root of all

300KnowJ.ng
.
and Being:

by Marjorie Grene,
PP. 20 5-6.

(Chicago:

Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited
University of Chicago Press, 1969),

301 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) p. 6.
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. .
303
sense-rea d 1ng
an d sense g1v1ng.

Thus, we indwell

language and are tacitly committed to the realities language
reflects.

When we disagree on the nature of things, we are

not simply having a verbal dispute.

We judge and indwell

reality through language and develop a rational vocabulary
through an acknowledgement of reality.

I have already made

this point in regard to tacit knowledge, but we should remember it in order to avoid thinking of language as somehow
divorced from reality. 304

Thus, Polanyi says "To talk about

things ... is to apply the theory of the universe implied by
our language to the particulars of which we speak" .305
In Meaning Polanyi distinguishes two types of semantic meaning:

indication and symbolization.

Indication pro-

jects meaning away from the self as center (the person makes
judgements, discovers, creates new objects or ideas), and
symbolization is a reversal of this movement from self to
object:

symbols draw the person to themselves and, thus,

give themselves to persons.

Indication, then, is

302 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:
Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 80.
303 Ibid., pp. 113-14.
304 Ibid.
305 rbid., p. 81.
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self-centered; and symbols are self-giving.

306

We must distinguish this self-giving, however, from
sense-giving.
giving.

As we have seen, indications can be sense-

Eg., the meaningful use of a word sometimes makes us

look through the word toward inventing a new meaning, and this
•
•
II
•
•
•
307
is "sense-g1v1ng
s1nce
we app 1 y a mean1ng
to exper1.ence.

Polanyi considers all verbalizations to be forms of sensegiving.

Acts of interpretation are instances of sense-read-

ing since they attempt to make sense jointly of a text and the
experience described by the text. 308
Sense-reading and sense-giving are cyclical activities.
The

p~rson's

integration of meaning is sense-reading, and his

projection of meaning in words is sense-giving.

But another

person's interpretation of his projection of meaning is sense.
309
rea d 1.ng.
Symbols, however, are not projections or readings of
sense.

A symbol is an object of some kind which has a mean-

ing that does not bear on reality in the same way in which

308

Ibid., p. 188

309 Ib1·d.,

pp. 185 - 6 .
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1v-ords

denote objects.

"stand for" objects.

Instead of denoting objects, symbols
An example is a flag or a medal.

focal object, a flag is apparently meaningless.

As a

But subsi-

diary to the flag as a focal object are the meanings it is
intended to give to us:
country, etc.

a sense of patriotism, pride in

Thus, in symbolization the subsidiary clues

are more important than the focal object since the focal
object is of interest only because of its symbolic connection with the subsidiary clues through which it becomes a
focal object.

In this sense, symbolization reverses the self31 O Th
· d 1cat1on.
·
.
centere d movement o f 1n
e sym b o 1 as a f oca 1
J

object, draws us into its subsidiary meanings, thus carrying
us away into what it stands for.
The subsidiaries that bear on a sybmol become,
through our surrender to it, embodied in it.

Through this

embodiment, the symbols reflect back on their subsidiaries,
fusing our diffuse responses and memories so that we are carried away toward an experience of these subsidiaries which
bear on the focal symbol.
ing of the symbo1. 311

We are "picked up" into the mean-

Obviously such symbols as flags, medals, logos, etc.,
do not have any intrinsic meaning as focal objects.

In fact

310 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 72.
311 Ib1d.,p.
.
~
;3
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what they are as objects are generally incompatible with the
meanings they give us when we surrender ourselves to them.

A

flag is painted or dyed cloth; but patriotism has nothing to
do with paint or cloth.

Yet these elements, though incompatible

with feelings of patriotism, are joined in such a way as to yeild
these feelings.
We may infer that, since the subsidiaries of a
symbol are embodied in it through our surrender to it, we ourselves indwell the symbol.

This irtlwelling gives the symbol

body; yet the symbol itself has the power to draw our lives,
our committed responses, into it so that we give embodiment
to it.

Thus, symbols are self-giving not only in the sense

that it gives us its meaning; but it is self-giving in that
we invest ourselves in it and, thus, empower the symbol to
yield what we have invested as a community in it:
ourselves in the

s~mbol,

we find

and are empowered by it to grow into

new· meanings.

Not all symbols, however, are composed of "incompatible elements''.

Some symbols are composed of elements which

are themselves of intrinsic interest as well as the subsidiary
. ld . 312
.
meanlngs
t h ey yle

Polanyi classes metaphor as a third

type of semantic meaning which is composed of elements that
are as important as their subsidiaries.
312
Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 74.
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Metaphors are symbols which have meaning in themselves.

Thus, a metaphor is itself a meaningful relation

between the vehicle (the words, materials, acts, etc.) and
their tenor (intention, meaning); and this relationship itself
(the metaphor) draws us as a symbol into itself, integrating
us to the meaning of its subsidiary clues as we surrender to
it. 313 The "tenor" of a metaphor is the object of principle
interest which we embody through another intrinsically interesting object (the vehicle), thus giving the first object a new
emotionally charged meaning. 314
The word "metaphor" brings immediately to mind literary or poetic metaphor; and, although Polanyi intends the
word to have a much wider-ranging meaning, such metaphors are
excellent examples of what Polanyi means.

In poetry, eg.,

words which have meaning are vehicles to express a much different tenor of meaning than the words themselves have.
Words in poetry have meanings which are essential for the
tenor of meaning to "come off".

Thus, we must pay attention

to their meanings while surrendering ourselves to the higher
meaning of the symbolism that they constitute.

Polanyi says

that this act necessitates an act of the imagination that is

313Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 77-79.
314 Ibid., 151.
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And,

like jokes, metaphors lose their point when explained in
detail in terms of the literal meanings of their vehicles. 316
Their meaning is destroyed when we shift our focus from their
meaning to their constituent parts, 317 as is the case with
all destructive analysis.
To sum up, Polanyi distinguishes between self-centered and self-giving semantic meanings.

Self-centered

meanings are acts of indication and are patterned after the
normal "from-to" dynamic of tacit knowing.
may be instances of sense-reading

o~

Such meanings

of sense-giving and

involve a commitment to reality-beliefs that are embodied
in language.

Symbolization, however, reverses the "from-to"

pattern in that the subsidiary meanings are of intrinsic
interest over the focal object constituting the symbol.
Symbols stand for the feelings and memories and ideas which
they have the power to invoke in us by drawing us into their
subsidiaries.

Metaphor, however, as a special case of

symbol, utilizes as its vehicle elements which are of

in-

trinsic and important interest in order to constitute higher
315 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 82.
316 .
Tb"d
l l . , p .79
.
317 Ibid., p. 82.

200

meanings that require imaginative effort to understand.
The importance for ethics of this explication of
symbolism and its distinction from non-symbolic meanings lies
in Polanyi's concept of metaphor.

We have already seen in

detail how meanings developed by sense-reading and sensegiving are operative in ethical knowledge and action.

Now

we can understand how symbols in the form of metaphor are
operative in the ethical domain.
As we have seen, the development of knowledge and of
standards of action in all areas of human endeavor often
take leaps forward by the individual initiative of single
pers@ns.

Such leaders, after mastering the tradition of

their field, achieve insights that show promise of a continued
self-confirmation and of truly developing knowledge in a particular field.

The masters of particular traditions who

achieve such insights become the leaders of their field.
They have the power to break the mold of past understandings
and of shown "apprentices" deeper truths within their field.
In establishing new forms of thought, new inventions, new
political structures, etc., they become "great men".
A great man can become a symbol which stands for an
ideal, a political ideology, or a religious concept among
many other things.

We can readily think of how the jowly

201

visage of George Washington affects

A~ericans,

the figure of Lincoln--or, negatively, Lenin.

as well as
Such men are

symbols which stand for deep cultural commitments in which
we all participate.

Washington stands, perhaps, for a

national pride in integrity; Lincoln stands for sheer human
greatness; Lenin, negatively, stands for a mistrust of
munist ideology.

com-

The mention of these great men, the sight

of their figures in painting or statuary, etc., draws our
feelings and memories to the tales of their deeds and the
values which they embody.

We are carried away by their

symbolic appearance to the values which they stand for.
Great men, then, are symbols of cultural values in
which we participate.

But they are not symbols in the

sense that flags, medals, etc., are symbols.

That is, they

are not meaningless in themselves and dependent for their
power as symbols on the investment of meaning the culture has
committed to them.

Great men are metaphors for the values

they realize in changing cultural life for the better.
They have meaning in themselves, since we can observe the
dynamic of their lives and understand how they lived and what
motivated them.

But to understand the values they stand

for, we must make a special effort of the imagination.

With-

out such an imaginative act, the tenor of their meaning
falls flat, just as we can fail to understand the point of a
Poem while understanding all of its words.
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Great men in the ethical realm, then, are metaphors
which continue to preserve the ideals they established and
to inspire further ethical development.

Meeting them,

hearing of their deeds, seeing pictures of them, etc., draws
our feelings, memories, ideas, and commitments into their
subsidiaries:

ethical values and acts.

Thus, they have,

as metaphors, the power to preserve cultural values and
standards and to inspire creative acts representing higher
values.
In sum, then, we can say that an extension of
Polanyi's notion of symbol into the ethical domain of knowledge and action relies on his concept of metaphor.

And

the particular metaphor that is relevant to ethics is that
of great men whose personalities and accomplishments have
so impressed a culture that they act to draw us into an
appreciation of the values their lives embodied.
But what is the dynamic by which this appreciation
is developed through participation in the metaphor?

For a

closer look at how the metaphor of great men draws us into
the life-stream of their value-insights, we may turn to
the manner in which it affects us.

Polanyi says that

world views are to be judged not by the standards of science but by the criteria by which art is judged:

as a work
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.

.

of t h e 1mag1nat1on.

318

The metaphor of Great Men is indeed

a work of the imagination, as we have noted, and must be
approached as Polanyi would approach and judge a general
world view (for this is actually what such metaphors represent!):

by criteria pertaining to art.
This does not mean that Polanyi thinks root meta-

phors of reality (including what I term "ethical metaphors"
of great men) are simply works of art, as though they bore
no import for our commitment to seek reality.

In the first

place, we shall see that Polanyi believes that art itself
does bear on reality in its own way.

But, more importantly

for our purposes, we need not identify ethical metaphors as
mere art forms.

Polanyi says we should judge them by the

criteria of art, but he does not say that they are art in
the same sense in which poetry, literature, painting, sculpting, etc., are art.

If he did believe this, we could not

distinguish the domain of art from that of ethics or philosophy.
By the "criteria" of art I think he means that, since
ethical metaphors are products of the imagination, we must
examine the manner in which imagination functions in art to
318 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 104.

204

judge whether our imaginative

i~sights

in other domains are

indeed integrations through imagination or are mere assumptions.

And, since art gives the best illustration of how

imaginative integrations, including art's power to integrate
us into its symbolism, functions, we may turn to art for
insight concerning how to understand a similar imaginative
process in ethical metaphors.
We may, then, lay to rest any idea that art does not
bear on reality.

It does introduce us to imaginative reali-

ties which may or may not open doors to new insights into
the world of perception and thought.

An artistic problem

is an imaginative anticipation not of unknown facts that
already exist but of a fact of the imagination that could
319
exist.
The artist is not necessarily interested, then,
in "realistic representation".

He is not after realism in
this sense but rather he seeks an artistic reality. 320 This
artistic reality requires an act of the imagination; and
such an act may lead one into a world quite different from
the one he lives in--yet still a world to be judged as such
on the merits of its own power to draw us into it.
The difference between acts of imagination 1n metaphor and those in science or the other domains we have
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already discussed is that others may reap the benefit of
original work in science (and other fields of thought) without repeating the imaginative effort of the scientist.

But

a work of art is independent of its author and draws us into
itself demanding that we re-create the vision of its
author. 321
Ethical metaphors, then, are realities despite the
fact that they are imaginative productions.

They draw us

into a world of value that could not be seen until, by a
unique combination of self-surrender and imaginative interplay we are shaped by their power to inform us.

This act

of imagination is different from that of the ethical thinker
who, after a long period of study, achieves creative insights
and discoveries concerning ethical realities.
more like that of science than art.
scope of ethics.

Such work is

But this is not the full

Ethical metaphors are more like art than

science in that they require us to perform the same act of
imagination that the great man performed in order to achieve
and benefit by his insight.

As an ethical thinker, one may

build upon another's thoughts and advance ethical thinking.
But one cannot build upon the insights of a great man until
one has surrendered to his metaphor: and this requires reenacting the imaginative act that produced the metaphor.
321 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 84-5.
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Concerning the basic dynamic of artistic symbolism,
Polanyi says,
First the artist produces from his own diffuse existence a shape circumscribed in a brief space and a
short time--a shape wholly incommensurable with the
substance of its origins. Then we respond to this
shape by surrendering our own diffuse memories of
moving events a gift of purely resonant feelings.
The total experience is of a wholly novel entity, an
i~agin~z~ve integration of incompatibles on all
s1des.
Important for understanding the relation of an ethical metaphor to society, however, is Polanyi's claim that symbolic
integrations of art, poetry, myth, etc., do not enter our
lives in a practical way.

They do not "work" in the prac-

tical sphere.

They have to be re-enacted through imagination
with each encounter and are not made functional in society. 323
Thus, the metaphor of a great man does not itself lay down
rules about how to achieve the Good.

Such metaphors are

ideals, outside the realm of practical ethical life.

They

may draw us into a world of inspiration and give us insights
never before attained.

But they themselves do not enter into

our everyday world and demand reform.

We must apply the in-

spiration of the metaphor to our practical efforts and insights before any change can occur.

And this practical acti-

vity is clearly different from a pure indwelling within the
322

Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 88.
323 Ibid., p. 125.
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metaphor.

Only when the meanings yielded 1vi thin the metaphor

have become, with much human effort, eventually integrated
into the communal vision of value and the Good and have been
employed to inspire change do they effect cultural development.

And, at this stage, they are no longer metaphors but

are communal, indwelt forces of change.

They no longer

require an imaginative effort to be comprehended, but require
only a commitment to submissive and creative participation.
Art, then, affects life by crying out against the
meaninglessness of culture and thereby proving its own capacity to transcend culture by imaginatively projecting new
visions of meaning. 324 Art affects the lived quality of our
325 an d we e ff ect new stan d ar d s o f l"f
.
. or d er to
ex1stence,
1 e 1n
integrate these qualities into our lives.

As art, these

visions of meaning are separate from our lives.
integrated into life, these meanings are no

And, as

longer,art~

This

i

"de-artization" of a symbol is comparable to its destructive analysis which, as we remember, has the benefit of
breaking down the elements of an insight, a technique, etc.,
into "palatable" particles capable of reintegration in new
forms.

And so ethical metaphors may be broken down by de-

structive analysis (whereby they cease to be metaphors) to
324 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 116.
325 Ibid., p. 109.
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yield insights and standards which the community may employ
for development.
We have already seen in previous sections how in
epistemology, ontology, and ethics insights are projected
as universal standards to which all must submit.
claims the same universality for art.

Polanyi

He claims art is

both intensely personal and detached in that the finished
product bears inseparably the personality of the author and
yet has a life of its own.

Thus, art constitutes a personal

claim to a universal standard of truth and reality in the
same sense in which science and other intellectual endeavors
claim universal standards. 326 And that is why Polanyi says
that art has no tests external to art. 327

Art may interact

with tradition and the public's present inclinations as well
as the author's judgments.

But an artist submits these to

being universal standards which may be contested by other
artists--for they are not infallible for being art!
The ethical metaphor,· as an imaginative work similar
to the

symbols of art, must be judged by the universal

standards of meaning in the ethical domain which they give

326 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 102.
327

Ibid., p. 103.
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to the culture.

Only those who can be drawn, by an act of

the imagination, into such a metaphor can judge whether it
truly introduces one to a world of ethical possibility.
Such a judgment must be distinguished from that concerning
whether communal insights into value or the Good are fruitful

fo~

bringing the Good into concrete reality through

standards of ethical action.

The first judgment is more

like an artistic judgment; the second judgment is more like
a scientific discovery.

Both judgments function in the

ethical domain of knowledge and action.
Returning to Prosch's claim that morality derives
its power to carry us away through the same sort of transnatural symbolic integration that operates in art and religion, we clearly can agree with him to a certain extent.
Further, he is correct in pointing out that a refusal to
participate in the ethical symbol reduces it to merely an
.
328 But the mistake
.
. h no power o f commltment.
ob servat1on
Wlt
Prosch is making here is that he identifies Polanyi's entire notion of value with the ethical symbol.

And I have

tried to show how the ethical domain, though it supports and
is, to some extent, supported by ethical symbols, is not
circumscribed by the borders of these symbols.

The ethical

328 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. lOS.
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domain also includes commitment to values and standards
that are easily comprehended with no real effort of the imagination but with a simple intent to submit to the standards
one has learned within his culture.

Prosch's identification

of ethics with ethical symbolism is not only textually incorrect, but it implies ideas, inconsistent with Polanyi's
plicit statements. 329

ex~

One important implied inconsistency is Prosch's
assertion that values are persuasive only because they "carry
us away". 330 Here he uses the language of symbolism to
describe the source of authority for ethical values.

He im-

plies that commitments are possible only when we are carried
away by an ethical symbol.

But this assertion places too much

emphasis upon art as the model for knowledge and action.

It

overlooks all Polanyi has said about the role of commitment
in such non-symbolic endeavors as science, technology, history,
politics, etc. If commitment is powerless without symbol,
then it ought to be powerless in science.
it plays an important role in science.

But Polanyi says

Therefore, commitment

329
cf., Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 30; 4Si -Scientific
Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred Schwarz (N.Y.·. N.Y.:
International Universities Press, Inc., 1974), p. 65; Knowing
and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, edited by Marjorie Grene,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 18, 31, ·44.
330
Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. lOS.
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cannot be dependent upon symbol for its power, although its
ideal can be manifested by committed application of the symbol.
Another inconsistency lies in Polanyi's explicit
denial that ·ethics is grounded in symbol.

He says, "Moral

rules are therefore an instrument of civic power in the hands
of those who administer moral
to custom and law.

cultur~,

and morality is allied

Men form a society to the extent to which

their lives are ordered by the same morality, custom and law,
which jointly constitute the mores of their society".
Clearly, if Polanyi's work in Meaning is consistent
with his earlier thought (and I have argued that it is),
~

then Prosch is wrong to narrow the power of ethics down to
ethical symbols.

They have an important role to play; but,

as we can see from the quote above, the ethical domain ineludes much more than ethical symbol.
We may conclude with some brief remarks about religion.

Polanyi classifies religion as an imaginative endeavor

which generates symbol.

But the solemnities of religion

differ from works of art in that they are deliberately unoriginal.

They employ conventional and traditional forms,

and they intend to call our existence to a comprehensive and
lasting framework. 332

Participation in worship is a way of

332Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), P. 118 •.
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thanking and trusting God, and ritual is a way of realizing a
sense of eternity over temporal existence.

For Polanyi,

God is the focal point that fuses by imaginative effort all
the incompatibles of the practice of religion.

Only through

333
participation in acts of worship can we see God.

Now Prosch has evidently picked up Polanyi's assertion that only by participation in religious symbol can we
know God as a clue that the same pertains to ethics:

only

by participation in the ethical symbol can we know the Good.
But we must observe that the analogy does not hold.

In

Polanyi's view of religion, God is the symbol which gives
meaning to the subsidiaries of ritual and worship.

Thus,

Polanyi is consistent in saying that we know this symbol only
by participation in it.

He says of all symbols that they

are known in this way.

But ethical symbols, which are also

known only by participation, are not the whole of ethics.
This much is plain from the passages referred to above.

Thus,

we do not come to know ethical realities merely by participation in ethical symbols.
Finally, we must note that the basic attitude of man,
whether concerned as moral or religions, is one of holding
together the incompatible elements of life (fears, pains,
anguish, etc.) in a permanent tension with the hope that he
333 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 155-6.
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can do what he must by a power that is beyond him and yet
which enables him to live within the limits of his capacities, his "calling". 334 This hope is an attitude that can
be symbolized; but it is not a symbol itself.

Attitudes

such as hope, fear, hatred, love, etc., are not in themselves
symbols as Polanyi understands them.

But they are effective

in defining the kind of response we take up toward the symbols our culture provides us or that we discover.

Thus, we

must not understand attitudes like hope as ethical or religious symbols, even though they join incompatible elements
together under a tension.

For there is no imaginative

effort involved in taking up hope, except in response to
symbols that demand such effort.
I ccnclude, then, that Polanyi's notion of metaphor
is an instance of symbol that bears on ethical realities.
This bearing has to do, however, with giving us visions of
particular values or the Good which we cannot attain without
surrendering and submitting to the symbol.

It does not have

to do with the whole of ethics, such as the development and
learning of moral standards, moral commitment, submission
to custom and law, and knowledge of moral values, that is
possible apart from symbol.

We may now turn to Polanyi's

334 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 156.
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explicit statements on the nature of ethical realities in
society in an effort to understand how the whole of the
ethical domain actually functions in society.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION
We have established that all value knowledge bears
the same structure as knowledge in any domain.

We organize

our vague notions of value into the explicit integrations
that form our concepts of value.

And these concepts are not

mere mental constructions but are arrived at with the commitment that they touch upon an aspect of reality.

We are com-

mitted to our concepts as revealing aspects of reality;
hence our conceptions of value, Good, and right represent
commitments in these areas which we have already made at the
moment we "discover" these conceptions.

We indwell our

value commitments, bringing them to explicit focus when the
challenges of life require reflection and value-reorientation.

.

And we discard those value commitments which prove

themselves out of touch with the reality we face; i.e., we
prove such values to be "false".
We have shown that the body, as the prime medium of
all knowledge, cannot be disregarded in value-knowledge.

The

body mediates between the subject-object dichotomy, allowing
for the appearance of a world already shot through with
values, preferences, and a sense of what is right and Good.
The body is the prime medium of experience; and our conceptions in all domains of thought are explicitations of the tacit
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knowledge mediated through experience, the contact of the
body with the world.

Hence, explicit value-concepts are

grounded in a perception of a world in which values are
always already operating; and the skills and habits of right
action and of consistently responding appropriately to our
chosen values indeed essentially involve the body.
Value-knowledge, then, is an intuitive integration
of particular value-preferences into a systematic whole
which bears the marks of a grasp of reality, of the kinds
of values which we ought to prefer to realize in the world.
Mediated by the body, value-knowledge grows as we gain
insight into the nature of the world in which we live and
into the nature of the Good itself.

Each insight integrates

tacit elements of knowledge that heretofore were non-functional, bringing a new mode of life to the person.

And

each insight acts as the tacit ground for new discoveries.
Knowledge of values is neither inductive nor deductive, though it may include such inferences.

Rather, it

is constituted by testable intuitions which can be criticized by means of the results we obtain in following them.
If

t~e

results lead to a sense of reality, we are justified

in following their lead; if not, we are not so justified.
We must see Polanyi as an intuitionist-cognitivist in value
theory.

Further, we must see his position as mediating

between a rationalist and empiricist position; for we do
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have an! priori sense of "betterness", but this sense is
not concrete nor does it give us an insight into particular
values.

The sense of "betterness", of one thing or course

of action being better than another, is rooted fundamentally
in our biological existence; but the explicitation of concrete, particular values is a process of intellectual discovery.

And such discovery can be "right-headed" or mis-

directed, right or wrong.

Standing out beyond our compre-

hensions is reality itself, luring us to ever more comprehensive integrations of truth in the domain of value-knowledge.
Value-knowledge, then, can be said to be "true" or
"false".

Like all other forms of knowledge, a tacit know-

ledge of values is a kind of "foreknowledge", a desire to
make explicit our vague sense of what is better.

This move-

ment, lured and conditioned by the reality it seeks, is a
passion for understanding, a passion for breaking through
the paradoxes and irresolved difficulties of present conceptualities into new vistas of truth.
knowledge we

folio~

Thus even in value-

our intimations of reality, seeking the

marks of truth in our conceptions:

fruitfulness, intrin-

sic interest, coherence, accuracy and close definition, and
systematic relevance within the domain of value-knowledge.
All of these marks of truth, of the knowledge that
the values we hold are true in the sense that they reveal
something of a world of value that remains tacit in our
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understanding, a tacit world that calls us to the responsible
explicitation of the concepts it promises us.
Commitment and movement toward the realization of
such promise within the domain of value-knowledge is the
essence of a personal knowledge of values.

We find ourselves

already committed as persons to the explicit concept of a
v~lue

which we have been indwelling personally in the tacit

dimension of knowledge.
This does not mean that the values we hold and explicitly own as our commitments are subjectively chosen in
the sense that they are arbitrary and unjustified.
knowledge of values is responsible knowledge.

Personal

Like all

other domains of knowledge, it both proposes and obeys the
standards of corrictness that are suggested within the domain
itself and which are properly relevant to it.

Our assertions

of value-knowledge are essentially the obedience of personal
commitment to universal standards that grow out of prior,
tacit commitments.

Our explicit values are, thus, always

concepts which integrate personal commitment with impersonal
standards; and in this sense they are said to be responsible
commitments.

Explicit commitment to a value is at the same

time submission to the universal value standards implied and
proposed as part of the commitment.

And this submission

involves an expectation that others should also submit to the
authority of such values; for we submit to what we believe
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are universal value standards.

A responsible judgment on

what is a proper value is personal knowledge in that it involves both the tacit and explicit poles of knowledge.
We begin, then, by ordering our preferences in the
attempt to satisfy our most fundamental biological needs;
and this effort represents a tacit foreknowledge of values
that we will come to acknowledge as such in the process of
value-explicitation.

Thus, the need to evaluate and order

values is a need to know them, to achieve intellectual
insight into them.

And each attempt at re-evaluation and

reordering is satisfied only when new levels of understanding
are reached--levels which themselves, firmly indwelt, become
the tacit ground for higher integrations of more profound
values.

The ultimate reality of which our process of value-

explicitation allows us an ever more comprehensive grasp,
as judged by the marks of truth that attend any knowledgeclaim, is the Good.

Thus, we attend to the Good and engage

in the process of bringing it to clarity through our personal
commitment to its explicitation in knowledge and its integration in action.
We achieve our notions of the Good and of value,
then, by arriving at comprehensive visions that are grounded
in and bring integrated unity to our various tacit comprehen'

sions of it.

The Good finds continued and unexpected
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confirmations as we proceed to explicate it rightly according to the calling to responsible judgment by which the
reality of the Good itself attracts us.
Our explicitation of the Good proceeds both from a
recognition of the Good as a whole toward an identification
of the tacit particulars or values which compose it and
from a knowledge of such particular values toward a comprehension of the whole they compose.

We "interiorize" par-

ticulars in order to integrate them into a comprehensive
whole; and we employ a "destructive analysis" of the whole
which we comprehend and indwell in order to grasp new values
which have integrated themselves within our grasp of the
whole.
The explicitation of the Good depends upon the alternate use of both of these methods.

However, the explicita-

tion of a particular value is generally the result of destructive analysis, while the explicitation of a comprehensive whole that reflects the Good is achieved through the
integrative interiorization of particular values.

In either

case, explicitation is not a matter of logical deduction
or empirical "addition".

It is fundamentally a matter of

intellectual insight.
Heplful in explicitating the Good is a formalization
of this insight.

Polanyi does not believe that any domain
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of knowledge can be fully formalized.

The key tenet of tacit

knowledge is that we always know more than we can tell.

Thus,

knowledge as such, in any domain, cannot be identified with
the system which formalizes it.

And this must be true also

of the ethical sphere of knowledge.

If we attempted such a

formalization in this domain, the same problems that attend
such attempts in other fields would attend it:

systematic

errors, misapplication of facts and procedures, the inherent
impossibility of fully formalized knowledge.

Our perspective

of the Good must, rather, be guided by our personal commitments which are no less unjustified for being unformalizable.
The dual

procedure of explicating the Good and dis-

covering higher values is also a procedure of correcting
false values.

We can isolate them through destructive

analysis, correct what is wrong in them, commit ourselves to
the restructured values, and re-integrate them into a renewed,
comprehensive grasp of the Good as a whole.

Values themselves

are an integration of both tacit and explicit components of
the value commitment; this is what Polanyi means by a personal knowledge of values.

Thus, no theoretical, explicit

structure or system can be identified with the process of
discovering and holding values.

Such an identification mis-

takes a sociology of values with a comprehension of the dynamic of value-knowledge.
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personal knowledge of values involves, then, what Polanyi
calls "indwelling".

Indwelling is that deep form of com-

mitment in which we spill ourselves into subsidiary elements
and arrive at discoveries in the value realm completely
committed to them.

We indwell ethical realities, discover-

ing explicitly those to which we have already become committed.

Such indwelling represents the truth of the exis-

tential dictum that "existence precedes essence."

For the

"spilling over" of indwelling, indeed the ,very act of indwelling itself, is the "thrusting forward" of our existence
in the sense.in which most existentialists understand it.
Further, such indwelling is quite different from a distanced
contemplation and rational control of a concept; that music,
art, poetry, etc., emphasize such indwelling is adequate
evidence of this.

But this does not mean that we cannot

indwell intellectual concepts so as to rely on them tacitly
in order to focus on new discoveries; for the enterprise of
science attests to this capacity.
The point is that we do indeed indwell ethical
realities; but we neither make our values subservient to
explicit choices (as do the existentialists) nor do we first
discover values and then commit ourselves to them.

We in-

dwell them, discover explicitly what is tacit in our indwell
ing, and find ourselves committed explicitly to what
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previously was only tacitly valued.
Value-knowledge is not discovered in isolation from
others.

Like all knowledge, value-knowledge is convivial.

Polanyi is not a solipsist; tacit knowledge functions to give
us an awareness of the person through our indwelling the
meaning of his acts.

All communication depends upon the

communal sharing of social meanings that arise out of such
indwelling; thus, all values arise out of such sharing and
are essentially interpersonal.

Our values and standards of

the Good are not simply ours, but are discovered in the context of tacitly indwelt social meanings that are an inherent
part of our personal reality.

And this involves specific

acts of trust and obedience to authority, all of which constitute particular social structures.

We are all inter-

personally reliant upon such structures in that we indwell
them as a community of persons and develop our values in the
1

communal context of human meaning.

Our values transcend

our own particular ability to integrate and comprehend them;
we rely on communal meanings.

This does not mean, however,

that we cannot oppose particular social values; we have the
power to isolate them by destructive analysis and to consider them critically, restructuring and re-integrating them
into social life through the common forms of social change.
We are then both comrnitted·to the tradition of communal
meaning and capable of opposing it without destroying it
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through radical action.

We must submit to the tradition in

order to learn the social meanings essential to moral development; but we oppose its falsehoods as we discover them.

We

learn through indwelling the tradition not only what it is
but what it ought to be.

Nonetheless, we are not justified

in claiming that our notion of the Good is the only correct
one; even in our conviction of being right in opposition to
social concepts, we must acknowledge room for growth and
correction.

We must learn the tradition from persons who

indwell it and are connisseurs of it; and we must intend to
become connoisseurs ourselves, connoisseurs who can be opposed
and corrected.
Value-discovery, then, is a response to our convivial obligations and draws us beyond ourselves into a reality
of Good to which we find ourselves already committed and
which we hold as universal truth.

We "break out" of old

thought and behavior patterns by transcending old knowledgestructures in our

movemen~

toward new vision of the Good.

The questing power of the mind wedded to imagination taps
into the potential of discovery inherent within the reality
of the Good, releasing and controlling the path of discovery
through heuristic visions.

Knowledge of value and of the

Good is not a mechanical process of discovery but is a
uniquely human event.

Discovery requires a human grasp of

a problem, a paradox in value-theory, and involves effort
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and free exploration.

Only when we go beyond mechanical

rules of procedure do we "break out", risking defeat and
hoping for accomplishment.
The marks of a true value-discovery are the same as
for any truth; they show a sufficient degree of plausibility
in resolving present difficulties, are accurate comprehensions of the tradition in terms of our present conceptualities, are systematically important and intrinsically interesting.

Further, we follow "hunches" en route to their discov-

ery, we have "anticipatory intuitions" of them.

We know in

advance what would "count" as a proper ascription of value,
and we find an intrinsic promise of a deeper access to ethical realities through an indwelling of our discovery as a
"final" resolution.
The process of value-discovery is a passage from
more tangible realities to less tangible ones.

But being

less tangible does not mean that a higher insight into the
nature of the Good is less real.

For Polanyi, a concept is

"real" to the extent that it gives us access to a deeper
comprehension of reality.

The less tangible a concept is,

the more comprehensive it is and the wider a range of indefinite future confirming manifestations it presents us.

Thus,

the less tangible a value-discovery is, the more "real" it
is; such discoveries approach the reality of "wholes" or
"universals".

226

Universal values are not simply aggregates of particular, elementary values.

They are integrations of these

into novel, complex, wide-ranging insights into the Good.

We

rely on knowledge of particular values in order to achieve
such integrations and are subsidiarily aware of them in the
more comprehensive insight.

We acknowledge them as parts

which ontologically sustain and contribute to the reality of
the Good as the highest universal.

It is the universal

itself which attracts our focus in the search for meaning and
knowledge of the Good, which releases and controls our process of achieving higher insight.

Thus, universals are not

mere mental constructs but have in themselves a power to

.

draw our focus and crystallize our insight into higher value
and the Good.

Our highest vision of the Good is that stan-

dard to which we ourselves submit and which we choose to
indwell as our highest access to the Good.
The concept of values and of the Good does not constitute the whole of the ethical domain.

The ordering of

goals constituted by our insight into values implies an
ordering of the human activity which is committed to realizing them.

For knowing a value is itself a commitment to it;

a commitment to realize it.

If our values are true, then

the effort to realize them involves actions which are in
accord with the nature of the Good in so far as we understand it.

Such actions are right actions; and those actions
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which fail to be guided by such insights are wrong accions.
Communal value standards imply communal norms of
action to which we submit as we participate in developing
these standards.

Our behavior is always guided and disci-

plined by the authority of communal norms of action, which
are ordered toward their own stable preservation.

These

norms of action are the origin of communal obligations, of
our sense of "ought".

We find ourselves obligated to act

rightly, to act in accordance with communal norms.

When we

act rightly, we act justly; and we have a right to pursue
the Good according to communal norms.
A personal knowledge of the Good, then, implies a
personal knowledge of right and wrong.

For we have a per-

sonal knowledge of the communal standards of action that
are implied in our system of values.
Our development of ethical norms requires and is more
than a change of behavior.

Just as all knowledge is con-

stituted by a dynamic of tacit reliance and explicit focus,
so all changes rely upon simple, particular states of being
in order to develop more complex and highly integrated ones.
Since all knowing is a form of change, discovery of values
and new insights into the Good are changes of human modes
of being.

They are ontological developments which share

the dynamic of tacit knowing in the structure of reliance
and focus.
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Ontological change is not mechanical and determined
The movement from a lower system of values to a higher, more
complex and integrated one which issues in new standards of
action is a free movement.

This does not mean that the

movement from a lower level of moral functioning to a higher
is not deliberate.

But it does mean that such achievements

are motivated by uniquely personal intimations of the Good
and follow an indeterminant course.

We are able to decide

whether to fulfill self-set standards; we are not determined
by theffi.

Thus, in the process of free decision, we act out

and continually resolve a tension between universal standards (the determinate pole of cHoice) and personal commitment (the indeterminate pole of choice).

We are onto-

logically free to choose our actions; and this indeterminacy
and creativity are logical implications of tacit knowing
(since the unspecifiability of tacit clues make determinism
permanently unjustified).
creative, and emergent.

The moral life, then, is free,
We are responsible for our decision

and are called to take responsibility for our freedom within
the context of communal life.

Freedom and responsibility

are given together, we must deal with an ordered society
within which we order our own actions in pursuit of the
Good.
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The dynamic of moral growth follows the same pattern
of integration and development as applied to all forms of
ontological change from lower levels to higher ones.

Higher

insights into value are epistemologically dependent upon
lower ones; and higher standards and norms in pursuing the
Good are ontologically dependent upon lower ones.

The higher

levels impose on those below it the "boundaries" of their
functioning, such that they serve the higher in sustaining
its pote-ntials.

Higher standards of action are not, however,

reducible to the aggregate norms and values of lower standards.

Rather, we indwell or "embody" these lower standards

giving them whqt justification they have in view of a higher
indwelling of these higher standards and forms of action
which harness the dynamic of the lower.

And we may seek con-

stantly to achieve higher levels of moral functioning, if we
follow the ontological impetus toward the higher that is inherent within the structure defined by "reliance" toward
"focus".

We move ever upward in our ability to make respon-

sible, effective choices in pursuit of the Good.
This development toward higher levels of moral functioning is not merely a personal achievement.

It is carried

on within the communal context and is ultimately a
achievement.

co~~unal

Indeed, we have an obligation to sustain and

forward society's values.

Moral acts are themselves forms

of our total aorganismic participation in the moral life
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of the community.

They are guided by insights into right

action, insights which allow submission to the communal moral
Good.
Right action, then, embodies both the moral and the
non-moral forms of human action according to the ordering
principle of the pursuit of the Good which is inherent within
it.

The esta:)lishment of a standard of right relies upon our

commitment to right action and justice as ordering principles
within the community.

The Right embodies itself in such acts.

Human action itself forms a hierarchy of levels of human
reality, each level realizing a higher form of moral and communal life.
Since moral life develops through submission to standards which we learn within the community and project universally, we must view it as obeying and being guided by rules
of action.

Moral standards are the operational principles

of moral life as it moves toward the potential of realizing
the Good.

These standards comprise the rules of action within

the community and tend to establish a stable pattern of ethical life which we are obliged to respect.

But respecting

these standards does not mean obeying them unquestioningly.
We are free not only to explore alternative ways of pursuing
the Good which may enhance the moral life of the entire com
munity, but we may also abrogate our responsibility and follow our own self-oriented desires in a manner destructive of
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communal-and-personal-development.
We develop moral life by finding alternate ways to
achieve this Good when our normal ways are closed off, by
discovering novel rules of rightness, and by a normal maturation of our present moral life.

Also, we may be "carried

away" by moral symbols into new dimensions of moral life far
beyond our grasp without the aid of the symbol.
For the most part, however, moral life develops in a
natural way.

A continually developing insight into right is

the ordering principle of moral life.

It releases and sus-

tains the potential for right action and establishes workable systems of morality.

Our highest, most well integrated

standards become the centralized principles of our ethical
life, regulating our behavior in a general way.

But they

leave room for an exploration of "equipotential" methods of
responding to specific situations, just as biological organisms are successful in life by adjusting to specific situations while meeting the life requirements of the organism
as a whole.

Our moral principles develop toward stability

and permanence as long as they are effective in meeting the
requirements of moral, human life as a whole; but, toward
the end of adaptation for the better, they remain flexible,
changeable, and open to new discoveries, new insights into
right.
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Noral life is the life of the person as a whole.
And moral freedom involves the ability to either grow or devolve.

Moral evolution occurs only under obedience to or

proper restructuring of moral standards consistently pursued; moral devolution occurs when one deliberately performs
wrong actions.

We learn rules of rightness from the tradi-

tion, from connoisseurs of the moral tradition.

And we change

it for the better by achieving connoisseur status ourselves
and establishing new rules of rightness which benefit the common Good.

We can commit errors or refuse to benefit the

common Good.

But our moral health depends upon positive

development of the moral life.

And this development esta-

blishes a hierarchy of values and standards of action in
which each level supports and sustains the one above it and
is controlled by the higher level.
We, then, have the power to change communal life for
the better.

We can even achieve a status of greatness where-

by we can function with high effectiveness--perhaps even as
a symbol--to effect social change.

Thus: we can transcend

our moral culture toward higher ideals, toward the "ultrabiology" of moral change.
Moral life, then, moves ultimately toward a communal
realization of the Good through a self-regulating movement
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toward the consolidation of a unified and unifying moral
development of persons.
human decision.

Such change depends, however, upon

And even entire societies may follow a com-

munal intimation of hidden moral realities.

Borrowing from

Teilhard de Chardin, Polanyi calls such communal realizations the development of the "noosphere", the sphere of life
most uniquely human, moral, and spiritual.
We may, then, summarize my contributions to Polanyi
studies thus far by pointing to four specific contributions:
1) I have drawn from a wide number of resources to present
an integrated description of Polanyi's epistemology and
ontology; 2) I have located the parallel between his epistemology and his ontology and have lifted out from them a
basic structure to ethical experience and have shown that
ethical theory is possible in terms of personal

knowledg~;

4) I have extended the ethical domain of knowledge (and
action) beyond the purely symbolic knowledge with which
Harry Prosch wishes to identify it and have shown that ethical knowledge is fundamentally personal knowledge,. sharing
all of the elements and the dynamic of personal knowledge.
We may now proceed to the confirmation and "fleshing out"
of these contributions in Part II.

CHAPTER EIGHT
AN OUTLINE OF WHAT WE MUST EXPECT TO FIND
IN POLANYI'S SOCIAL THOUGHT, BASED UPON
WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THUS FAR
We have established that the structure of tacit knowing pertains to a knowledge of values and of the Good.

And

we have further established that the ontological parallel
to tacit knowing, the ontological structure of evolution
through a reliance upon particular elements to integrate novel
wholes, pertains to the moral development of the person
according to "rules of rightness".

And the general structure

of the process of valuation and right action should now be
clear.
But, despite the clarity of ethical import which
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology evidences, we can still
go much further in developing his notion of the ethical
domain.

Having explicitated the structure of an ethical

domain from his epistemology and ontology, we can now search
his social and political writings for confirmation of this
structure.

If we find this structure confirmed in these

.

writings, we can be much more certain that the ethical structure we have explicitated was indeed tacitly implied in
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology and was not a mere
isogesis of the texts.

For, although it is possible to
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slant the evidence in order to make these texts appear to
be at least favorable to the development of ethical theory,
such self-deception becomes virtually impossible when the
ethical interpretation can be tested.
Polanyi has not left us without an adequate test of
such an interpretation.

First, although he never attempts

to develop ethical theory as such, he does often refer to
concepts which are valid only under the supposition of an
ethical domain of knowledge and action:

eg., the common

Good, freedom, moral culture, moral ideals, "right" and
"wrong" types of societies .. Such references, though not
comprising a systematic

ethic~,

are useful in testing the

fundamental structure already explicitated.

If what Polanyi

says in such references either is a direct implication of
our explicitation or at least is consistent with it in a
confirming sense, then the explicitation is probably correct.

Thus, a good test of the reliability of our explici-

tation is to draw the most reasonable expectations concerning w·ha t Polanyi might explicitly say about moral life on
the basis of his tacit understanding of the ethical domain.
We can then compare our expectations with an account of
what he actually does say, as clearly and systematically as
this can be elucidated.

If the two match, then Polanyi's

explicit moral concepts are consistent with his tacit understanding as comprehended in our explicitation.

And this
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"consistency" will also bear the marks of deep rootedness in
the more systematic tacit structure of the moral dynamic
implied in his epistemology and ontology.
We should be surprised if, after demonstrating tow
knowing and doing are inextricably linked, we did not find
the enterprise of science determined not only by the epistemological dynamic of tacit knowledge but also by rules of
research and investigation which transcend mere epistemological requirements.

Science is a social procedure for

establishing facts about the natural world.

It is in the

unique position as a cultural institution of organizing the
social responsibilities of scientists to pursue the truth for
its own sake.
We should expect, then, that science will function
under rules which ensure the proper and effective pursuit of
this goal.

And these rules are actually a "mini-model" of

an ethic, since they involve social rules aimed at achieving
a specifically defined communal Good.

Thus, the institution

of science itself should evidence an "ethic of discovery"
which organizes the enterprise as a whole.
We should find truth itself as an ultimate value in
this ethic of discovery, a value realized as a moral value.
For inherent in the enterprise of science is the conviction
thatwe ought to discover truth; and, since the failure to
do so can come through deliberate (self)-deception, fraud,
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and generally inappropriate methodology as well as by honest
error, the ensurance of right procedure demands rules which
structure behavior in many ways other than those which
specifically govern research.

The pursuance of truth, then,

demands an ethic of discovery.

And we should expect Polanyi

to insist on all the social elements which ensure the discovery of truth:

free exploration, autonomy, conviction

and conscience.
We should, then, be able to find within the communal
enterprise of science an ethic which cannot be denied essentially as pertaining to communal concerns in general.

That

is, we should find it strange that the scientific enterprise
would stress· free thought and exploration, the pursuit of
truth, and responsible research while finding these denied
in other communal concerns.

Since we have established that

the ethical dimension involves knowledge of ethical realities,
then there are moral truths.

And we should expect Polanyi

to suggest at least the possibility of such knowledge in the
moral domain.

Indeed, the same dynamic of knowledge and

action which establish intellectual standards of truth in
general should be recognized as effective in the moral domain.
If our argument that knowledge should be expanded to
include moral knowledge leads us to expect to find evidences
of such assertions in Polanyi's political anJ social writings,
then the argument that the ontological dynamic of biological
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development should be expanded to a higher development of
man into moral and spiritual dimensions should lead us to
expect that Polanyi would refer to moral rules within the
social context.

Just as intellectual visions in other do-

mains establish the "rules of rightness" for pursuing truth
and accomplishing purposes within them, so we should expect
to find moral ideas functioning in society as rules of rightness.

And we should expect to find conscience playing a

prominent role in the communal moral consciousness, given
the intuitionism of Polanyi's ethical epistemology.
The epistemological concept of "indwelling", and
its ontological counterpart in the concept of "boundary
conditions", should show up as playing an important role in
the proper functioning of a communal ethic.

We should find

Polanyi referring to an indwelling of moral teachings and
ideals; and, because of his insight into the nature

o~

symbols, we should expect to find the assertion that "moral
heroes" act as symbols that "carry us away" into new dimensions of the personal knowledge of moral realities quite
consistent with his theory of personal knowledge as a whole.

We should discover that morality, like any domain of human
knowledge and action, is motivated by passions similar to
those for truth; and these passions drive us to an ever
deeper indwelling of moral realities.
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We should be very surprised to find any statements
in Polanyi's social or political writings which support a
deterministic position.

For he specifically repudiates

determinism in his philosophy of science.

Freedom is at the

root of his thought, as already evidenced in his epistemology and ontology.

Hence, freedom should be the cornerstone

of his social-political theories and, consequently, of his
moral theory.

For it would seem even more absurd to find

arguments for political and social freedom while discovering
assertions of determinism in the moral realm.

We should ex-

pect Polanyi to emphasize both the power to choose and the
liberty to choose.
This freedom, evident in the discovery of truth and
preserved within the enterprise of science, will be given
maximum interplay in the ordering of society toward the
particular goods of each theater of human endeavor.

Yet it

will be disciplined by that ordering in a way which permits
that good (and the communal Good) to be maximally realized.
We should find some suggestion of a theory concerning how
the tension between freedom and control is resolved both in
the pursuit of discovery in the sciences and in the common
pursuits of society.

Without such a theory, we would find

only a very sketchy and incomplete notion of the moral dimension.
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It is clear that Polanyi cannot allow our freedom of
choice to develop into anarchical social freedom.

And, in

order to clarify why he cannot do this, we must discover
both what he conceives to be a free society and what he considers to be an "unfree" society.

We can expect only "free"

societies to be "moral" ones; and unfree societies cannot be
moral.

We should look for a thorough moral critique of

non-free societies such as the Nazi regime and Marxism, as
well as of societies which claim to be free but which do not
obey the rules necessary to preserve both freedom and the pursuit of the Good.

Without a critique of what does not count

as a free (and moral) society paired with a description of
what does count as one, we could confirm little of what we
have argued concerning Polanyi's ethic.
We find, then, that, in order t0 confirm much of what
we have argued concerning the structure and dynamic of a
Polanyian ethic, we must turn to his social and political
writings in search of scattered statements regarding moral
life.

For these alone can demonstrate (in so far as this

is possible) not only that Polanyi puts his tacit ethical
dynamic to work in these writings but also reveal a good
deal of how that dynamic effects the functioning of society.

CHAPTER NINE
THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE AS A MODEL
FOR MORAL COiviMUNITY
In this chapter I return to Polanyi's notion of the
nature of the scientific enterprise in order to lift out
the social dynamic of the search for truth (rather than the
epistemological dynamic, which was dealt with earlier).

My

purpose in doing this is to demonstrate that science, considered as a human activity, involves essentially a moral
strategy for achieving its purposes.

Thus, science, replete

with its commitment to truth, is a moral activity; and it
binds scientists together as a moral community..

Commitment

to truth, freedom of exploration, mutual control and polycentric interests, free competition for publication, etc.,
are all social and moral activities which make the achievement of truth possible.

And, if truth is possible only under

such conditions, then the development of moral truth itself
can occur only under similar social structures.

Hence, the

republic of science is a model for the moral community.
essential structure is the fundamental structure of all
truth-finding, which is the root of all moral development
(since without moral truth there can be no moral life).
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I present evidence in this chapter that Polanyi
intends to see his concept of personal knowledge extended to
other domains of thought such as art and history.

Thus, if

the ethical domain is a legitimate field of thought, as I
have argued that it is, then ethics itself must pursue ethical truths through the same truth-facilitating procedures
which account for the success of science.

And this means

that a certain ethical structure must correspond to such an
enterprise:

the republic of science.

The moral field of

action requires a knowledge of moral truth which, in turn,
depends upon a moral structure which permits truth to be
discDvered.

Thus, moral decisions will be made in the con-

text of a moral structure which allows its own self-revelation.
From this point, the "confirmation" slides into a
description of how moral organization functions in society.
And the description matches what we might have expected to
be the case judging from the ethical theory I develop from
Polanyi's epistemology and ontology.

The chapter ends with

a description of the communal movement toward the Good as
a moral achievement.

This chapter will demonstrate that the

expectations outlined in the previous chapter are fulfilled
by a close analysis of Polanyi's social and political thought;
there is indeed an ethical substructure which functions
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tacitly in Polanyi's thought.

We shall, however, devote

the last two chapters to Polanyi's concept of the free society
(and the preversions of freedom).
1.

The·Moral Autonomy of Science
Science, as a human enterprise, provides a "mini-

model" of an ethical soceity.

Much of what we should expect

concerning what Polanyi would say about the nature of morality
may be found in his concept of the structure and functioning
of the sciences.

Thus, we may begin our investigation of

Polanyi's explicit concepts of the moral domain by noting
how they come to the fore in the scientific enterprise.
Polanyi explicitly declares

that morality plays a

significant role in the very foundations of science:
The third party in the scientist's mind which transcends both his creative impulses and his critical
caution, is his scientific conscience. We recognize
the note struck by conscience in the tone of personal responsibility in which the scientists declares his ultimate claims. This indicates the
presence of a moral element in the foundations of
science ... 335
This statement indicates clearly two important
features of a moral dynamic:

conscience (responsibility) and

the freedom which this implies.

The scientist

has the

responsibility to make true ultimate claims, or at least
claims that are true in so far as he understands them.

This

335M· h 1 P 1
. Sc~ence,
.
. ~c ae
o any~,
Faith, and Society
(Chicago: ·The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 41.
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responsibility is prompted by coliscience and is explicitly
moral.

A scientist would be wrong not to meet the standards

of procedure and concern for truth that is inherent within
the scientific enterprise.

In so far as he achieves the

communal aim of scientific truth in accord with the proceedings prompted by conscience, the scientist dwells within the
moral framework of science.
The scientific enterprise, then, is deeply formed by
moral considerations that flow directly out of the concern
to guarantee the discovery of truth.

The scientific com-

munity is a moral association of persons acting on the basis
of a common belief. 336 That is, the scientist has a responsibility to speak to the common understanding of scientific
truth, not only in the sense of the knowledge we have of particular truths but also in the sense of what generally counts
as truth.
Polanyi sums up the moral structure of science in
Science, Faith, and Society (pp. 55-6) as an emotional and
moral surrender to truth.

This surrender unfolds according

to the following phases:
1) Love of science and faith in its significance.
2) Inspiration by and acceptance of past scientific
heroes .
36
.) Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chciago Press~ 1975), p. 169.
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3) Striving to satisfy a feeling for reality by listening to scientific conscience
4) Fostering new original efforts and administering
scientific culture.
5) Fellowship in a community of conscience rooted in
the same ideals recognized by all.
The scientist is defined as such by his love of the adventure
of discovery; and his commitment to the significance of
science is essentially a moral one because it is a commitment to discover and be guided by truth.

Thus, he relies upon

the body of truth and propriety of procedure already firmly
established in the scientific community.

He is inspired by

them and indwells them on his own odyssey.

This indwelling

forms a tacit understanding of what counts as true and worth
researching, thus forming his scientific conscience.

It is

the lens through which he views and attempts to discover the
truths concerning the natural world.

And the fruits of his

research constitute a new body of truth which provides new
guidelines for discovering further truths.

Guided by scien-

tific culture, he assists in its administration.

And, thus,

he lives in, responds to, and participates in forming a fellowship in a community of conscience which guides the scientific enterprise.
We must define the scientific enterprise as a search
for truth in relation to the natural world.

The moral com-

mitment to the discovery of scientific truth, as outlined
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above, must be distinguished from the practical concerns of
science.

Science pursues knowledge simply for the sake

of knowing and is not determined by practical, social
337
needs.
Hence, Polanyi does not include the mas~ive military-industrial concern to invent and produce a constantly
renewed technology as essential to his definition of science:
"We must reassert that the essence of science is the love of
knowledge and that the utility of knowledge does not concern
.
"1 y " . 338
us pr1.mar1.

Indeed, practical discoveries are more the
339
result of pure, theoretical research than the aim of them.
This does not mean, of course, that science cannot be

responsive to social needs; it only means that it cannot be
subservient to them and that it must be developed on its own
340
.
terms f or 1.ts own purposes.
The independence of the search

..

for truth represents a higher principle than that of the
market. 341
337 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 4.
338 Ib"d
6
1

• '

p.

.

339
Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the
Sociology of Science: the Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.:
Arno Press, 1975), p. 19.
340 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theor-y~(~c=h-l.~.c~a--g_o_:--~R~o-o_s_e_v__
e~l-t~U~n~i~v-e--rsity,
1962), p. 18 ..

341 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theor~y~(~C~h-l.~.c~a--g_o_:--rR~o-o_s_e_v__
e~l~t~U~n~i~v-e--rsity,
1962), 25.
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Polanyi, then, distinguishes between pure, theoretical
science and technological invention.

The former constitutes

the moral association of persons engaged in the process of
discovery, aild the latter constitutes the application of discovery.

The moral value pursued in science, considered as a

morally disciplined enterprise, is truth.

Thus, truth is

a

moral value realized within the moral guidance of the community of persons committed to it.
The commitment to truth in science functions as a
moral absolute.

It makes science morally aut8nomous in that

no truth can be accepted or discarded on any grounds other
than those which respect truth absolutely.

Polanyi believes

that the enterprise of science is grounded in our trust that
society is in theory seeking truth and is willing to acknowledge the significance of discoveries even when they count
against cherished prejudices. Every claim of science relies
upon this trust. 342 Thus, no scientific theory can be criticized, rejected, condemned, or suppressed on political or
ethical grounds. 343 The moral obligation of science to truth
is an autonomous obligation which must be fulfilled according
to standards projected solely out of that pursuit.
342
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Soci~ty
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 73.
343 "Can a Scientific Theory be Legitimately Criticized,
Rejected, Condemned, or Suppressed on Ethical or Political
Grounds?", R. Hollinger, Journal of Value Inquiry, 9, 1975, pp.
303-6.

248

2.

The Ethical Dynamic of Science
The communal obligation to pursue truth in the sci-

ences cannot proceed without

order~

Polanyi characterizes the

community of scientists as a miniature "body politic" on the
whole, though specifically established to pursue truth. 344
If we can establish the means by which scientists
control or regulate the body politic of science, we will be
able to say something about the moral structure of science.
For if science is morally committed to truth, then those
means by which the scientific community is regulated properly
to

achi~ve

this goal are fundamentally moral regulations; for

their effectiveness rests upon the essential moral commitment to truth itself.
Polanyi believes that the way in which science actually functions in a successful way is.the way in which it
ought to be allowed to function.

Science functions best when

it functions as a republic consisting of a society of free
explorers. 345 It functions successfully under a delicate
balance of freedom and regulation.

This balance is achieved
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by self-regulation, which is generally effective in produc.
. f u 1 con f orm1ty
.
.
. t s. 346
1ng
a f ru1t
among sc1ent1s

Most impor-

tant, there is no central authority which exercises power
.
. f.1c b e 1.1e f . 34 7 s c1ent1sts
.
.
over sc1ent1
are f ree to f o 11 ow
their hunches; but their hunches are valuable and worth
following only in so far as they are informed by the communal
sense of what counts as true.
Polanyi likens the self-regulation of the scientific
enterprise to the way in which a group of people might accomplish the task of putting a puzzle together.

Although there

is no central plan governing the moves of each person, the
puzzle is pieced together, and more quickly than it would be-if only one person

w~re

working on it.

The task is quickly

accomplished because each person relies on the work of others
while benefitting from each person's success in developing
.
348
th e p1cture.

s c1ence,
.

. a process o f group cooperat h en, 1s

tion and is more successful by virtue of being a group effort
than it would be if it were the product of isolated

34 61•11C
"",{ · h ae
. 1 P o 1 any1,
. S c1ence,
.
F a1t
. h , an d S oc1ety
.
(Chicago : The Un i v e r s it y of·~c,.o;;h;....;i...;;.c:...a--g...,.,o:.__..,P=<"'r-e--s-s.:. .'--::-1"'9-;:6"""6"""")-,-p-......:....<;,-S 7 •
347 Ibid., p. 51.
348 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theor-y~(~C~h-l~.c~a-g~o~:...;;__~R~o-o_s_e:...v--e~l--t~Urn~i~v--e~rsity,
19 6 2) ' pp. 6- 7 .
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. d.1v1. d ua 1 s. 349
1n
The puzzle is put together in view of all.
son responds to the total, joint effort of all.

Each

pe~-

Thus, inde-

pendent initiatives are organized to a joint achievement by
mutual adjustment.
system of things.

There is a joint discovery of a hidden
Attempts to organize the total effort under

a single authority eliminates independent initiatives, reducing joint effectiveness and leading to paralysis of the opera350
.

t lOll.

The ethic of the scientific enterprise, then, is constituted by the attempt to maintain the delicate balance of
freedom and control within the communal framework of a selfregulation grounded in an eye for the truth.

Mutual adjust-

ment alone can insure the success of the scientific enterprise.
"Mutual control", then, is the means by which scientists "keep watch" over each other.

Each scientists is sub-

ject to criticism by all others--or is encouraged by their
appreciation.

Of course, the scientific world consists of

an unorganized melange of highly specialized fields; and no
349
Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theory (Chicago: Roosevelt University,
1962), p. 8.;
Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi,
edited by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: The Univetsity of Chicago
Press, 1969), p. 50.
350K nOWlng
.
and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by Marjorie Grene, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
19 6 9) ' pp . 50- 1 .
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scientist can claim to be competent to judge the work of
those outside his field.
But scientific specialties are not each wholly unique.
They generally overlap one another in the form of a "chain",
so that one field may be in the "neighborhood" of ancther.
One field has enough similarity to another that a scientist.
in one can comprehend and to some degree judge the validity
of insights in another field.

And the mutual judgment that

arises out of this situation exercises the responsible control that maximizes freedom of exploration while minimizing
stifling suppression.

Out of such dynamic arises general

standards of judgment which equalize standards of worthwhileness and plausibility throughout the scientific world. 351
Thus, even though no single scientist can judge the
validity of all research in a certain domain, he can critique the work of those who are themselves in a position to
judge scientists whose work he cannot directly critique.
This creates a continuous line of qualified critique and forms
the ground of all mutual adjustments. 352
'

.

~

.

. 351Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 72.
352Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Fress, 1962), p 217.
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Indeed, we trust specialists in knowledge only because we
assumeas true the cultural ideal that the domains of science
are so coherent that specialists can supervise one anJther
and, thus, warrant the confidence of society and its support
of intellectual pursuits.
We must ask, then, by what standards this critique
of mutual adjustment is carried out and how is it enforced.
Polanyi says the main mechanism of control in mutual scientific authority is a mutual recognition of merit and contribution as well as a mutual censure of falsehood. 353 Such
authority has the guardianship of the premisses of freedom
in that it protects against lawlessness in the scientific
community. 354 This means that a predominantly accepted
scientific view of the nature of things must exercise a
rather severe discipline over scientists. 355 • For without
respect for the ideals of science, scientists could only resort to charlantry, which would dissolve all scientific

353 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theor-y~(°C~h-l~.c~a_g_o_:--~R~o--o_s_e_v_e~l't~~u~n~i~v-e--rsity,
1962)' p. 21.
354 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 63.
355 Knowing
.
.
an d Be1ng:
Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by l\larj orie Grene, (Chicago·: The University o± Chicago Press,
19 6 9) ' pp . 9 2- 3 .
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opinion, leaving no standards at all to satisfy. 356
The discipline of mutual adjustment ctilizes various
means to assure a measure of control: 357
1) publicatons in periodicals, books, papers, etc.
2) selection for scientific posts, research grants,
etc.
But the most important method in an area where controversy
arises is that of persuasion, of critical argument aimed at
making the truth manifest.

Critical argument is not intend-

ed merely as a destructive force.

Its aim is to isolate

and evaluate the nature of falsehoods in the scientific
world.

And such a task cannot be achieved without two impor-

tant elements of evaluation:

consultation with other sci-

entists both within and without the field in question and
competition of ideas in the interest of establishing. the
truth.

Thus, consultation and competition are also important aspects of mutual contro1. 358
These methods of scientific discipline guide research and judge results by allowing or
publicity.

disallo1~ing

their

But they also appeal to the scientific consci-

ence to strive for the truth out of a free response to it.
357Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 47-9.
358Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 165.
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Indeed, the purpose of these means of discipline is to make
possible a free and spontaneous order of individual initiatives.

For this kind of order is possible only if each

scientist takes into account what others have done previously
in relation to similar problems.
of mutual adjustment may

~

Of course the effectiveness

to diminish somewhat as the

group to which one must adjust one's efforts grows larger.
For where large numbers are concerned, each can only adjust
himself to a general state of affairs which the others have
bequeathed to him.

Nonetheless, the method works better than

alternatives such as control by a central authority.

In

general, the method of mutual adjustment works quite well,
no matter how large a group is involved.

A centralized authority, apart from any private
authorities, tends to destroy the motivation of the persons
thus controlled so that they do not choose to adjust to one
another but must be forced to follow a "party-line". 359

359Michael Polanyi, The Lo§ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), pp. 185-6.
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Polanyi likens the breakdown of individual adjustments to
the situation that would result if individuals in a line of
battle did not meet their responsibility to adjust their
efforts to one another in attack and defense: the entire
360
Or again, a centralized authorline of battle fails.
ity might be able to plan a summary of goals and moves
required to achieve them; but it cannot say exactly which
moves at which times will be effective in accomplishing
particular goals. 361

Polanyi calls this system of mutual adjustment a
"polycentric" system.

Each center of research adjust itself

in relation to the others to allow a maximum effect in the
362
group task with a minimum of stress to each.
In such a
system, the line of authority remains between scientists
363
rather than over them.
Polycentric controls yield an

360Michael Polanyi, History, Philosopht and the
Sociology of Science: The Contempt of Freedom~.Y., N.Y.,
Arno Press, 1975), p. 35.
361 Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 134.
362Ibid., pp. 173-5.
edited
Press,

Michael Polan
e Un1vers1ty o
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. d.1rect
1n

conse~sus

364
b etween sc1ent1sts
.
..
an d cannot b e f orma-

lized into a complete system of inflexible rules.

Polanyi

considers insight into the general will governing scientists
to be a tacit skill as are other human capacities that are
governed by polycentric systems, such as physical skills,
intellectual tasks, and, as we shall see, social life itself.
Polycentric adjustment is evident in all phases of biopsychological development and adaptation, from the
specialized functioning of organs in respect of the health
of the entire organism to the polycentric task of harmonizing

t~e

purposes in life, the task we call the achievement

of wisdom. 365
the number of

The more highly specialized and the greater
individual~

involved in mutual adjustment, the

. system wor k s. 3 6 6·
b etter t h e po 1 ycentr1c

Thus, t h e more com-

plex the world of science becomes, the greater becomes the
effectiveness of each, individual pursuit of truth.
Polycentricity has its strong points and its weak
points.

It avoids the risk of creating an inflexible body

of rules generated by one authority which is incapable
364K now1ng
.
and Being: Essay£ by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by Marjorie Grene, (ehicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1969), p 85.

365

MichaeL Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 177-8.
366

rbid., p. 118.
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of following the many leads to truth generated in a single
problem.

But, on the other hand, it cannot guarantee that

any particular pursuit of truth will be successful or that
the pursuit will be good for the enterprise as a whole. 367
Nonetheless, no other system can avoid these risks or provide the benefits of polycentric control through mutual
adjustment (ibid).
The scientific world, then, is motivated in its pursuit of the truth by a fundamental moral concern for the
truth.

And this moral concern grounds the procedure of the

pursuit.

The scientific community forms a body politic

governed generally by an ethical commitment to the truth and
specificially by procedures which procure an effective balance between free exploration and communal discipline.

This

balance is maintained by polycentric controls of mutual selfadjustment.

Scientists judge the validity and worthwhile-

ness of one another's work, exercising discipline and control through persuasion, denying of forwarding publication,
and criticizing one another's research in a free market place
of ideas.

The individual is free in science to speak and

367 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 157.
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seek the truth even if his convictions oppose current
beliefs, 368 thus preserving the right of opposition.

The ethical dynamic of science meets some of the expectations we have developed from an analysis of Polanyi's
tacit ethical structure.

But, if the world of science is

a microcosm of ethical life, then we should expect the freedam, the pursuit of absolute values, and self-regulation to
be a part of ethical life as a whole.

Indeed, Polanyi ex-

pands the freedom to pursue truth as an ultimate value to
academic institutions, asserting that they should be free
to pursue the discovery of truth in all domains of knowledge. 369

They should be free to follow independently the

inherent interest suggested in exciting problems suggested
in research in any domain of knowledge. 370

The education

of society should impart a commitment to truth and freedom

368Knowin
by Marjorie Grene,
1969), p. 70.
369Michael Polanyi, The Lo§ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 41.
370rbid., p. 43.
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as the general authority of all knowledge. 371
Polanyi refuses, then, to allow a commitment to pursue scientific knowledge to produce a rationalism which denies
truths not discovered by scientific method as understood by
"scientific rationalism".

He claims that such denials are

evidence that scientific rationalism is out of hand, as when
the neurologist is compelled to deny the unconscious or de. h enomenon. 3 7 2 Polanyi
. 1s
. an 1ne
. ff ectua 1 , ep1p
c 1are t h at 1t
reminds us that even scientific rationalism is guided chiefly
by the intellectual, moral, and social progress of the 20th

century.

The authority, custom, and tradition of this

society constitute the very language in which rational thought
is expressed. 373 Thus, we should not imagine that rational
thought can successfully deny the categories of custom, ineluding morality, in which it is rooted.

We must, then, ad-

mit that categories other than "true" or "false" are operative
in our lives.

Polanyi says, "Knowledge can be true or false,

while action can only be successful or unsuccessful, right

371
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ'
(Chicago: The University of Chic~go Press, 1966), p.Z.
372 Knowin
by Marjorie Grene,
19 6 9) ' pp . 4 2 - 3 .
373 rb·d
41
1

. '

p.

.
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or wrong". 374

And he claims that to assume an action can

be explained without ahy evaluation is to assume acts can be
performed without mordl motive at a11. 375
The need to view human life from the perspective of
categories other than those permitted by a strict scientifie rationalism is, however, rooted even more deeply than in
culture.

Man needs a full understanding of his condition

and, due to a biologically rooted inability to withstand
protracted perplexity, he seeks understanding through categories other than scientific ones.

Without the development

of non-scientific categories for understanding, such full
understanding cannot be achieved.

And, with protracted

.
.
.
. 1 b rea kd own. 3 76
perp 1 ex1ty,
one b eg1ns
to exper1ence
p h ys1ca
We see, then, that the positivist conception of
morality, wh1ch turns moral statements into nonsense because they have no verifiable meaning, is clearly

374
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Pose-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 175.
375 scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred
Schwarz, (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc.,
1974), p. 143.
376 visual Presentation of Social Matters (n.d.),

Econ file #6, box 25, folder 9, pp. 1-4.
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. f actory. 377
unsat1s

Positivistic science itself cannot sane-

tion moral claims and in fact denies their validity by its
emphasis upon "physicalism" 378 And as long as positivistic
science remains the uncontested authority and perfect ideal
of knowledge, ethics cannot be secured from a destruction
. 1 d ou b t. 379
by scept1ca
The ethical dynamic of science must, then, be extended to the pursuit of truth in all domains of knowledge.

If

freedom, the value of truth, and self regulation constitutes
the dynamic of science, then they must be extended as the
ethical dynamic of all domains of knowledge.

For Polanyi

makes the same demand of all domains of knowledge:
should pursue the truth.

that they

And if the pursuit of truth in

science is effective only under the polycentric control of a
free mutual self-adjustment of scientists, it is reasonable
to conclude that every domain of knowledge would bendfit by
a similar ethical dynamic.
Indeed, this seems even more reasonable when we find

377 scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by Fred
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc.,
1974), p. 84.
378Know1n
.
Essays by Michael Polan i, edited
T e Un1versity o C icago Press,
by Marjorie Grene,
1969), p. 46.
379 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.27.
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Polanyi saying " ... truth of literature and poetry, of
history and political thought, of philosophy, morality, and
legal principles, is more vital than the truth of science." 380
If such truth is more vital than science, then the effectiveness in pursuing truth afforded by the ethical dynamic of
science must be extended to other domains of knowledge.
After all, non-scientific domains of knowledge are not thereby

~scientific:

"The study of man in humanistic terms is

not unscientific, since all meaningful integrations (including those achieved in science) exhibit a triadic structure
consisting of the subsidiary, the focal and.the person, and
all are thus inescapably personal" 381

Meanings in science

are no more favored than meanings in art, religion, and moral
. d gments. 382
JU

The passionate valuations that make scientific

truth possible are also to be justified in other domains of
.
.
1 u d.1ng mora 1'1ty, 383 an d sue h d oma1ns
cu 1 ture, 1nc
possess
their own kinds of formal excellence. 384

~ 80 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,

N.Y.: Doubleday

& Co.,

Inc., 1966), p. 84.

381

Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 64.
382

Ibid., p. 65.

383

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 134.
384

Ibid., p. 133.
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3.

Truth and Morality
Responsible human choices are analogous to acts of

discovery.
ideals.

They submit to the demands of their own self-set

Responsible choice has, then, the status of being

grounded in personal knwoledge. 385

Indeed, Polanyi has

explicitly stated that his purpose in formulating the notion
of personal knowledge was to provide grounds for conceiving
. d gment. 3 8 6
of man as t h e-seat o f mora 1 JU

Th 1s
. means tat
h
he

conceives of the moral life as involving a personal knowledge
of values and of the ultimate
sense of right action.

p~rposes

of life as well as

He confirms in this statement the

argument we have built out of the epistemological

and~onto

logical works that moral life is an independent domain of
knowledge and action.

Certainly, he intended to avoid the

reductionistic tendency of naturalistic explanations df mora.
.
l 1ty
wh.1c h d eny t h e ex1stence
o f human respons1"b 1"1"1ty. 38 7
If the responsible moral decisions of life,
rationally guided by a personal knowledge of values and of
the Good, are the essential aspects of ethical life, then

385 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 46.
386 Ibid., p. 28.
387 Knowin

by Marjorie Grene,
1969)' p. 42.

The
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ethics is a force in its own right, a domain of knowledge
in its own right.

Polanyi again confirms our previous argu-

ments in saying, " ... freedom of thought is rendered pointless
and must disappear, where reason and morality are deprived of
their status as a force in their own right". 388
This status comes as we see all knowledge as personal and all personal knowledge as a domain of discovery and
of action.

Only human actions, of course, are subjects of

moral judgment, though even the sciences make value judgments of some kind.

There is a continuous evaluation of

standards of excellence from the sciences all the way to
moral evaluations.

But the same dynamic of indwelling func-

tions throughout the continuum.

By indwelling the mind of

another through his actions we can understand the moral
quality of his acts.

Polanyi explicitly says that this

moral knowledge, as often uncovered in history, is con.
. h t h e sc1ences.
.
389
t1nuous
Wlt

Indeed, we develop and obey moral standards even
when we do not intend to do so.

We use moral standards

388 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago ?ress, 1969), p. 107.
389Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 79-81.
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when we express condemnation or approval or seek guidance
in a moral dilemma.
faith. 390

This use is uncritical, a matter of

But we also use moral standards in a more explicit

way, as when we raise moral issues in themselves and question
their validity or forward their tentative conclusions.

Indeed,

this explicit focus on moral issues safeguards moral principles from the self-destruction that comes of boundless self391
.
.
d eterm1nat1on.

Such safeguards are necessary, for Polanyi

claims that moral judgments cut deeper than intellectual valuations (as evidenced in the fact that a man consumed by intel.
.
.
1 ectua 1 passJ.on
may a 1 so b e va1n,
envJ.ous,
mean, etc .). 392

Some human actions, then, can be explained only by
reference to the exercise of mor?l judgment.

And where we

recognize moral judgment, we recognize the existence of human
values as motivating persons.

And, in recognizing this as

true not only of others but also of ourselves, we refer to
moral judgments which we hold to be valid and thus discover
that we do in fact (and must!) make the distinction between
moral truth and moral illusion.

Moral truth is founded on

3 9 OS
·
. f. Th
h ___an__d~~O~C~J.~a~~~e~a~J._t~y,
S . 1 R 1.
~C~J.~e~n~t~J.~~l~C~~O~U~g~t
e d . by
Fred Schwarz, (N.Y., N.Y.: International University Press,
Inc., 1974), p. 84.
391

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 86.
392

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), ~ 215.
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the recognition of a valid, rational claim; moral illusion
393
. compu 1 s1ve,
.
1"1k e sensory 1"11 usory 1"11 us1on.
.
1s

The standards of truth, justice, and morality, then,
394
.
. d as 1n
. d epen d ent powers 1n
. pu bl"1c a ff a1rs.
must b e recogn1ze

Moral judgments arise out of the context of communal relations in which we indwell our religious, ethical, and intellectual commitments.

They arise and are

verified in much

"f"1c comm1tments
.
.
t h e same way sc1ent1
are. 395

And morality,

like all thought is valid by its own standards and its pro. everywh ere prompte d b y 1ts
.
.
396
gress 1s
own pass1ons.

There is always, of course, a range of discretion
in every moral choice.
society.

Choices are not determined by

The "compulsion" of a choice comes from a valid

.
.
su b m1ss1on
to one ' s own sense o f respons1. b.1 1"1ty. 397

393Know1n
.
by Marjorie Grene,
1969)' p. 33.
394

Ibid., p. 34.

395

"A Bridge from Science to Religion Based on
Polanyi's Theory of Knowledge". Willaim Scott. Zygon, 5,
1970, p. 57.
396

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Ch~cago, The University of Chicago
T>ress, 1962), p. 215.
397

Michael Polanyi, The Studi of Man (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 195 ), p. 22.
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As with all knowledge, the craving for the universal searches
out the only thing that can satisfy the intellectual passion:
the

uni~ersal

itself.

Thus, though we are free subjectively

to co as we please, this freedom is overruled by the responsibility to do as we must. 398
In this vein, Polanyi says, "Moral judgments are
approvals and as such are akin to intellectual valuation.
The thirst for righteousness has the same capacity for satisfying itself by enriching the world that is proper to intellectual passions ... moral man strives to satisfy his own
.
1 va l'd'
. h h e attr1"b utes un1versa
stan d ar d s, tow h 1c
1 1ty. 399
These universal standards measuremore than the rightness of an action.
moral force.

Men are valued as men according to their

We do not judge the performance of the facul-

ties in valuing a person, but the effect of it on the whole
person.

Moral rules control the whole self rather than the

exercise of our faculties.

Living by codes of morality,

custom, and law is to comply to standards in a far more comprehensive sense than is involved in scientific and artistic standards. 400

398 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge:

Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Pres:, 1962), p. 309.
399 Ibid., p. 214.

400 rbid., p. 215.
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Truth and morality, then, are intimately linked.

Just

as there are ethical commitments to truth which ground the
procedures which discover it, so does truth itself become a
moral value.

And this leads us to acknowledge the truths

we discover within the moral domain as moral truths.

These

truths are independent in that they do not depend upon anything other than moral experience in the form of a sense of
values and of right.
moral decisions.

Moral truths, then, form the grounds of

And these decisions are stated as "oughts":

they constitute moral "rules".
4.

Moral Rules in a Social Context
Polanyi says that men form a society to the extent that

their lives are ordered by the same morals, customs, and
laws. 401

This means that a society is essentially a moral

organization of persons.

And the fundamental moral ground of

the society as a whole develops over time into the customs
(mores) and laws of the society.
The moral ideals of a culture constitute its guiding
precepts of right and wrong.

Moral ideals are rules of right-

ness.

401

M~1c h ae 1 Po 1 any:1,
. P ersona~1 Know 1 e d ge: ·Towar d s A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, The University of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 215.
1
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Whatever rules of rightness a person tries to fulfill
he commits himself to an ideal; and again, he can do
so only within a medium that is blind to this ideal.
The ideal determines the standards to which a person
holds himself responsible; but the ideal-blind medium
both grants the possibility for striving for this
ideal and zimits this possibility. It determines his
calling.4 0
Our society teaches us the moral rules, we indwell in order to
project new ideals.

And yet it also acts to "drag" us down

from our commitment and effective action in realizing our
highest ideals.

Society is the medium of the ethical domain,

not the self-identical scope of moral life. , Our communal life,
bound by the codes which form society, inspires us to ideals
which are not wholly impractical.

But they are not fully

. h er. 403
. bl e e1t
rea 1 1za
This "seeing" of ourselves is the function of conscience.

.

Conscience interprets and applies tradition.

Tradi-

tion imposes a general authority in laying down the general
presuppositions concerning value, right, and good which we
indwell from infancy.

But conscience alone is the specific

authority for the explicit moral decisions we make.

Tradi-

tion cannot impose specific moral applications, as this would
402
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowled e: Towards A
Post-Critical Philosophy (Ch1cago, T e Un1vers1ty o C1icago
Press, 1962), p. 215.
403 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The
University ~f Chic~go Press, 1958), p. 63.
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.
d estroy 1ts
purpose as a gu1. d e. 4 04

Polanyi says, "A General

Authority relies for the initiative in the gradual transformation of tradition on the intuitive impulses of the individual adherents of the community and it relies on their con.
.
. . " . 405
sc1ences
to contro 1 t h e 1ntu1t1on

Thus, the role of

conscience is to interpret and develop the thrust of tradition toward a deeper insight into value and a more comprehensive movement toward the Good.

For Polanyi, the words

"conscience" and "moral" are never merely descriptive terms
but carry with them the sense of "commendable" or "wrong". 406
For Polanyi, different moral systems are not just "different";
some are more commendable than others. 407
Thus, the criterion for deciding which value systems
are commendable and which are not lies in conscience.

The

final grounds on which one bases the premisses and decisions
of conscience are moral truths we indwell.

The criterion

of conscience is not a pragmatic one which depends upon which

4 O4rM1c
. h ae 1 P o 1 any1,
. S c1ence,
.
F a1. t h , an d S oc1ety
.
77

(Chicago:

The University

of~C~h~i-c_a_g~o~P~r-e_s_s~,-,1~9 6 6')-,--p-.~57

.

. 405 rbid., p. 59.
406 rntellect and HoEe, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and
William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968),
p. 369.
4 O7Ibid. , p. 3 73.
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belief "works" to aid us in pursuing some particular goal.
All beliefs "work" for those 1vho believe in them. 408 But not
all beliefs are true in that they do not all comprehend the
proper values which, universally followed, lead toward the
Good.

Hence, we cannot rely upon what works pragmatically

to lead us to particular goals.

For we can be successful

in accomplishing a goal even though we are mistaken in what
we believe is true.

For

Polanyi moral truth is the ground of

conscience; for we have a deeper inner impetus to seek truth
than to succeed in a particular goal.

And conscience itself

attests to this when we avoid truth in favor of a self-justified pursuit of personal goals.
Conscience, however, is powerless without the will
to act rightly.

Once conscience has discerned the right

action according to universal standards of action, it must
take precedence over both will and our perception of the
facts.

We must sometimes even proceed with an insight into

right as informed by. conscience when the

temporary facts count

against it.

The will must bow to the conscience, which may
demand "conversion" even against our will. 409
4 0 SM · h 1 P 1
. Sc1ence,
.
F a1t
. h , an d Soc1ety
.
1c ae
o any1,

(Chicago:

409

The University
rbid., p. 67.

of.~C~h~i_c_a_g~o~P~r-e_s__
s~,~1~9~6~6~)-,--p-.--T61.
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Conscience, then, is the final adjudicator in all moral conflicts:

both when one is faced with a choice between two

value systems and in conflicts within the scope of an accepted
authority.

But as long as conflicts are generated from two

fundamentally different views of the same region of experience, they must proceed more by an attempt at persuasion and
conversion by reference to the intrinsic worth and superiority
of a particular position.

And this is especially a matter of

intuition and conscience. 410
Polanyi says conscience functions by the interiorization of moral teaching.

To interiorize is to identify our-

selves with a moral teaching.
"indwelling" a concept.

This is what Polanyi means by

Moral teachings form the proximal

term of tacit moral knowledge, which in turn forms the framework for moral acts and judgments.

All indwelling is "interi-

.
. " . 411
0r1zat10n

A moral teaching appears meaningless until the student hits on the same indwelling that the teacher is practicing.

We must dwell in the particulars while attending

toward a comprehensive entity that these particulars constitute.

This is acceptance of the teacher's authority.

It

4l 0M1c
· h ae 1 P o 1 any1,
. S c1ence,
.
F a1t
. h , an d S oc1ety
.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 66-7.
411

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 17.
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requires "believing" before "understanding".

For we must com-

mit ourselves to communal life as a part of becoming human,
of becoming a

pers~.

This commitment is an indwelling.

And,

more fundamentally, it is an acceptance and trust of communal
modes of life:
stand it. 412

it is faith, a faith we adopt before we underWe must not turn to blind traditionalism, of

course, but must nonetheless recognize our limits and the neces.
s1ty
o f re 1"1ance.

0 t.erw1se
h
.
our pat h

413
. . se lf - d"estruct1ve.
.
1s

We find, chen, that our expectations concerning the
nature of moral authority are met in Polanyi's social writings.

Just as scientific conscience ensures the pursuit of

truth in that domain, so does conscience in general ensure
the pursuit of moral rightness.

We may now ask how the rules

developed out of moral conscience work to effect moral change
in society as a whole.
5.

Communal Change of Moral Consciousness
The transmission of moral beliefs is accomplished not

so much by precept as by example.

The transmission of moral

belief by example can occur via the symbols generated by
412

scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed., by Fred
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc.,
1974)' p. 61.
413

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 61-2.•

2 74

moral heores.

We have already examined-the nature and dynamic

of symbols; and we must vie\.; the ethical domain as generating
its symbols in the form of "moral heroes".
Our modern, highly articulate culture flows largely
from a small set of men whose works and deeds are
revered and consulted for guidance. The knowing of
these great men is an indwelling ... our awareness of
thelr works and deeds serves us ... as a framework for
unfolding our understanding in accordance with the 414
indications and standards imposed by the framework.
Indeed, ·the acts of "world historical personalities" 1 ike
Alexander, Augustus, Charlemagne, Luther, etc., are the most
striking examples of human decisions.

Yet heroes of the moral

world are even more influential in the long run, though pDlitical persons affect the framework of political power and
create the drama of human history. 415
Can unique moral heroes provide us with moral knowled~e

since they do not represent known patterns?

Yes--the

more unique the heroes are, the more interesting they are in
themselves and the greater opportunity they offer for an
intimate indwelling of their individuality. 416 We must
414K.

.

now1noby Marjorie Grene
1969)' p. 136.

415 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 71-2.
416

Ibid., p. 85.
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recall that a symbol is a unique power which draws us into
itself and integrates us into its meaning.

In the case of

the moral hero, his uniqueness creates a symbol which draws
us into his moral reality and integrates within us a new insight into the Good.

Thus, to contemplate a person as an

jdeal, as a moral hero, is to submit to his authority for
judging oneself 417 and, ultimately, to be created by him in
a new moral realm.
Our very calling as human beings is shaped and determined by the moral symbols that reach out to us and to which
we willingly submit ourselves.

Thus, our commitment to our

social and mental milieu can be shaped and determined by who
we recognize as our heroes and masters. 418
Of course, not all moral change is determined through
moral heroes.
life.

There is also a natural evolution of moral

If tacit thought is the indispensible, ultimate power

by which all explicit thought is endowed with meaning, then
no one generation or individual can or should critically test
all the teachings on which it relies.
417

We always know more

Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 96.
418 Ibid., p. 98.
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than we can tell:

the transmission of knowledge from one

.
. pr1mar1
.
·1 y tac1t.
. 419
generat1on
to t h e ot h er 1s

Th us, 1t
· 1s
·

logically impossible for the moral tradition to operate without the addition of wholly original interpretive judgments,
such as what "heroes" supply, at each state of transmission.
This process of heroic reinterpretation introduces elements
which are wholly novel, 420 a process which pertains to all
fields of knowledge.

But we must understand Polanyi when he

says, "Further controlling principles of life may be represented as a hierarchy of boundary conditions extending, in the
case of man, to consciousness and responsibility".
refers here to the
man.

natur~l

421

Polanyi

and continuous moral development of

The heroic inbreaking of new moral ideas does indeed

produce moral symbols which integrate us into the new discoveries that constitute the heroic insight.

But there is a

natural and continuous bio-psychic development that constitutes moral life as well.

Thus, we can understand also how

each act of understanding may lead to a conversion to a truer

419 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday
420

(Chicago:
421

& Co.,

Inc., 1966), pp. 60-1.

Mi~hael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society

The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 58.

Knowin
by Marjorie Grene
1969)' p. 239.

and Being: Essa s by Michael Polanyi, ed.
C 1cago: T e Univers1ty o C 1cago Press,
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. way of being a man and of understanding him better. 422
Thus, apart from the inspiration and insight generated
by moral heroes, the natural tendency of man's evolution is
toward moral insight.

And his pursuit of the Good tends

naturally, when guided by moral insight, to an increased interest in the welfare of the whole of society and to a les-·
sened interest in his own welfare.

Polanyi says,

I have said that at the highest level of personhood
we meet man's moral sense, guided by the firmament
of his standards. Even when this appears absent,
its mere possibility is sufficient to demand our
respect.
We have here a fact which sets a new major task to
the process of evolution: a task which appears the
more formidable as we realize that both this moral
sense and our respect for it presuppose an obedience
to commands accepted in defiance of the immemorial
scheme of self-preservation which had dominated the
evolutionary process up to this point.422
Carl Friedrich has pointed out 423 that Polanyi's insistence upon the universal intent of moral and intellectual
passions :eads to the suggestion that justice is grounded in
a kind of natural law. 424 This natural law is the product
of convivial discernment.

The embodiment of justice, which

422 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. Sl-2.
423 ''Man, the Measure: Personal Knowledge and the Quest
for Natural Law in Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1968), pp. 91-109.
·
424 Inte1lect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and
William H. Poetat, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968),
p. 91.
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is grounded in human nature, within law is the main concern of
natural law theorists, 425 a concern which is justified by the
fact that the personal coefficient of knowledge cannot be re. can f rom sc1ence.
.
426
move d f rom 1 aw any more t h an 1t

The

basic law of human nature upon which natural law may be built
is Polanyi's claims that man is moved by moral and intellectual passions which have a universal intent and bear upon an
.
h aust1"bl e rea 1"1ty. 427
1nex

Polanyi confirms in these passages the communal nature
\

of moral experience.

We would expect such a confirmation,

of course, since we have already established the communal
nature of knowledge and of science in particular.

We discover

in these passages that morality, as an independent force, is
developed not only within the context of the community but that
• the

commu~ity

itself has a moral nature which may evolve to-

ward higher moral insight or decay by neglecting its responsibilities.

We see, then, that the Good cannot be separated

from the communal Good.
425
Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and
William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968),
p. 92.

426

Ibid., p. 101.

427

Ibid., p. 109.
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6.

The Communal Good
A faith or confidence in the potential of the human

bond and of shared obligations implies, as we have seen, a
moral bond.

Polanyi says,

.. the group has a claim to conformity of its members,
and that the interests of group life may legitimately
rival and sometimes overrule those of the individual.
This acknmvledges a common good for the sake of which
deviation may be suppressed and individuals be required
to make sacrifices for defending the group against subversion and destruction from outside.428
Thus, Polanyi explicitly outlines

~he

origin of a notion of a

common Good which places all persons under an obligation to
cooperat~

as a community in its establishment.

The common Good is not merely a subjective idea about
goodness or rightness, as we have seen in our discussion of
the implications of Polanyi's epistemology.

The Good, as we

have also seen, is as much a reality as are those discovered
in scientific pursuits. 429
We aim, as a community, at the Good.
declares that the communal aim
the Good.

lS

But Polanyi

not the sole impetus toward

Indeed, the community itself is not a single entity

428 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 212.
429 "Politics and Science: A Critique of Buchanan's
Assessment of Polanyi", P.C. Roberts, Ethics, 79, April 1969,
p. 239.
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but is a collection of different people who share some beliefs,
ideals, and motives in life.

Individuals can differ from one

another in the community to the extent that the society they
compose contains a mixture of both highly developed persons in
the moral domain and those of lower development.

We have

already noted the role of heroes of discovery and attainment
in the community.

Thus, it should not surprise us that society
fosters both individual and communal ("civic") thought. 430
The community must foster the individual thoughtwhich
forwards the life of the community as a whole while maintaining itself as a community against forces which would rend it
asunder.

This demands a delicate balance between freedom and

control similar to that maintained in science.
The community must maintain this control in a·manner
similar to the way in which it is maintained in science: by
moral inspiration combined with some procedures for-enforcing
the basic order which allows society to function most effectively in its pursuit of the Good.

The fundamental method of

control, as in science, remains a moral control.

Civic sense

and moral convictions are embodied in society and form the
"civic home" in which we live.

We cannot force individuals to

indwell the moral life of the community; for moral standards
430 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-

Britical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 215.
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are rightly rendered suspect when they are upheld by force,
are based upon property and wealth, or are imbued with a
local loyalty. 431
Polanyi acknowledges four "coefficients" of societal
organization, each of which plays a role in a communal cohesion and realization of the Good: 432
1.

shared convictions

2.

shared fellowship

3.

co-operation

4.

authority or coercion

The joint functioning of these elements of communal life is
responsible for social cohesion and are the grounds upon which
all social institutions (family, religion, education, etc.)
are built.

The first three are essentially moral since they

involve a free response to the beliefs, friendship, and goals
of others.

We must acknowledge our natal embodiment of these

and choose them in the process of attaining social maturity.
But the last element mentioned represents the public power
which shelters and provides effective control of societal institutions.433
431 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philoso~hy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. 215-1 .
432 rbid., p. 212.
433 rbid., pp. 212-13.
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Inherent within this difference between the first
three coefficients of societal organization and the fourth one
in a polarity of communal life.

On the one hand, social pro-

gress in achieving the Good proceeds by shared passions and
standards.

On the other hand, some external control is neces-

sary because individuals can rise above or fall below general
societal standards.

Thus, individuals are not dependent upon

the societal moral life they indwell.

They can form a moral

pole which, for the better or worse, are at variance with the
civic pole of communal moral life. 434 Yet both the "moral"
and the "civic" poles are necessary to communal life:

"

the restraint which power incurs as the price of employing
morality for its own coercive purposes proves only that morality for its own coercive purposes proves only that morality
is an indispensable, though self-willed, ally to power. 435
All elements are necessary for achieving the social Good.
The Good, then, is not just a personal achievement,
though it is uniquely personal.

The Good is a communal

achievement, so far as it is achievable at all.

Only by

434
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 215.

435 rbid., p. 226.
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indwelling communal norms can we be informed concerning any
notion of the Good and work to transcend it--or fail it and
experience guilt.

Communal life is a delicate balance between

external control and a moral commitment to obey the standards
of society.

Freedom, commitment, and external control are

blended within the community to make the Good both an individual and communal achievement.
Finally, we can now observe that our conception of a
moral reality, developed from, an analysis of Polanyi's epistemological and ontological works, is explicitly confirmed
as an extension of conscience as we find it in the scientific
.
436 p o 1any1. says,
enterpr1se.
A personal knowledge of man may consist in putting
ourselves in the place of the persons we are studying and in trying to solve their problems as they
see them or as we see them. That opens the door for
our entry into human personality in its whole moral,
religious, and artistic outlook, as the bearer of a
historical consciousness, a political and legal responsibility. Thus, it introduces us through an
extension of scientific enquiry straight into the
whole sentient, c~eative, and responsible life of
human concerns.4j7
The ethic of discovery, then, which extends itself
to moral truths, must, by implication, extend itself to the

4 36M1c
. h ae 1 P o 1 any1,
. S c1ence,
.
F a1t
. h , an d S oc1ety
.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 55.
437 scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed., by Fred
Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press, Inc.,
1974), p. 96.
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moral governance of society as a whole.

The same ethic which

undergirds the free pursuit of truth also undergirds the moral
conscience of a free society. What works in the process of
scientific discovery 438 also works to establish the political
and moral truths which undergirds a free society. 439
Polanyi claims, however, that the norms for judging
concrete truths within particular domains may differ; but he
does .not admit that what is essential for truth in any domain
(i.e., the intent to discover truth within a context of free
inquiry) may be sacrificed in any domain of knowledge.

And

this is precisely what determines his affirmation of the
necessity of the free society as a social truth:

freedom in

society is an implication of the need to freely pursue the
438 Michael Polanvi, The Republic Df Science: Its
Political and Economic Theory~(~c=h~i~c~a-g_o__:--~R~o-o_s_e_v_e~l-t~U~n~i~v--ersity,
1962), p. 5.

439 To be more specific, the extension of the dynamic
of social organization is based on exactly the same kind of
truth which science discovers. Frank Knight ("Virtueand
Knowledge", Ethics, 59, July, 1949, pp.271-284) early raised
the issue whether the norms applicable to science are applicable to other domains of knowledge or to society as a whole.
His aim was to question whether social-political, communal
norms are true or false in the same sense in which scientific
ones are. Certainly, the kinds of truths involved are different. Communal moral truths and norms of pursuing the Good
ar~ not true or right in the sense of passing muster before
present concepts of scientific truth. But the ethical dynamic
of truth-seeking and norm-setting is not dependent upon truth
being specifically scientific; scientific truth is, rather, a
species of tacit knowledge. And the dynamic of tacit knowing,
applicable in all domains of knowledge, is the real root of
the ethical dynamic of knowledge and action.
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truth in any domain.

He emphasized science because he was a

scientist and because science is supposed to be the major
. soc1e
. t y. 440
source o f trut h 1n

440 Polanyi has been further criticized, however, for
claiming his notion of truth-judgment is not subjective but
personal. We will remember that a personal judgement abides
by standards set by the judgment itself and, thus, is not subjective since it aims at universal coverage. The judgment
then becomes the standard of the com~unity of knowers within
the domain of knowledge at issue. This notion has been misunderstood to mean that the standard is merely what the community tends to believe rather than what they are supposed to
believe according to the standards they obey. Thus, some
have argued that Polanyi is a subjectivist in so far as political truths are concerned since in this field there is often
no agreement as to the best idea or course of action to follow.
Such critics claim that POlanyi would leave such truths up to
pure choice as to how to view things, a choice that may not
represent the truth at all (''Politics and Science: Reflections
on Knight's Critique of Polanyi", James M. Buchanan, Ethics,
77, '66-'67, pp.305-6). They often turn to a more "pragmatic"
standard of truth: the "best" social order is that which
works the best, that gives us what we want. And such con. siderations makes "truth" an irrelevant consideration (ibid.,
308). But clearly Polanyi does not claim that political
truth--~r any other truth--is constituted by social agreement.
The agreement of society is formed by a social acknowledgment
of truth and a commitment to obey the standards of truth in
so far as they are known. Thus, the agreement is based on
truth; it does not itself constitute the truth. Such a notion would make truth subjective, and all political truths
would be relative to choice in such a view. But foremost in
Polanyi's mind is that we discover political truths in themselves and then forward them by agreement and obedience to
the standards of knowledge that the truth implies. Political
truths are, then, agreed upon only because they are acknowledged as such; and the prime social and political truth
which this procedure necessitates is the truth that persons
must be-Iree to discover the truth in all areas of knowledge
supported in society.
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We have, then, established both the fact and nature
of the

do~ain

of societal, ethical truths.

We may now examine

the ethical structure of society as a whole, as evidenced in
its social institutions and political dynamic.

We can best

begin this investigation by examining how society goes wrong.
For we can most easily discern a correct functioning of
society by comparing such structures with the fundamental
immoral structures of society.

CHAPTER TEN
THE MORAL INVERSION OF THE FREE SOCIETY
This chapter is a propadeutic to the final chapter
on Polanyi's notion of a free society.

In it I analyze what

Polanyi considers to be various moral inversions of freedom
and the common Good as exemplified in certain social-political structures such as Marxism, democratic libaraJism,
Nazism, etc.

An understanding of what is wrong with these

attempts to give a moral organizati6n to society (attempts
which are moral even when they focus on giving an amoral
structure to society) will help us grasp the nature of the
free society.

We shall see that Polanyi's dissatisfactions

with social structures that differ widely from the ethical
structure which makes science successful is that they fail
to provide the means to discover in a free manner the very
truths (moral and otherwise) which they require in order to
maintain themselves.
1.

Moral Inversion in Society
Communal moral truths are, then, important aspects

of truth and are very much linked to the method of establishing scientific ideas.

Indeed, Polanyi claims that the modern

mind, with its penchant for science, is a fusion of scientific

287

288

skepticism and a passion for moral progress.

441

But this

fusion has not been a healthy one, for the most part.

In-

stead of producing a commitment to moral and scientific
truths, it has made science itself a standard for moral truth.
Indeed, modern society has paradoxically believed that it is
morally necessary to judge all truths by the standards that
pertain to science.

So our culture seems pervaded by a dis-

sonance of extreme critical lucidity and intense moral conscience.442
laxity.

The problem with modern society is not moral

We have never seen so much moral intensity, much of

which has been aimed at humanitarian reform.

Polanyi affirms

that there has been moral excess and that ethics must catch
up to the pathological forms of morals created in this era
of excess. 443 The root of this pathology lies in the peculiar cooperation which skepticism gave the passion for social
betterment in the philosophy of the enlightenment. 444 This
skepticism criticized all pronouncements on moral truths,
thus releasing persons from falsehoods and prejudice.

But

such skepticism did not distinguish true moral ideas from
. Tl...~e-~ac1
.,. . t D.1mens1on
.
(G ard en C.1ty,
. 441 M.1c h ae 1 Po 1any1,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 57.
442 Ibid., p. 4.
443K now1n
.
by Marjorie Grene
1969)' p. 3.
444 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 57.
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false ones; moral ideas in general came under attack.

Thus,

men were also freed to follow a-moral courses of action.

In

this sense, a concern for true morality leads to a protest
against falsehoods which inevitably include all moral
values. 445
Polanyi insists that the development of moral

pas~

,

sions and scientific skepticism into moral skepticism is not
just an accidental, historical development.

This development
446
was a logical development of these attitudes.
And he
claims that we now face' the same outcome today as we grope
our way back to the sceptical ideals of the 18th century. 447
Polanyi says that the passions generating moral seepticism were not religious but moral, though their moralities were perverted and immanent only in brute force. 448
Elevati~ns

of nationhood as a law unto itself above moral

standards are, according to Polanyi, the ultimate logical end
of the enlightenment. 449 Clearly, he sees our present danger

44SKnOWlnO'
,
by M&rjorie rene
19 6 9) ' pp. 8- 9.
446 Ibid., p. 10.
447 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
448 Ibid., p. 17.
449 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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of moral skepticism as leading logically to the ends which
threatened enlightenment society in the rise of nations and
in moral libertinism and to the end that development implied:
the collectivisms of communism and nazism.

These threats are

not political or economic in Polanyi's view, but are most
intimately connected to the moral values we hold and the way
these values open us to truth in all domains of knowledge, including the political domain.
Polanyi refers to the improper development of moral
ideas in society as "moral inversion", claiming that it is
rooted in the skepticism that destroys the belief in truth,
justice, law, etc., which are supposed to embody the social
passions.

Without these, social passions are perverted into
brute force. 450 The national sense of "moral responsibility"
then

becom~s

the capricious shaper of all personal knowledge
making all knowledge dependent upon social compulsions. 451
Such a move makes knowledge dependent upon the collective
social needs, no longer allowing free pursuit of the truth.
450
Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 5.
451 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 43.
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This essentially denies the reality of science as well as
the realities of other domains of knowledge such as law,
art, religion, etc.

And, by denying them, it takes the

first step in destroying them and confirming its own perverted doctrine as "truth" 452
.
.
" n1"h"l"
Polany1. also cal 1 s t h"1s 1nvers1on
1 1sm . 453
If

Nihilism and moral inversion are identified in Polanyi's
writings, and the ends of each are the same.

But one small

difference between them lies in the fact that moral inversion
may be hidden somewhat from the view of society, whereas
nihilism is an explicit attitude.
nihilis~±c

As Polanyi says, the

revolutionary gives effect to his immanent mora-

.
1"1ty. 454
.
b y h"1s man1. f est 1mmora
l 1ty

Nihilists, then, function under the principles of
absolute skepticism.

They are attracted to those types of

political positions which share their skepticism, finding
identity in a violent narrow political creed.
the nihilist a sense of moral superiority.

This gives

But since he

cannot demand justice in the name of justice or humanity in
4 S2M. h 1 P 1
. S c1ence,
.
F a1t
. h , an d S oc1ety
.
1c ae
0 ar.y1,

(Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 81.

453K now1n
.

by Marjorie Grene
19 6 9) ' pp. 4 3- 4.
454

and Being: Essays b Michael Polanyi, ed.
icago: T e University o C icago Press,

Ibid., p. 44.
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the name of humanity, he
"scientific" society.

mus~

turn to devleoping a perfect,

He develops a sense of righteousness

about calculated brutality.

Nihilists become impenetrably

skeptical fanatics, and the pursuit of naked power becomes a
blind moral passion. 455

Thus, the nihilist accredits in-

.
. r1g
. h ~ousness to revo 1 ut1onary
.
tr1ns1c
power. 456

Polanyi affirms, then, that modern nihilism is not a
moral laxity but is a part of the comprehensive moral protest of our time.

The intensification of moral demands has

led to a sense of moral degradation in relation to our failure to live up to self-professed principles.
to a rebellion which aims at

establi~hing

power, free from traditional .compromise.

And it leads

another center of
This center must

proclaim itself groundlessly as the absolute good--and amoral
reign begins. 457 Such societal essentials as justice and
charity, in so far as they are truths held by society, are
t

458
.
rans f erre d to party 1nterests.

455 Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 16-17.

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge· To~ards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
456

1962), p. 237.
457

Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1969), pp. 4-5.
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 78.
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This process of inversion is deeply intensified by
positivism.

Under the influence of positivism, which elevates

the standards of science to a position of judging validity
in all domains of knowledge, truth became identified with
science.

Science, in turn, became, under positivism, a mere

ordering of experience.

Thus, justice, morality, custom, and
law became mere conventions charged by emotional approva1. 459
Undergirded by positivism, then, science produced a

skepticism in domains of knowledge in which it had no right
to judge.

The moral passions are then displaced to a fevered

attempt to apply scientific categories of understanding to
moral~ty,

politics, and law, thus destroying the inherent

standards by which such fields judge their concepts valid.
In summary, Dr. Jim Wiser has said " ... nihilism sooner or
later generates a political creed which functions in the
place of the discredited moral ideals of the tradition." 460
Polanyi is not willing to admit, however, that all
·modern achievements are simply products of moral inversion

459 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 8.
460 Human Reason and the Quest fnr MPRning, Jim WisAr;
Pap~r given at the Canadian Political Science Association,
Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 9-11, 1977, p. 3.
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(nihilism) or are themselves nihilistic.
to be distinguished from nihilistic ones.

Some movements need
Freud, eg., assert-

ed that all value judgments are guided absolutely by the
desire for happiness and are all illusions bolstered by argument.

Therefore, he admires people who spurn false standards.

But this is only a spurious moral inversion since Freud holds
the ideal of a society in which all work for the happiness of
all. 461 Again, utilitarianism may seem to be morally inverted
when it decries moral sentiments as hypocritical while asserting itself as scientific.
nihilism,
dards.462·

But this, too, is only a spurious

since utilitarianism achieves to ethical stanThus not all modern movements are nihilistic.

The danger is more specific (eg., Naxism and Communism) and
its results are more concrete than vague moral disease.
Despite the danger Polanyi says we face of moving
back to nihilism, he claims that our present health is well
grounded and is a natural power of all societies.

Societies

have a natural power for recovery from moral inversion and
moral pathologies.

Fanatical hatreds, lies, and cruelties

can become pointless with an upsurge of national feeling for
dignity and the hope of freedom and need for truth. 463 ·
462
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 233.
463Knowl.n
.
by Marjorie Grene
1969)' p. 18.
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Polanyi points to the Hungarian revolution as an example of
how the demand for truth can receive the explicit support
even of those involved in denying this, such as the secret
police. 464 There is, then, a natural recoil from the nihilistic effects of scientific rationalism.

And in our times, it

has hardened our moral tone and cleared the ground for relaying the foundations of morality. 465 Polanyi calls this
•111 rev~s~on~sm.
• •
• 466
reco~
II

Thus, although all of the logical antecedents of ir.version are present today just as they were in the enlightenment, we are still beyond nihilism.

We can suspend the

logic that leads to inversion by establishtng a civic partnership united in its resolve on continuous reforms and in its
refusal to be led by radicalism into the logic of moral inversion.467

We can recognize that it is logically false to

deny truth since such a denial affirms truth.

And this

truth has an operative power, a spiritual reality, which is
_merely transferred to temporal political exigencies when

464K now~n
.
by Marjorie Grene
19 6 9) ' pp. 20- 21.
465 Ibid., i?· 44.
466 rbid., p. 21.
467 Ibid., pp. 22-3.
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this truth is denied. 468

We break out of such denials and

move out of the path to nihilism not by a mere intellectual
achievement (e.g., the discovery of truths), since all truths
can be shadowed by a commitment to nihilism; but rather we
accomplish this by dissolving nihilism as an existential
commitment 469 through a renewed commitment to truth over
party or social interest.

In sum, we see that for Polanyi there is a general
passion for social justice, freedom of thought, and the
desire for increased prosperity.

The original impulses toward

these were, however, perverted through moral inversion, an
inversion which is deeply grounded in intellectual error
because of its denial of

moral, political, and

social

468Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ~
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 7 .
469Knowin
by Marjorie Grene
1969), p. 31.

i, ed.
Press,

471Polanyi's affirmation of political truth as linked
to commitment in an important sense should be adequate evidence that Najder's complaint that Polanyi is "merely intellectual" in his view of historical change and does not pay
attention to social and economic causes is a mistaken judgment; Intellect and HoBe, ed. by Thomas A. Langford, and
William H. Poteat (Cur am, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1968), p. 379.
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truth 471

Nihilism, however, cannot-satisfy this passion be-

cause of its denial of truth, which is essential for any
social order, even a nihilistic one.

But this logic of

nihilism can be suspended by a commitment to truth.

For only

such a commitment can dissolve the view of all truths as
being dependent upon party interest.
The issue of freedom for truth is the basic determinant of the government and form of society in which we
live.

If we cherish truth and promote its free pursuit, we

move toward the free society in which moral values have a
voice of truth in their own right.

But if we seek only the

interest of the party we choose, truth cannot survive.

And,

without truth, we cannot establish a society which is responsive truly to the needs of its people.
Polanyi does not leave us with abstract statements
concerning social-ethical dynamics and the way in which they
go wrong.

He gives concerete illustrations of the essential

forms of ·moral inversion which afflict humanity.

We can firm

up our confirmation of the moral structure of society by more
deeply investigating moral inversion in its concrete forms.
471

Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 2-3.
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2.

Marxism as an Example of Moral Inversion
Polanyi defines society as a form of human existence

which attempts to make sense of the relations between persons.472

And he says that adherence to truth implies adher-

ence to a society which respects truth; thus, love of truth
reappears as love of a society which fosters truth.

Submis-

sion to intellectual standards implies participation in a
society which accepts the cultural obligation to serve these
standards. 473 The search for truth, then, is itself a move
to establish a society which respects truth and all of the
forms of organization that commitment implies.

We have

already outlined the societal structure of the "republic of
science''.

We shall now see how, according to Polanyi, the

refusal to make truth primary and an end in itself has quite
different ramifications for the society which pursues this
path.
The organization of society is a necessity, even when
there is an agreement of convictions:

"Though men be har-

moniously guided by their agreed convictions, they must yet
form a government to enforce their purpose". 474 Polanyi
472 rntellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A. Langford and
William H. Poteat (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1968),
p. 3.

473 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 203.
474 Ibid., p. 224.
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refers to this government as a "moral culture" and emphasizes
the essential difference between two types of moral cultures:
the free society and Marxism, which interpret the same data
differently and do not accept the same facts as real and significant.475·

The former is free in so far as it acknowledges

thought as an independent force in society; and the latter is
.
.
. so f ar as It
. In
. prinCIP
. . 1 e d enies
.
tota 1 Itarian
In
t h"IS. 476
We cannot, of course, choose to live in a state of
total anarchy, for Polanyi, such a state is inconceivable.
Human conviviality is a brute fact which we cannot escape.
"We embody our own temporal, inchoate experiences stretching
over a long period of time, in the unification of one moment-which also embodies our unification with one another in the
477
same moment".
We do not need to deal at length with conviviality here, since we have already dealt with it.

But

we do need to recall that conviviality is at the root of
society and of the government that reflects its organization
toward common purposes.

4 75
. . .
~ichael Polal_lyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 240.
476
Ibid., p. 376.
477
Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1962), p.l53.
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Marxist totalitarianism is Polanyi's prime example of
a "moral culture" that places the interest of the party over
the independent pursuit of truth.

Marxism is a form of

totalitarianism which sublates thought in the service of the
proposed welfare of the state and denies independence and
free activity to thought. 478 In Polanyi's opinion, Marxist
totalitarinism shapes the facts at will and gets these accepted not only by coercion but also by persuasiveness, including a wholesale corruption of the principles of factual
evJ."d ence. 479
Because of this, the Marxist state functions without
regard for voluntary support:

Persons in such a state can

become convinced that it is right to obey no matter what is
commanded; and one can be silenced out of any disaffection
by the weight 480 of social di"sapprova1. 481 But most of all,
the impact of Marxism is the denial of any intrinsic creative
power of thought, a denial which makes independence in thought

478 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 214.
479 Ibid., p. 241.
480 Ibid., p. 225.
481 Ibid., p. 224; Polanyi affirms that Stalin's regime
is an example of such a state's ability to exercise power
without voluntary support.
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unthinkable for Marxists. 482
Marxism unites moral passion and skepticism into a
political doctrine.

Political power is scientifically sanc483
tioned, so there is no room for moral truth.
For this

reason

Marxis~

can act unscrupulously in a deliberate man-

ner because it can claim that its righteousness is embodied
in its power.

And this makes Marxism "morally" attractive

to those seeking a perfect justification of the use of
power. 484 It allows Marxists to argue for their position
on "moral"

grounds, even though Polanyi claims their argu.
.
485
ments represent a mora 1 1nvers1on.
Marxism is, according to Polanyi, the most interest.
1ng
case o f t h e mora 1 f orce o f ..1mmora 1.1ty. 4 8 6 . As d.1aII

II

lectical materialism, Marxism makes stern scientific objectivity the proper moral response to our challenge of high moral
dynamism, thus

coll~psing

the proper antinomy between them.

483M.
. Th e Tac1t
. D.1mens1on
.
(G ar d en C.1ty,
r1c h ae 1 Po 1 any1,
·N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 59-60.
484 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 231.
485 Ibid., pp. 231-233.

486 Ibid., p. 227.
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Moral force is transformed into a commitment to amoral objectivism.

Morality, as a concern for a scientific objectivity

which controls the "facts" of life, becomes imminent within
the material concerns of the proletariat.

Thus, the science

of Marxist society provides objective view that gives the
Morality--what

moral force to create the Marxist "utopia".
. d one- -no 1,onger h as 1ntr1ns1c
.
. . wort h487
1s

It becomes a func-

tion of decisions to structure society "scientifically".
Thus, moral objections to Marxism are answered by reference
to its scientific correctness; and it does so by asserting the
"morality" of using power to shape society by "scientific
principles" without being committed to these
. t h emse 1 ves. 488
va 1 ue 1n

principles as a

Such a philosophy leads to a "logic of revolution".
If society is not divine, it is made by man, who then is free
to do with it as he likes.

There is then no excuse for a

bad society, so a good one can be made without delay by seizing power through revolution. All resistance must be put down
as treason. 489 Eventually messianic violence is transformed

487 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. 228-30.
488 Ibid., p. 231.
489Know1n
.
by Marjorie Grene
1969)' p. 13.

and Being: Essays by Michael Polan i, ed.
C icago: T e University o
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from being a means to an end to being an end in itself, 490
and this constitutes the worst aspect of moral inversion.
Combined with such force, truth becomes identified with the
value of party expediency, and the critical faculties are
paralyzed to the point that one can no longer apprehend truth
at all.

The distinction between objective truth and party

truth collapses into the latter. 491

No human judgment in any

field--politics, law, art, etc.--can be valid except in
. serves a part1cu
. 1 ar power an d en d . 492.
t h e sense t h at 1t

Polanyi attributes the immorality of Marxist action
to the logic upon which it is founded; but he does not deny
that Marxists, like anyone else, may act contrary to the logic
of revolution.

Indeed, he says that, as a matter of fact,

despite Russia's explicit totalitarian planning of science,

~

490K

.

d

. . now1ng an_ Being: ~ssays by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by daq or1e Grene (Ch1cago: Tl1e University of Chicaao Pr<>s s
1 9 69), p. 14.
0
....
491

'

Ib1·d., p. 29.

492s .
.f.
h
c1ent1 1c T ought and Social Reality ed
b F d
Schwarz (N y
. I t
·
'
· ' Y re
1N y
•
:
'
n
ern~t~oi_lal
Universities
Press.
Inc.
:
•
•
1
~974~, p. 64, NaJd~r has cr1t1c1zed Polanyi's claim that a '
co~nmltJTient. to Marx1sm necessarily fosters the love of state
~ower, den1es moral motives in public life and openl·r d 1
1nhumani
ty· . He agrees t h at .\f arx1sm
.
.
may be ' auil ty of ,.. loec · ares
.1

d1screpancy between scientific and moral cl~ims but do gic~
~allow Polanyi in claiming th&t Marxists must n~cessari~; ~~
1~mo~al; Intellect and Hope, ed. by Thomas A Langfo d
d
W1ll1am H p 0 t t (D h
N
·
r an
p. 376 : ·
ea
ur am, .C.: Duke University Press, 1968),
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for the most part science proceeds in the same way as it does
ever)'1vhere else. 493 Thus, the logic of revolution can be
"suspended" at any point; but the suspension is always contrary to the movement of the logic and, hence, to the depth
meaning of a culture.

As long as the logic is merely suspend-

ed, the immediate danger exists that revolution morality will
recapture the movement of a culture.
The fact that the logic of revolution is sometimes
suspended, however, is significant evidence of its falsehood
in Polanyi's view.

Scientific truth, eg., in so far as it

aims at discovering the truth, is not and cannot be dependent
upon the interests of a party.

Newton's work on gravitation,

eg., was a d{rect result of a pursuit of truth:
Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler.

the work of

It was not a response to

. .
.
.
494
t h e maritime
Interests
o f 1Newton I s time.

Marxist philosophy of science cannot integrate party
interest with the bald fact that no one can tell what the
results of a discovery will be.

And this necessary ignorance

makes it impossible to claim that discoveries are motivated
495
The Marxist attempt to do so is
by historical interests.
an example of "writing history backwards", i.e., infusing
493 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p.84.
494

Ibid., p. 78.

495 rbid., p. 80.
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into historical characters foreknowledge of their own
future. 496

Nonetheless, in so far as the logic of revolu-

tion functions tacitly even in the committed Marxist society,
pure science
3.

.

rema~ns

.

'bl e. 497

~mposs~

The Logic of Liberalism
In view of Polanyi's distaste for Marxism, one might

think that he would support the liberal, democratic institutions of England and America in opposition to Soviet Marxism.

But, although he has much respect for the positive

aspects of their political and social institutions, he does

496 Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 81.
497

Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. 3; Polanyi says that
a similar point is intended in the Hungarian revolutio~. The
failure of Marxist Hungarian society to allow truth--and moral
truth--to have its own say in the domain of politics and history brought forth a rebellion against oppression. The rebellion itself was a message concerning the nature and role of
truth. The message of the Hungarian revolution is that
truth must be recognized as an independent power in public
life. The press must be free to tell the truth; Knowing and
Being: Essary by Michael Polanyi, edited by Marjorie Grene,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 24;
The Hungarian revolution recognized the metaphysical reality
of truth, justice, morality, and art; and that such an acknowledgment should serve as an axiom of further political thought;
Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 24; For freedom is possible
only if truth, justice, humaneness, etc., stand above society
as ideals which it serves. Only then can society be free to
judge itself; Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy and the
Sociology of Science: the Contempt ofFreedom (N.Y'.; N.Y.:
Arno Press, 1975), p. 11.
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not consider them an ideal paradigm of what he calls the ''free
society".

Their institutions are based on liberalism and

utilitarian philosophy.

Liberalism in England and America

implies that only beliefs which are demonstrable should be
imposed on others (otherwise the conflicting beliefs must be
tolerated).

This in turn implies only demonstrable ethical

beliefs should be imposed.

But liberalism, in Polanyi's view,

also holds that ethical principles cannot be demonstrated.
Thus, absolute doubt is applied to traditional ideals, weakening their force in culture and threatening to destroy the basis
of freedom of thought. 498 . Indeed, where the logic of liberalism was not suspended but given free reign in Europe, the result was its self-destruction through pacifism in the face of
.
499
. an d t h e f asclsts.
t h e •Nazls

In practice, however, the logic of liberalism was
suspended in the U.S. and England.

Skepticism was not applied

to religious beliefs and, thus, moral beliefs.

And democra-

tic institutions were allowed to grow while religious belief
was strong, giving effect to moral principles in a free
society. 500 The free society, then, relies upon a suspension
498 Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 10.
499 Ibid., p. 13.

500 Ibid., p. 11.
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of the liberalism-logic which would, given free reign, destroy
the foundations of freedom.

Utilitarianism, eg., a product

of liberal thought, cannot condone commitment to ideals which
demand serious sacrifices.

For the principle of utilitari-

anism is to pursue happiness as the highest Good.

Neverthe-

less sincerity is often measured by a lack of such prudence
in pursuing committed ideals which do not lead to happiness
but to loss. 501 Utilitarians attempt to camouflage selfishness as a lack of self-interest. 502
Even if the liberal and utilitarian aspects of democratic institutions are dangerous potentials toward the incursion of a logic of revolution, they still have elements
to recommend them that are foundational in a free society.
For they allow everyone to state his beliefs and allow
others to listen and form their own opinions, which result
in a free exchange of mind.

Such exchanges come as close as

possible to the truth and are the anti-authoritarian formula
of liberty. 503 In a free society, the art of free discussion,
501
Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 10.
502
Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 98.
503
Meaning, Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 7.
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as the ground of democratic institutions, is the tradition
which guides conscience in its decisions.
proceed by the principles mentioned:

Free discussions

fairness and tolerance.

Fairness is putting one's case objectively by sorting out
facts, opinions, and emotions.
laid out for opponents.

Hence our position is clearly

Tolerance is the capacity to listen

to our opponents and sort out the sound from the unsound
points.

Fairness and tolerance must be exercised in the face

of a listening and judging public, which is an essential
504
partner in free controversy.
Interference with the pursuit
of truth in a free society comes only in the interest of truth
505
itself and not .of some particular social interest.
Marxism and democratic institutions grounded in liberal
utilitarianism, then, both represent moral inversions of
society.

Marxism denies the social freedom necessary to pur-

sue truth as an end in itself, particularly in the domains of
historical and political truth.

Hence, moral truth has no

independent force, and the society is ordered by a "moral"
concern for dispassionate objectivity in the form of an unjustified use of power and oppression.

Liberal-utilitarian

5 04 M1c
· h ael P o 1 any1,
. S c1ence,
.
F a1t
. h , an d Society

(Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 67-8.

505 rbid., P· 69.
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institutions allow for tolerance of conflicting points of
view, unlike Marxist societies.

But this only means that

demonstrability has become the sole criterion of truth, a
criterion that becomes more and more harsh as demonstration
becomes more difficult.

And the criterion of happiness as

the ultimate moral guide of action becomes necessary when
the indemonstrability of moral truth becomes evident.

And

the "happiness principle" is obviously inadequate when we
are called upon to make ultimate sacrifices for a principle
we cannot deny as essential for attaining or moving toward
the Good! 506

506 we might take exception to Polanyi's conception of
Marxism and a liberal, utilitarian society. We might point
out concerning Marxism that a commitment to truth might be
extended from the sciences to all other doma1ns of human
thought without changing the fundamental principle of Marxist socialism. Polanyi might argue that only the economic
freedom of capitalism can allow an economy to truly prosper.
But this only means that Polanyi presupposes that the actual
discovery of truth, economic growth and stability, etc., are
marks of the moral truth of his ethical dynamic. If we suppose with him that such achievements are movements toward the
·Good, then we shall be inclined to his view. But we cannot
exclude the possibility that, even if Marxism is saddled
with developmental problems which prevent its proper functioning in Polanyi's own time, its principles of centralized
control and solidified, co-ordinated societal structure and
power cannot "work". Polanyi argues that the logic of Marxism leads to a necessity to acknowledge its self-defeat.
But we must admit that the word "logic" is ill-chosen, since
an historical outcome can hardly be seen as a logical implication of the statement of an historical principle. We may
not, then, be able to agree that Polanyi's critique of Marxism is necessarily correct. But this does not mean that
Polanyi is wrong about the possibility of achieving the Good
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These examples of "moral inversion" have the useful
purpose of throwing into relief Polanyi's notion of a free
society.

We earlier pointed out that the free exploration

of truth was, in Polanyi's opinion, essential for scientific
discovery.

And we have outlined the ethical dynamic implied

in the structure of such scientific investigation.

Now we

can precede to outline the ethical structure of the free
society as informed by the ethic of the republic of science.

in a free society. It only means that Marxism and a free
society are not necessarily mutually exclusive in respect to
thepossibility of achieving the Good.
Concerning a lib0ral and utilitarian society, we must
note that again Polanyi has not met the arguments of these
positions head on, except for the issue of the absolute demonstrability of knowledge. His argument that an absolute sacrifice can be made only on principles inimical to the happiness
principle of utilitarianism is easily answered by the reply
of an altruistic utilitarianism which values such sacrifice
as a part of the meanin~ of utilitarianism. Polanyi has furthermore never clearlyistinguished between his concept of
the Good and the Good as understood by utilitarians. Quite
possibly, they are not mutually exclusive. But again, despite Polanyi's ineffective critique of utilitarianism, he
cannot be judged thereby to be wrong about the ethical dynamic of the free society.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE FREE SOCIETY
This chapter on the free society integrates many of
the arguments developed in my discussion of the republic
of science as a model of the ethical community and the insights gained through an analysis of moral inversions with
explicit statements Polanyi makes about a free society.

The

result is an overview of the free, moral community; and this
overview makes it plain that the expectations concerning
the nature of ethical society which developed as a result of
explicitating the tacit ethical structure of Polanyi's epistemology and ontology have been met.

This discussion of the

free society concludes the argument of the work as a whole
and demonstrates the importance of a commitment to continued
explicitation of ethical knowledge in the communal context.
Inherent within the ethical structure of the republic
of science is the freedom to explore domains of scientific
knowledge and to pursue truth as a value in itself.
and utilitarianism represent perversions of

•OUT

Marxism

freedom to

explore, adopt, and reject ideas in the pursuit of our
"hunches" or insights into truth.

Hence, freedom must be

the fundamental reality of the ethical society:
society is a free society.
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the ethical
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The term "free society" refers to the freedom individuals have to make significant choices in respect to their
own lives and for structuring their society.

Such a concept

of freedom would be nonsense unless man's choices made real
differences.

Polanyi is a proponent of political and social

freedom in so far as he believes in a more fundamental moral
freedom:

man bears responsibility for what he becomes and

blame or praise may be attached to his deeds.

Polanyi is not

a determinist, as we have already noted.
Political and moral freedom are grounded in man's
capacity to perform acts that serve no material need merely
because they are deemed excellent in

th~mselves. 507

Polanyi

calls this the "spiritual" foundation of freedom and mutual
respect.

Polanyi does not meet head on the epistemological

and ontological problems that have perennially beset anyone
who asserts either a doctrine of determinism or of human
moral freedom.

He seems simply to assume naively that an

observed capacity in man to act in contradiction to his
apparent benefit is the manifestation of his freedom.

His

approach here remains phenomenological in respect to
507 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 86.
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a description of freedom, while he improperly assumes this
description is itself sufficient to establish the case that
inan ·is free..

This assun:iption is.; no doubt, grounded in his·

belief that any explicitation of tacit knowledge manifests
an as'pect of reality.

While this assumption may be proper
i~

in the sense that something of reality

revealed even in

mistaken ideas and that we arejtistified in_commiting ourselves to what we believe is the best

interpretat~on

of

experience, we cannot assert with Polanyi's uncritical
'

attitude the reality of human freedom.
that Polanyi may be right and even

We must say simply

~hat

we prefer along with

..

him to assume the reality of human freedom and to

per~eive

social structures as amenable to change through man's own
free capacities.
Whether the free society is grounded in human moral
I

freedom is not, however, an essential
the case I am

presen~ly

establishing.

I

to_decide for

poi~t
~

'

We 'need only acknow-

ledge that Polanyi himself believes in human

fre~dom

and that

this belief plays a key role in his concept of the scientific
enterprise and of the nature of social change and development.

Polanyi deems science as the prime example of man's

capacity to act beyond his needs in accordance with what is
"excellent in itself":

truth.

Dedicatio·n to science is at
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.

the same time the acceptance o{ an obligation to be free.

508

There is no demand for absolute conformity .in free science,
since the professional standards of science themselves impose
a discipline that recognizes and_ encourages the right of rebellion against these standards for the sake of preserving
originality. 509

We should, then., expect Polanyi to champion

not only the moral freedom which grounds human responsibility
but also the exercise of that freedom within the social and
political structure of society.
'

For Polanyi, moral freedom shades into political
freedom as the moral power of self-determination becomes
enmeshed with a cultural tradition.

A self-determ-4:-Rative

society thus achieves thi power to achieve knowledge and transform itself while preserving individual initiative.

The

freedom of social self-determination is grounded not only in
moral freedom but, perhaps just as importantly, in the freedom to pursue truth for truth's sake.

But freedom of thought

cannot be restricted to the scientific enterprise.

Polanyi

extends the need for pure, theoretical knowledge of truth
·
· 1 u d.1ng mora 1·1ty. 510
t o a 11 d oma1ns
o f · k now 1 e d ge, 1nc
509

Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1969), pp. 54-5.
.
510

Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the
Socioloay of Science: the Contem t of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.:
rno Press, 1975 , p. 10.
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Moral knowledge, knowledge of what is right and of
what is good, is, then, an important part of the self-determination of the free society.

The free society must be free

for the sciences as well as for truth in every domain including the truth of what it ought to do and to value.
Polanyi does not believe that either utilitarian or
totalitarian societies include the general respect for truth
that is essential for social freedom. 511 His misunderstanding that utilitariansim is fundamentally egocentric is, as
we have seen, responsible for his belief that it overlooks
the need for general rules of conduct and tends to nihilism~ 12
And his perception of totalitarianism as requiring blind submission to impersonal standards of knowledge and action is
resp~nsible

for his assertion that this also denies a respect

for truth.

Concerning such respect for truth, Polanyi says,

The recongition granted in a free society to the
independent growth of science, art and morality,
involves a dedication of society to the fostering
of a specific tradition of thought, transmitted and
cultivated by a particular group of authoritative
specialists,· perpetuating themselves by co-option.
To uphold the independence of thought implemented
by such a society is to subscribe to a kind of
orthodoxy which though it specifies no fixed articles of faith, is virtually unassailable within

51

~chael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 19.

The

~ichael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 32-3.
51
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the limits imposed on the process of innovation by
the cultural leadership of a free society.Sl3
Truth in all domains of human thought, including
morality, is the fundamental drive of a society that dwells
in the freedom to pursue the Good on its own flexible terms.
This general drive to truth includes a search for moral
truth; and this search is successful in its continued confirmation of truth as the sine qua non of achieving the Good
and in its discovery of universal principles of conduct which
guide society to ever more profound realizations of the Good.
We can understand, then, why Polanyi considers freedom of
thought in general as the essence of moral thought and freedom.

And we can appreciate his acknowledgment that such

freedom is a priviledge to be gained through political struggle, a struggle which demands our total commitment which cannot be met by proposing an ideal of superior detachment.
Rising above the struggle with an attitude of detachment
withdraws us from the struggle and
"t se If .

~

j~opardizes

freedom

514

S13 M1c
. h ae 1 P o 1 any1,
. P ersonal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophr (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
19 6 2) ' pp. 244- 5 .

514
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Sdciet~
(Chicago: The University of Ch1cago Press, 1966), p . .
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The necessity of freedom to pursue truth in every
domain for the sake of discovering and preserving the moral
truth that enables society to freely pursue the Good demands
a reasoned effort to shape society toward maximum freedom
and to discover truth.

In the social context, Polanyi means
by "reason" a commitment to fairness and tolerance. 515
Fairness and tolerance must be exercised in the face
of a listening and judging public, which is an essential
partner in free controversy. 516 Any interference with the
pursuit of truth in a free society must come only in the
interest of truth itself and not in the interest qf some
. 1ar soc1a
. 1· comm1tmen
.
t . 517
t1cu

par~

Free thought, then, demands the fairness of putting
one's case objectively, of sorting out facts, opinions, and
emotions.

And it demands the capacity to listen to opposing

points of view, to sort out the sound points from the unsound
points.

It demands that society give independent status and

a theoretically unrestricted range to thought,even if in
SlSMichael Polanyi, The Lo§ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 29.
516Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 67-8.
517 Ibid., p. 69.
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practice it must impose a particular code of laws and a public education on society. 518 Only then, under such circumstances, can truth open onto the moral realities by which
we pursue an ever more profound realization of the communal
Good.
The free society is defined, as is science (a

soci~ty

of free explorers), mainly by its attitude toward the discovery of truth.

Four elements constitute the relation be-

tween society and truth in general:
1) a belief that there is such a thing as truth

2) a belief that all members of society love truth
3) a belief that all members of society feel
obliged to follow the truth
4) a belief that all members are in fact pursuing
truth
These elements are quickly lost in a society which fails to
preserve them or profoundly doubts any one of them.

Polanyi

says that we must have confidence in them in order to cre519
. soc1ety.
.
ate t h em 1n

we

cannot expect trut h to d.1scover

itself, nor can we precede alone without the support of the
community.

All four of these elements are necessary.

We

518 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 214.
519

(Chicago:

Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ;
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p . l .
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must call forth the respect latent in every man for the truth
by placing as much confidence as possible in his actual pursuit of it.

In this area, doubt itself can destroy the honest

effort on the part of others to cooperate in the discovery of
truth.
The social dimension of truth, then, is very
tant in Polanyi's view.

impor~

In an ideal free society, everyone

would have perfect access to the truth in all domains.
this is not practicable in concrete

But

society; each person

must rely on others for truth since he is capable of knowing
very little directly himself. 520 Society, then, functions to
foster mutual reliance of persons in pursuit of truth, as
exemplified through the services of social institutions.
These institutions aid the discovery of truth, even though
they limit each man's freedom. 521
The coherence of a free society is spontaneously
established by self-coordination (polycentric or mutual con_trol).

Thus, authority is exercised by equals over each

other, and all tasks are set by each to himself.

In Polanyi's

view, such a social dynamic opens man radically to an emerging sense of meaning that is cosmic in proportion and gives
520
We have already noted the importance of this in
the previous discussion of the nature of social relations.
521 Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 68.
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man a purpose bearing on eternity because of its fruitfulness for truth.

The actions of individuals in a society

ordered by spontaneous interaction are said to be free in
so far as they are not determined by a specific command.
. compu 1 s1ons
.
.
1 or genera 1 . 5 2 2
Th e1r
are on 1y 1mpersona
Polanyi says,
Public liberty can be fully upheld as an aim in
itself, in so far as it is the method for the social
management of purposes that are aims in themselves.
Freedom of science, freedom of worship, freedom of
thought in general, are public institutions by which
society-opens to its members the opportunity for
serving aims that are purposes in themselves. By
establishing these freedoms, society constitutes
itself as a community of people believing in the
validity and power of things of the mind and in our
obligation to these things.523
This belief acknowledges that in a free society, society as
a whole cannot know the public interest.

-known only fragmentarily and

Rather, this is

is left to be achieved as the

outcome of individual initiatives aiming at fragmentary
problems. 524
This does not mean, of course, that there is no
supervision of group efforts.

Group efforts are sometimes

522
Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 159.
523 rbid., p. 193.
524 Micahel Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theor-y~(nC~h~i~c~a__g_o_:~~R~o-o-s~e~v~e7l~t~U~n~i~v~e~r~sity,
1962)' pp. 26-7.
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supervised by some form of centralized planning.

But such

instances are designed to serve the goal of maximizing all
possible individual initiative.

Polanyi says,

As long as c·ertain guiding principles- -of truth, of
justice, of religious faith, of decency and equity-are being cultivated, and as long as commerce is
protected, the sphere of supervision will predominate and planning will be limited to isolated patches
and streaks.S25
Thus, only if civic thought is shaped by the same principles
that sustain the freedom of individual thought can civic
.
526
t h oug h t b e f ree an d power f u 1 to s h ape 1"d ea 1 f ree soc1ety.
A dynamic orthodoxy, then, claims to be a guide in
the search for truth and, thus, grants the right to opposition in the name of truth.

Truth, considered broadly here,

is any mode of excellence in which we recognize the ideal of
self improvement.

Freedom is safeguarded in that, although

there are restrictions on what people can do (one cannot
simply do as he pleases), there is an assured right to speak
the truth as one kn·ows it.

The cultivation of public free-

dom in this sense--and not as a private freedom to do as one

525
Michael Polanyi, History, Philosopht, and the
Sociolo
of Science: the Contem t of FreedomN.Y., N.Y.:
rno Press, 19
, p.
526
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 222.
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pleases--is the distinguishing mark of a free society. 527
This freedom takes on the form of polycentricism
within the societal context.

But, although Polanyi explicitly

extends the preferability of a polycentric system of mutual
adjustment beyond science to literary and artistic circles,
he is ambivalent about whether such a system applies to the
appreciation of moral ideas.

In the Tacit Dimension, a later

work, he denies the validity of polycentric mutual control to
moral ideas and asserts indirectly that such controls do not
apply to politics since politics is a deliberate organization
of moral .ideas. 528 But in Science, Faith and Society, he says.
that the way in which each person is an equal partner in the
development of the "general will" in the Republic of Science
may be generalized to other modes of discovery in literature,
. po 1"1t1cs.
.
529
t h e arts, an d 1n

Thus, he implies that moral

ideas also fall under such a system.
This contradiction does not receive clarification in
Polanyi's works.
slip.

But I do not think it represents a fatal

Obviously Polanyi believes that moral ideas are truths

527 Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its
Political and Economic Theory (Chicago, Roosevelt Universiyt,
1962), p. 26.
528
Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 83-4.
529 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 16-17.
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which are discovered in their own right.

My previous argu-

ments have shown that Polanyi clearly implies this.

Further,

we have already noted that moral change comes about by allowing our behavior to be guided by higher principles than they
were before.

So moral ideas are truths about principles of

human conduct which lead toward the realization of our highest
values:

The Good.

These ideas are parallel to scientific

truths in that both they and scientific truths should be
distinguished from the societal procedures which make possible
their discovery.

These procedures, as, eg., a system of mu-

tual adjustment, may be more applicable to some domains of
knowledge than others.

Since_·§ome domains, such as science,

require and generally operate through the efforts of large
numbers of scholars, they are most amenable to systems of
mutual control.

But this does not mean that the ideas dis-

covered are true or false by virtue of public opinion.

It

only means that certain lines of research are supported by
the community according to the public opinion of the scientific community.

In the case of moral ideas, there is no

large number of scholars which must adjust their findings
in the light of one another's research.

Indeed, the content

of ethical discoveries are not the result of empirical
researches as in science but are more personal appropriations of meaning within the community.

Activities, such as

324

political, economic, and legal activities, may be adjusted
mutually; but the values and principles of the ethical domain
require communal support as absolute goals and rules of behavior.
What appears to be a contradiction in Polanyi, then,
is really his indirect way of affirming the autonomy of the
moral domain of knowledge and action.

He denies the princi-

ple of mutual control to moral truths because they represent
absolute intentions of the community.

But he affirms mutual

control to those institutions which are formed in the context
of realizing these moral goals:

the functioning of society

which undergirds its realization of moral truth and the Good.
Thus, Polanyi can say that it is the orthodoxy of free
thought that forms the coercive power of the state and its
institutions.

For the institutional framework of a society

that forwards free thought is the free society, which gives the
maximum opportunity for the realization of moral truth. 530
And so also he can affirm that even the laws of the free
society are developed by a form of mutual control in that each
judgment relies on that of previous judgments. 531

530
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 245.
531 Michae1 Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 162-3.
<

325

This mutual control, however, cannot be accomplished
via a central authority.

No committee of scientists, eg.,

could forecast the further progress of science, except for
routine extensions of the existing system.
advance can be foretold by a committee.

No scientific

Such a committee

could consider only problems of no real scientific value,
totally devoid of originality.

Only individuals can, by

life-time concentration, discover really worthwhile problems.532

Individuals, then, mus~ be free to follow the in-

sinuations of truth in any direction which can be supported
by the scientific community as a whole.

Where specific

authority, claiming alone to have contact with the center
of general authority, demands obedience through an abdication of ultimate judgment to their center, the result is
the loss of this precious freedom. 533
Polanyi, then, argues that polycentric adjustment is
essential not only in science, which flourishes only under
such a system, but also for the development of culture.

The

freedom inherent in such polycentricity is, by implication,
also necessary.

Indeed, he says that a collectivist revolu-

tion must, for the sake of itself, suppress the liberties of
533
Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 59.
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universities, law courts, churches, the press, etc.

534

Again,

Again, "General planning is wholesale destruction of freedom;
cultural planning would be the end of all inspired enquiry,
of every creative effort, and planned economy would make life
into something between a universal monastery and forced labor
camp".535
These criticisms do not mean that Polanyi beJfej)ves
polycentric systems of government do not have inherent risks.
He acknowledges that without a centralized specific authority,
it is impossible to safeguard entirely against arbitrariness
and decisional mistakes.

But this risk does safeguard the

freedom necessary for any field of human endeavor to survive
as such.

Competent opinion as normative must be given free-

dom of expression, though no degree of infallibility should
be attached to these. 536
The free society, then, is essentially a community of
persons bound by ethical values of truth, right action, and
the ideal of maximal freedom within a society ordered toward
the realization of the Good and the preservation of justice.
534 Michael Polanyi, History, Philosophy, and the
Sociology of Science: the Contempt of Freedom (N.Y., N.Y.:
Arne Press, 1975), p. 40.
535 Ibid., p. 60.
536 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 60-1.
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The same human ordering that makes the discovery of truth
possible in science and other intellectual endeavors is
essential to the political truths which make order possible
at all. 537 And the preservation of human order toward realization of the Good is essential to human success in any broad
ranging social venture.

Identifying free self-determination

with democratic institutions, Polanyi says that the "democratic spirit" which guides the life of a free nation is parallBl to the scientific spirit that underlies the activity of
the scientific community, particularly in its sharing of fundamental beliefs on a communal leve1. 538 Thus, Polanyi,
seems committed to the establishment of a free

soci~ty

that

is free by virtue of its commitment to freedom, to truth, and
to a moral order that preserves these ideals.
The principle of the embodiment of higher levels in
lower ones is, thus, extended to the moral and social rela539 rMora 1·1 ty 1s
.
.
. on a leve 1
o f respons 1.bl e c h o1ces.
t 1ons
higher than society's organization for power and profit.

The

537
Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed.
by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1969)' p. 68.
538 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Society
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 70.
539
Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man ( Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 67-8.
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higher principle is rooted in the lower one, so that moral
progress is rooted in an exercise of power and in aiming at
material advantage.

Absolute morality cannot be applied to

society, since power and wealth are always limiting mech.
an1sms
an d act as me d.1ums. 540

Nonetheless, such mediums

cannot sustain themselves; they require an ultimate aim at
the social and intellectual skills and tasks, including
morality.
And because our participation is most deeply tacit,
even new values within society are bred tacitly, by implication.

Within the social context, we do not explicitly

choose a new set of values as though they pre-existed and
had only to be chosen.
act of creating them. 541

Rather, we submit to them in the very
Thus, our tacit indwelling within

the social context of the search for the Good is in context,
not only of the moral life in which we presently participate,
but also of the originating forces of new values.

540Michael Polanyi, The Study of Man (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 87.
54 1Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966), p. xi.
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Polanyi views society as having both an intellectual
and moral task in preserving and forwarding the Good, a task
he says rests in the last resort on the free conscience of
every generation. 54 2

And the call of conscience involves the

aspiration to preserve the ideal of the free society: a
good society; i.e., one which respects the truth, desires
justice, and loves its fellows.543

And only a nation which

is sensitive to the claims of conscience and can follow them
is free. 5 44

Society, then, is an instrument of our conscience.

It protects us from our own greed and ambition as well as
from corruption from others.

Thus, man is morally dependent

on his civic contacts through which his moral life is organized.

Social responsibilities provide the occasion for moral

542Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith, and Societ~
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 8 .
543Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 30. Scientific
Thought and Social Reality, ed., by Fred Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.:
International Universities Press, Inc., 1974), p. 65.
54 4Michael Polanyi, The Lo~ic of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1 69), p. 45.
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life.

In this sense, then, the free society is an end in

.
lf . 545
1tse
Polanyi says,
But the restraint which power incurs as the price of
employing morality for its own coercive purposes
proves only that morality is an indispensable, though
self-willed ally to power. It does not demonstrate
that morality can ever control power according to its
own principles; civic culture still remains dependent
on force and material ends, and remains therefore suspect. Nor does the history of free societies dispel
this suspicion. We see, on the contrary, how every
new moral issue has evoked a clash of interests, how
often moral progress had to be forced upon the privileged by the pressure of the oppressed ... 546
The reality of the moral domain provides the ground for the
possibility of a conflict between forces which·restrict freedom and those which forward it.

But Polanyi explicitly sums

up the relations between the moral power of a free society
and the political, social, and legal changes within it:
To describe the institutional framework within which
moral, legal and political opinions are thus continuously re-moulded in a free society would lead
us too far. Suffice it to give some of the results
of this process, which has radically changed life
in the free countries since the principles of social
reform gained wider acceptance some 130 years ago.
There has taken place a far reaching humanization
of the criminal law and of the prison system, and
similarly of discipline in the army and the navy,
while the same changes have gone on in the schools,

545
Scientific Thought and Social Reality, ed. by
Fred Schwarz (N.Y., N.Y.: International Universities Press,
Inc., 1974), p. 65.
546 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 226.
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assylums, hospitals and within the family itself;
the Factory Laws have enforced more humane conditions of employemnt in an immense variety of ways;
new welfare institutions have been set up to provide
for the sick and the aged, for the disabled, the unemployed and the slum dwellers; free education has
greatly widened the prospects of poorer people's
children; the legal disabilities of women, of Catholics, Jews and of the colonial peoples have been
removed or at least greatly reduced; the extension
of the franchise and the recognition of Trade Unions
have shifted the balance of power in favour of
hitherto subordinate classes. All these were moral
improvements of society which in England's history,
for example, can be traced back to a series of
specific movements appealing to the public conscience; movements which had usually been evoked in
the first place by persuasive individuals devoted to
the advocacy of one particular reform. Such is the
dynamism of the modern free society. It consists in
the moral progress of civic thought, which transmits
its conclusions, through the machinery of self-government, into acts of social reform. It is the practical outcome of an intellectual process, moved by
its own passions and guided by its own standards.547
This quote

shrn~

the distinctly positive role of the

moral domain in the free society.

It sums up the unique

interrelations between the moral, political, and generally
social forces of the community, showing how moral directions
undergird other social developments.

And each social change

is a change for the better, a "better" informed by the insight into the Good within the moral domain.
But to what extent can we take the power of the moral
domain in society?

I do not intend within the scope of this

547
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' pp. 222-3.
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work to delineate in detail the functions of moral life in
the total development of society, though such an investigation would be highly valuable.

We can, however, observe

some very general statements in Personal Knowledge which confirm our argued expectation that a powerful, independent
moral domain actually directs through a pursuit of moral knowledge our movement toward the Good--and carries us beyond
society to the heart of the Good!
We have spoken of Polanyi's ontology as an "ultrabiology", according to his own notion of the import of his
work.

In this respect, he says,

i

The whole ontology of commitment and of a free society
dedicated to-the cultivation of thought by responsible commitments of its members can in fact be built
up, in this manner, as a generalization of biology
followed by reflection on this generalized biology.
Thus, at the confluence of biology and philosophical
self-accrediting, man stands rooted in his calling
under a firmament of truth and greatness. Its teachings are the idiom of his thought: the voice by
which he commands himself to satisfy his intellectual
standards. Its commands harness his powers to the
exercise of his responsibilities. It binds him to
abiding purposes~ and grants him power and freedom
to defend them.s~s

548
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962)' p. 380.
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The purpose to which we are bound and for which we
are empowered ultimately is the evolution of our personhood,
which Polanyi says produces novel centers of being. 549 The
capacity of the free society to sustain such evolution is
grounded in its nurturance of a free exploration of new
responses to moral dilemmas.

Such explorations are "random

impacts" which release the functioning of a novel ordering
principle.

Polanyi perceives such random impacts as produc-

.
b.10t1c
. ac h.1evemen t s. 550
1ng
But the direction of evolution transcends mere intellectual and social development:
The appraisal of living beings merges into an acknowledgment of the ideals transmitted by our intellectual heritage. This is the point at which the theory
of evolution finally bursts through the bounds of
natural science and bec0mes entirely an affirmation
of man's ultimate aims. For the emergent noospehre
is wholly determined as that which we believe to be
true and right; it is the external pole of our commitments, the service of which is our freedom. It
defines a free society as a fellowship fostering
truth and respecting the right.551
Finally, what is the point of arguing for the reality
of the moral domain and its power to shape society?

The

549
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 401.
550 rbid., pp. 402-3.
551 rbid., p. 404.
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point is that man bears a moral responsibility for what he
becomes; and that he bears the potential of becoming something so much greater than what he is at present that his
future is inconceivable.
So far as we know, the tiny fragments of the universe
embodied in man are the only centres of thought and
responsibility in the visible world. If that be so,
the appearance of the human mind has been so far the
·ultimate stage in the awakening of the world ... We
may then envisage a cosmic field which called forbh
all these centers by offering them a short-lived,
limited hazardous opportunity for making some progress of their own towards an unthinkable consumation.SS2
We end this long and complex argument for knowledge
of values and of the right within a Polanyian context of
personal knoWledge with this quotation from Personal Knowledge.
I have argued that, since the dynamic of tacit knowledge is
the same throughout all domains of knowledge such as science,
history, art, political science, etc., then one ought to
extend the form of personal knowledge to which it commits us
to the moral domain as well.

The evidence, both tacit and

explicit, for such an extension was shown to be abundant.
Furthermore, Polanyi's ontology provided grounds for an argument for a notion of the ethically right, of a standard of

552Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a PostCritical Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1962), p. 405.
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behavior which is comprehended in terms both of Polanyi's
biotically oriented ontology and his epistemology.
Finally, the argument for knowledge of the Good (and
values) and of the right was confirmed in its correctness
through an analysis of Polanyi's social and political thought.
We were able to discern the structure of moral knowledge within Polanyi's social thought, though such discernment would be
impossible without a clear knowledge of what to look for, a
knowledge gained in the analysis of his epistemology and
ontology.

Let us review briefly what these expectations were

and how they were met.

Based upon the tacit ethical struc-

ture which we explicitated, we should have expected to find:
1) that science itself would be viewed as an enterprise amenable to an "ethics" of procedure which
guarantees the discovery of truth.
2) that science would reveal most if not all of the
elements of a moral community: it would be a
mini-model of the ethical community.
3) that a moral community would include (following
the lead of the republic of science) freedom (and
free exploration), committed conviction, autonomy,
and a role for conscience.
4) that Polanyi would show a belief in the reality
and importance of moral rules in a social context.
He should believe in some kind of Good and in the
possibility of right actioD.
5) moral rules should be principles we can learn, indwell, and develop to higher principles.
6) that there should be a role for symbols inithe
moral community, particularly in the form of moral
heroes.
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7) that Polanyi would present a theory which would

attempt to resolve the tension between societal
control and freedom, since he believes in both
of these.
8) that there should be evident some vision of a free
society that functions according to moral principles.
Now it is evident in these last three chapters that these expectations have been met.

Expectations 1-3 were met in the

discussion of the republic of science when I showed that science does have a commitment to truth that demands certain
behavioral recommendations and restrictions:

in short, science

procedes on the basis of an ethical dynamic which holds truth
as its highest ideal. ·Truth is the moral ideal of science and,
as such, it directs the activities of those who would pursue
it.

Hence free exploration (including the sort of freedom

which grants us moral responsibility), personal conviction,
autonomy, and social conscience all form a part of the republic of science.
In Polanyi's discussion of rules of rightness as applied to communal life and as informed by social conscience
and a concern for both moral truth and truth in general we
find expectation 4 met.

Further, in this discussion, Polanyi

refers to the interiorization of moral teaching.

And this is

essentially a concept of moral knowledge as indwelt (meeting
part of the fifth expectation).

In my discussion of the corn-

rnunal change of moral consciousness, I show that Polanyi not
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only believes in moral development but allows for the role of
moral heroes in this development, satisfying the rest of the
fifth and all of the sixth expectation.

Thus, there is

development toward the communal Good as a change of moral consciousness toward a greater and more profound grasp of moral
principles.
The seventh expectation is satisfied in Polanyi's
application of polycentric adjustment and mutual control.

The

inversions of morality which come from restricting the freedom to pursue truth through the dynamic of these maximally
free controls throw into releive the vision of the free society
which Polanyi gives us in satisfaction of our last expectation.
I hope that this delineation of the-ethical dimension
of personal knowledge will provide a fresh and interesting
approach to the questions:

What should I value? and What

should I do?

THE END
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